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Improbable Realism theorizes the relationship between literary realism and 
probability, arguing that improbable events such as coincidence frequently facilitate 
the representational aims of the realist project in the nineteenth century.  Uniting 
historicist and formalist approaches to the novel, this dissertation examines how four 
important authors in the realist canon—Fielding, Scott, Dickens, and Hardy—harness 
coincidence as a narrative mechanism in their representation of particular social 
milieus.  As statistically unlikely encounters that defy the reader’s expectations of the 
everyday, coincidences have long been regarded by critics as antagonistic to realism.  
This critical disdain for coincidence, however, is unwarranted because it too readily 
applies Aristotelian aesthetic principles to narratives that work in fundamentally 
different ways from those Aristotle analyzes.  Aristotle’s exclusion of improbable 
events from well-constructed plots is grounded in his philosophical idea that 
accidental events are beyond knowledge, yet in modernity such events became 
important sites for the production of knowledge about life in the world.  This 
importance is illustrated in the way that many early novels in the eighteenth century 
use coincidental events to think through problems of agency.  Improbable Realism 
demonstrates that coincidence became an important narrative device for nineteenth-
century authors because improbable encounters generate opportunities for novels to 
represent complex relationships between the social base and individual agency. 
  
 Chapter One uses Fielding’s Tom Jones as a test case for examining the 
historical and theoretical issues surrounding coincidence, arguing that the narrator’s 
rhetorical framing of coincidental events marks an important contribution to the 
emergence of the realist mode.  Through readings of “The Two Drovers,” Redgauntlet, 
and The Bride of Lammermoor, Chapter Two demonstrates that Scott frequently 
harnessed the competing interpretations that coincidences elicit in his representation of 
historical particularity.  Chapter Three considers Dickens’s treatment of coincidence, 
arguing that it enables him in Martin Chuzzlewit to represent and historicize 
selfishness as a product of the increasingly mediated nature of Victorian social 
relations.  Chapter Four analyzes the importance of coincidence to the form of Hardy’s 
novels, linking its function to Hardy’s historicist habit of mind through readings of A 
Pair of Blue Eyes and The Return of the Native. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
From Probable Realism to Improbable Realism 
 
 
 
“And the classic method [of plotting]—oh, it was rigged!  By 
dismal coincidence, Mr. Jones has to be produced in the stage-
coach at the same time with Mr. Smith, so that something very 
nasty and entertaining might happen.” 
 – Sinclair Lewis, “Manhattan at Last!” 
 
“Rather than requiring our experiences with texts to squeeze into 
the spaces already carved out by our conceptual tools, we adjust 
those tools or invent new ones to account for those experiences.” 
    – James Phelan, Experiencing Fiction1 
 
 Varied as they may be, critical accounts of literary realism tend to share a 
disdain for coincidence.  Sinclair Lewis’s identification of coincidence with a “rigged” 
plot has been reinforced by critics who have classified coincidence as being at odds 
with the reader’s everyday experience and consequently antagonistic to realism.  
Coincidences, critics have argued, “[suggest] the manipulated sequences of literature 
rather than the ordinary processes of life,” or “lead to the expulsion of the reader from 
her imaginary position in the narrative world,” or “stretch [the reader’s] willingness to 
                                                 
1 Saturday Review (5 December 1925), reprinted in John Dos Passos: The Critical Heritage, ed. Barry 
Maine (New York: Routledge, 1988), pg. 70; Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the 
Rhetorical Theory of Narrative (Columbus: The Ohio State Univ. Press, 2007), pg. 87. 
 
 
 
2 
suspend disbelief.”2  As statistically unlikely events that defy the reader’s presumed 
expectations of the “realistic,” coincidences disclose the artificiality of fiction and thus 
seemingly undermine realism.  Indeed, coincidence becomes a central ground for 
articulating definitions of realism, as one common view of realism defines it primarily 
in terms of the exclusion of the coincidental.3  At the same time, however, critics 
continue to acknowledge the structural utility of coincidence within realist narratives, 
recognizing in part its inescapable presence in so many realist novels.  As a leading 
commentator on the realist novel has remarked, “Realism is programmatically 
antagonistic to chance, but […] almost must inevitably use chance to resolve its 
narrative problems.”4  What has resulted is a view of coincidence as necessary but 
somehow antagonistic to the workings of realist narrative:  it is “the foreign [object] a 
writer must make indigenous to the story.”5 
 This dissertation argues that this critical impasse reveals a deficiency in our 
conceptual tools for thinking about realism and, more specifically, the function of 
                                                 
2 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2001), pg. 253; Hilary 
Dannenberg, Coincidence and Counterfactuality: Plotting Time and Space in Narrative Fiction 
(Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2008), pg. 23; Marie-Laure Ryan, “Cheap Plot Tricks, Plot Holes, 
and Narrative Design,” Narrative 17.1 (2009): 58. 
3 For example, in Narrative as Virtual Reality (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001), 
Marie-Laure Ryan provides four primary interpretations of literary realism, one of which is the 
“probabilistic, Aristotelian interpretation”:  “for most readers this requirement means that the textual 
world does not transgress physical and logical laws, that it respects some basic conceptions of 
psychological and material causality, and that the plot does not overly rely on events of low probability, 
such as extraordinary coincidences” (157). 
4 George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), pgs. 19-20.  Levine continues, “Chance encounters seem like 
intrusions from another mode when they occur in realistic narratives.” 
5 Walter McDonald, “Coincidence in the Novel: A Necessary Technique,” College English 29.5 (1968): 
374.  Brian Richardson calls this problematic the “paradox of chance in fictional narrative”:  
“[chance’s] absence indicates a specious causalism that fabricates an unusual chain of appropriate 
causes and predictable effects; its presence, however, always reveals authorial intervention, since 
chance in literature is never a chance occurrence” [Unlikely Stories: Causality and the Nature of 
Modern Narrative (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1997), pg. 18]. 
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coincidence within realism.  More importantly, this dissertation addresses this impasse 
by demonstrating that coincidence is frequently a productive instrument for realism, 
rather than a problem.  I argue that coincidence, an improbable conjunction in time 
and space of independent narrative arcs, enables the realist novel to represent 
relationships that could not be grasped if realism were narrowly defined as 
verisimilitude or a mere “reflection” of the world.  This argument entails adjusting 
several interrelated conceptual tools we have for thinking about realism, including 
what distinguishes realism as a literary mode, the relationship between the narrative 
world and the real world, and how to understand the effects produced by improbable 
events within narrative fiction.   
The short version of my argument runs as follows:  critics—especially those 
who have been troubled by coincidence—tend to think of realism as a mode defined 
by its ability to mirror the real world or produce an “illusion of reality,” a definition 
that causes the realist text to be confined to “the probable.”  Because improbable or 
statistically unlikely events do not fit into this conceptual space, they seem to reveal 
the insufficiency of the narrative world to reflect the real world.  Therefore, 
coincidence (in this view) undermines realism by disrupting the illusion of reality or 
revealing the shaping hand of the author.  However, if we think of realism as 
characterized by its capacity to represent and historicize features of particular social 
milieus, then the relationship between the narrative world and the real world is not 
limited to one of simple or mere reflection.  “Reflection” or “immersion” theories of 
realism are based on Jamesian principles which—influential as they were for 
twentieth-century narrative aesthetics—inhibit critical understanding of how the 
nineteenth-century novel engages its reader.  The historicizing impulse of the 
nineteenth-century realist novel often foregrounds inherent differences between the 
world represented in the novel and the “everyday reality” of the reader, thus 
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problematizing any universalizing presumption of “the probable.”  Consequently, 
improbable events are no longer excluded a priori, and the important question 
becomes what kind of representational opportunities coincidence makes possible, 
rather than whether coincidence is itself “realistic” or “probable.”  Indeed, I shall 
demonstrate that coincidence actually facilitates realism’s capacity to represent 
particular milieus, especially in their bearing on human freedom and agency, because 
these aspects of reality cannot be simply or adequately “reflected” in the literary text.  
They require departures from the probable in order to be represented, and coincidence 
becomes one such historically codified mechanism of improbability. 
The primary focus of this project is how four important authors in the realist 
tradition—Fielding, Scott, Dickens, and Hardy—harness coincidence as a realist 
technique.  Critics have failed to appreciate the importance of coincidence in these 
authors, who utilize it in various forms and for distinctive ends.  Each of these authors, 
in fact, occupies a vexed position in the realist canon, in part because his method of 
plotting and representation has been read as deficient in comparison to a major 
contemporary: Richardson, Austen, Eliot, and James, respectively.    By analyzing 
how each of these authors makes coincidence a productive instrument for realism, this 
dissertation rethinks many aspects of critical reflection on the realist novel.  My 
intention is not to develop or outline a theory of literary realism and then apply it to 
particular texts, but rather to show that attention to the function of coincidence within 
particular texts must serve as the foundation for such broader theorizations of realism.  
At the same time, however, such attention to particular texts cannot be performed 
without first dealing with certain theoretical issues.  We will be blind to the 
representational opportunities coincidence makes possible as long as we retain certain 
misconceptions about the relationship between realism and probability. 
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The remainder of this introduction clears this conceptual space and then 
provides an overview of the importance of coincidence for the four authors I will 
examine in the subsequent chapters.  In the first section, I discuss existing critical 
accounts of coincidence, highlighting the way in which each adheres to an 
understanding of what I shall be calling “probable realism.”  Probable realism is the 
(often implicit) critical understanding that realism is by definition “probable” and thus 
necessitates the exclusion of improbable events such as coincidence.   I shall argue, 
however, that this strict identification of realism with the probable relies upon, yet 
fundamentally differs from, the Aristotelian conceptualization of plot, and is in this 
respect theoretically problematic.  While this first section identifies theoretical 
problems with the basic premises of probable realism, the second section demonstrates 
that the paradigm is historically inaccurate.  Probable realism asserts that unlikely or 
accidental events inherently detract from the representation of life in the world, but the 
important and unstable status of accidental events in eighteenth-century thought 
demonstrates that in modernity such events became an important site for the 
production of knowledge.  A brief consideration of a range of early novels illustrates 
that, far from being excluded, accidental or improbable events were foundational to 
the narrative form of the emerging realist novel.  This Introduction concludes with a 
brief discussion and summary of the chapters which follow, in which I more fully 
elaborate the ways in which coincidence functions as a realist technique in the 
nineteenth century. 
 
I.  Probable Realism: Understanding the Critical Paradigm  
 Aristotle’s Poetics remains a necessary point of departure for any discussion of 
probability within literature.  Although Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy may seem 
peripheral to realism in the novel, the Poetics has greatly influenced critical reflection 
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on plot in realist narrative.  A brief discussion of Aristotle’s ideas can help clarify 
some of the terms in play and also provide a framework in which to evaluate the 
theoretical foundations of probable realism.  The relevant sections of the Poetics are 
Chapters 7-10, where Aristotle discusses the arrangement of incidents, which he 
deems the most important element of tragedy.  Here Aristotle says repeatedly that the 
events of tragedy should be arranged according to “the laws of probability or 
necessity” (9:50-1).6  Aristotle’s aesthetic principle—that tragedy should present 
events in accordance with the laws of probability (eikos) or necessity and exclude 
chance (tūche)—follows from his understanding of the generic status of tragedy in 
relation to history.  While history is confined to the realm of the particular (what has 
happened), tragedy deals with the universal (what happens according to probability 
and necessity); thus, it is capable of producing unique effects and a type of knowledge 
different from that of history.  In order to do so, however, it must present events and 
organize its parts in accordance with probability and necessity.  The relation of events 
is governed by probability and not confined to strict necessity because tragedy deals 
with human affairs and actions.  For Aristotle, “necessary relations are mostly 
restricted to nonhuman affairs, whereas social relations are mostly governed by 
probability.”7  While the necessary and the probable are thus different, they are 
nevertheless of the same class and opposed to what happens by chance.  Within 
Aristotle’s philosophical system, chance or accidental events are not the objects of 
science since they are unpredictable and hence “in the strict sense ‘unknowable.’”8  
                                                 
6 All quotations of the Poetics are from O.B. Hardison, Jr., Aristotle’s Poetics: A Translation and 
Commentary for Students of Literature, trans. Leon Golden (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1968). 
7 Hardison, pg. 152. 
8 Dorothea Frede, “Necessity, Chance, and ‘What Happens for the Most Part’ in Aristotle’s Poetics,” in 
Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), 
pg. 204.  Frede’s essay is exceptionally lucid on these matters and informs much of my discussion here.     
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Chance, therefore, “should not play any prominent role in tragic development, since 
there is nothing to be known about—or learned from—such occurrences.”9  If tragedy 
is to attain its proper ends and be “not an imitation of men, per se, but of human action 
and life and happiness and misery” (Poetics 6:48-9), then it must adhere to the laws of 
probability.10  Indeed, “it is the possibility of depicting events undisturbed by 
accidents that establishes the superiority of tragedy over history and makes it an 
important philosophical enterprise, because it can depict the universal, i.e. what is not 
distorted by the incalculable vicissitudes of everyday life.”11  By the “probable” or 
“likely,” then, Aristotle seems to mean something like “true to life,” a verisimilitude 
producing knowledge of men and actions in the world. 
 What Aristotle means by the probable or likely is distinct from the modern 
mathematized theory of probability, which emerged around 1660 through the work of 
Pascal and Leibniz, among others.  The modern understanding of probability arose in 
part from an epistemological shift whereby the concept of evidence moved “away 
from the evidence of written authority—the evidence, in effect, of books—toward the 
                                                 
9 Frede, pg. 204.  Of course, Aristotle does allow for chance events in some limited capacity.  For 
example, in Chapter 9 Aristotle cites the example of the statue of Mitys in Argos falling on the man 
who murdered Mitys.  This event produces astonishment and heightens the effects of the action because 
the events occur “unexpectedly, yet because of one another” (9:58-9).  In other words, there is no direct 
causal relation between the murder of the Mitys and the collapse of his statue on his murderer, but the 
two events imply some sort of causal connection—i.e., poetic justice or fate.  Chance, therefore, seems 
acceptable if it produces astonishment while implying some sort of necessity.  Indeed, Aristotle remarks 
that events such as the statue of Mitys are “not without meaning” (9:67).  This, then, seems to confirm 
his basic framework: although the collapse of the statue does not follow necessarily or probably from 
the murder of Mitys, its collapse implies necessity of some kind.  Most critics working within the 
Aristotelian framework retain this caveat.  My concern, of course, is to not to identify when chance or 
coincidence is acceptable and when inadmissible, but rather to identify and describe the effects of such 
events. 
10 This, of course, applies not only to events themselves, but to character and action as well.  These 
issues will return in the next chapter, as they are a central feature of Fielding’s discussions of 
probability in Tom Jones.  
11 Frede, pg. 205.  
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evidence of the world itself—the evidence, as it were, of things.”12  The result was 
what the intellectual historian Ian Hacking has dubbed “the taming of chance.”  
Whereas for Aristotle the chance or accidental was strictly beyond knowledge, a 
statistically-based notion of probability enabled such events to enter the realm of 
knowledge.  The “law of large numbers” allowed seemingly random or unpredictable 
events to become knowable.  For example, given a large population, we cannot know 
or predict which specific men will become murderers, but statistics enables us to 
anticipate or predict how many will become murderers, and even to isolate variables 
which increase the likelihood of a man becoming a murderer.  The relationship 
between Aristotle’s conception of the probable as verisimilar and the modern 
conception of the probable as statistically likely is vexed and a matter of heated 
scholarly debate.  On one hand, Hacking, following Foucault, has argued that the 
modern conception of the probable is radically new—it represents an epistemic shift, 
rendering the two notions fundamentally incommensurable.  On the other hand, the 
literary critics Robert Newsom and Douglas Patey have challenged this claim.  They 
argue that there are continuities between these two conceptions and that Aristotle’s 
notion of the probable can be reconciled with the modern mathematized theory of 
probability.13 
 It is not my goal to resolve this debate, though it will become clear that when 
modern critics discuss probability, they reference Aristotle without acknowledging the 
                                                 
12 Robert Newsom, A Likely Story: Probability and Play in Fiction (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. 
Press, 1988), pg. 38. 
13 For the Foucault-Hacking thesis, see Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study 
of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction, and Statistical Inference (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1975) and The Taming of Chance (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), as well as Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).  For 
Newsom’s critique of this thesis, see Newsom, pgs. 35-54.  For a succinct summary of the debate, 
including Patey’s objections to the “Foucault-Hacking hypothesis,” see Appendix A of his Probability 
and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice in the Augustan Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), pgs. 266-73. 
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historical complexity of probability as a concept.  In fact, it is often quite unclear what 
critics mean when they discuss the probable, as the two notions of the probable tend to 
blend together or become interchangeable in discussions of literary probability:  
literature that is “true to life” is the statistically likely, or rather it is “true to life” 
because statistically likely.  The relevant point is that critics align realism with the 
probable, which, following Aristotle, implies an explicit exclusion of chance or 
coincidence, despite the fact that they have abandoned the philosophic framework that 
informs Aristotle’s insistence on probability.  In what follows, I examine four 
accounts of coincidence grounded in the notion of “probable realism”—one by an 
influential theorist of realism (Ian Watt), two by contemporary narratologists (Marie-
Laure Ryan and Hilary Dannenberg), and one by a critic who explores the theoretical 
problem of fictional probability (Robert Newsom). 14  Although the methodologies and 
aims of these critics differ widely, each critic implicitly or explicitly identifies realism 
with some notion of the probable.  After showing how the equation of “realistic” with 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that coincidence in the realist novel has also been accounted for in terms of what 
Thomas Vargish calls the “providential aesthetic.”  Put simply, the providential aesthetic maintains that 
most authors before George Eliot believed in a providential ordering of the world and consequently 
asserts that the form of their fiction cannot be read in isolation from that belief.  “In the providential 
aesthetic,” Vargish writes, “coincidence is not necessarily a failure in realism or (as is sometimes 
implied) a cheap way out of difficulties in plot and structure… [Instead,] coincidence characteristically 
refers the reader to causes and patterns beyond the immediate or empirical range of what we perceive as 
probable in physical nature” (i.e., it refers the reader to providence) [The Providential Aesthetic in 
Victorian Fiction (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1985), pg. 9].  Even Hardy is accommodated 
within this system: even though Hardy did not believe in providence, he is still writing within the form 
of the providential aesthetic, so his use of coincidence refers the reader to the absence of providence 
rather than its presence.  The providential reading of coincidence certainly provides insight into the 
structure of the Victorian novel generally and the structure of certain texts more particularly—it is hard 
to imagine reading coincidence in Jane Eyre or Villette in a manner other than providentially.  
However, it also reduces the question of coincidence to a matter of a particular author’s beliefs.  I do 
not engage more thoroughly with this view here because it differs on a fundamental level from the 
concerns of this project: it reads phenomena in a text as manifestations of an author’s beliefs, thus 
implicitly rejecting “realism” in any meaningful sense.  However, the claim that coincidence is simply a 
manifestation of authorial ideology will be a recurring problem throughout this dissertation.  In addition 
to Vargish, for accounts of the providential reading of coincidence see John Reed, Victorian 
Conventions (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1975), pgs. 126-41, and David Goldknopf, “Coincidence in the 
Victorian Novel: The Trajectory of a Narrative-Device,” College English 31.1 (1969): 41-50. 
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what is probable prompts each of these critics to create a strict opposition or 
antagonism between realism and coincidence, I will then identify the flaws within the 
two fundamental premises of probable realism.  These premises are, first, that realism 
entails a correspondence between the real world and the narrative world that 
coincidence inherently breaches, and, second, that this correspondence was a historical 
development necessitating the exclusion of coincidence from the novel at a certain 
historical moment. 
I begin with Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel (1957) because even though 
Watt’s theories have been subject to much criticism and revision, in many ways we 
have not moved beyond his view of coincidence.  Watt’s understanding of “formal 
realism” as the defining feature of the novel continues to shape critical preconceptions 
about the place of improbable events within the realist novel.  In distinguishing the 
novel from previous literary forms, Watt not only emphasizes the specificity of time 
and place, but argues that “The novel’s plot is also distinguished from most previous 
fiction by its use of past experience as the cause of present action; a causal connection 
operating through time replaces the reliance of earlier narratives on disguises and 
coincidences, and this tends to give the novel a much more cohesive structure.”15  This 
statement appears straightforward enough, but an inherent tension between “causal 
connection” and “cohesive structure” emerges in Watt’s discussion of Fielding, an 
author whom Watt clearly sees as having ceded some of the “realist” ground gained by 
Defoe and Richardson.  In his discussion of Tom Jones—a novel that I will examine in 
great detail in Chapter One—Watt writes,  
Fielding valued such devices [coincidences] because they made it possible 
to weave the whole narrative into a very neat and entertaining formal 
                                                 
15 Watt, pg. 22. 
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structure; but although such apposite juxtapositions of persons and events 
do not violate verisimilitude so obviously as the supernatural interventions 
that are common in Homer or Virgil, it is surely evident that they 
nevertheless tend to compromise the narrative’s general air of literal 
authenticity by suggesting the manipulated sequences of literature rather 
than the ordinary processes of life.16 
Thus, if what distinguishes the novel from prior literary forms is a “cohesive 
structure” created through causal sequence, Tom Jones certainly succeeds insofar as it 
has a “very neat and entertaining formal structure,” but its realist status is jeopardized 
because it achieves this structure through coincidences that “compromise” the 
“general air of literal authenticity.”  Of particular importance here is the distinction—
“surely evident” to Watt—between “the manipulated sequences of literature” and “the 
ordinary processes of life.”  For Watt, coincidences are not as troublesome as 
“supernatural interventions,” but they are still problematic because they compromise 
realist narrative’s “authenticity.”   
Watt’s statement illustrates a slight yet significant shift in connotation from 
Aristotle, to whom his focus on causal connections and his disdain for supernatural 
interventions owe a clear debt.  In Watt’s account, as in much reflection on 
coincidence, the modern, statistical notion of the probable becomes superimposed on 
the Aristotelian notion of the probable. Whereas for Aristotle the probable or 
verisimilar meant “likely” in the sense of accessing the universal, for Watt the 
probable or verisimilar means “likely” in the more statistical sense of “ordinary” or 
“literally authentic” to life as it is lived in its everyday particularity.  The peculiarity of 
Watt’s reliance upon Aristotelian principles is only heightened by the fact that his 
                                                 
16 Watt, pg. 253. 
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understanding of the realist novel is much closer to the Aristotelian genre of history 
than it is to tragedy.  Nevertheless, this perhaps explains why the problem for critics of 
realism becomes coincidence rather than simply chance events.  If chance is what is 
categorically opposed to the Aristotelian notion of the probable, then coincidence, as a 
subset of chance, becomes opposed to the more modern sense of the probable because 
it is statistically improbable, hence suggesting the “manipulated” rather than the 
“ordinary.”   
 Echoes of Watt can clearly be heard in Marie-Laure Ryan’s recent 
categorization of coincidence as a “cheap plot trick.”  Ryan defines a “cheap plot 
trick” as “an event that is poorly prepared, that looks forced, that seems to be 
borrowed ready-made from a bag of tricks and whose function for the plot as a whole 
is too obvious.”17  In outlining an Aristotelian, prescriptive account of narrative, Ryan 
is interested in the conventions that govern the production of narratives in general and 
the complications that subsequently arise in an author’s attempt to navigate those 
conventions within a particular work.  Ryan conceives of plot as occurring on two 
levels:  there is the plotting of characters, who are attempting to pursue and fulfill their 
goals in accordance with their character, and then there is the plotting of the author, 
who is attempting to convey values and beliefs through the interaction and destiny of 
those characters.  Ryan sees narrative devices like coincidence as a response to 
conflicts that emerge when the goals of the author are at odds with the goals of 
characters: “the author needs to make the characters take particular actions to produce 
a certain effect on the reader, such as intense surprise, curiosity, or emotional 
involvement; but acting toward this situation defies narrative logic, because [it] is not 
in the best interest of the characters, or not in line with their personality” (56).  This 
                                                 
17 “Cheap Plot Tricks, Plot Holes, and Narrative Design,” pg. 57; further references appear in the text. 
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conflict, which seems to be a common but not necessary consequence of narrative 
conventions, often generates “aesthetically deficient” solutions.  Authors, according to 
Ryan, either resort to “hackneyed devices” like coincidence (“cheap plot tricks”), or 
simply ignore the problem and create “plot holes.”  In other words, ideally this conflict 
between levels of plot might be resolved either through “actions that are probable 
within the circumstances set up by the plot” or through authorial bravura (“brilliant 
plot twists”) (57).  More often than not, however, authors turn to devices that facilitate 
the larger goals of the narrative “at the expense of verisimilitude” (59).  They sacrifice 
the probability of plot in order to preserve probability of character.   
As a basic heuristic, Ryan’s concept of “cheap plot trick” certainly has critical 
purchase: it accords with our experience as readers of “hackneyed” means that authors 
use to resolve narrative problems.  Applied as a narratological concept, however, it 
creates a categorical opposition between coincidence and realism: “The more realist a 
genre, i.e. the closer its world to our model of everyday reality, the less tolerant 
readers will be to the use of plot twists that stretch their willingness to suspend 
disbelief” (71).  Like Watt, then, Ryan’s understanding of realism entails a movement 
toward the depiction of “everyday reality” or “ordinary processes.”  And because 
coincidences are improbable or unlikely, they threaten this correspondence between 
the world of the narrative and everyday reality.18 
                                                 
18 Ryan’s work is one place where the continuing influence of Jamesian aesthetics (as articulated by 
James and Percy Lubbock) on contemporary criticism is especially apparent.  Ryan’s discussion of plot 
and narrative development reads very much like an influential narrative manual written in 1923 by 
Thomas Uzzell called Narative Technique: A Practical Course in Literary Psychology (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934).  Uzzell’s manual, which aims to provide literary training for 
aspiring authors, is clearly influenced by Jamesian principles.  In it, he provides an entire section—in an 
appendix on “Beginner’s Mistakes”—devoted to coincidence that discusses when it is allowable and 
when inadmissible.  Interestingly, Uzzell even discusses how events which may have actually happened 
in life are not the proper stuff of fiction if they are not simultaneously probable, concluding, “Probable, 
a story or novel [...] must be if it aspires to acceptance by the critical” (485, emphasis in original).  As 
we will see in Chapter One, this class of possible but improbable events is the very class that Fielding in 
Tom Jones discusses as those which are disbelieved by readers lacking proper historical faith.    
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 While Ryan and Watt both characterize coincidence as a failure of narrative 
technique, another recent study presents it as a constructive device that has the 
potential to contribute to realism.  In her book-length study Coincidence and 
Counterfactuality: Plotting Time and Space in Narrative Fiction (2008), Hilary 
Dannenberg chides “the literary analyst who treats fictional coincidence as a 
hackneyed device” and attempts to recuperate coincidence.  She argues that the 
cognitive effects of recognition generated by coincidental encounters contribute to the 
aims of realism.19  Drawing on the recent turn in narrative theory toward the cognitive 
sciences, Dannenberg understands narrative to be the process of the reader’s cognitive 
immersion in the narrative world: “realist texts […] attempt to camouflage the 
ultimate, extradiegetical causal level of the author […] by constructing a narrative 
world with its own intradiegetic connective systems.”  If this process of construction is 
successful or “convincing,” then “the reader is encouraged to believe in the internal 
logic and autonomy of the narrative world and thus that it is a ‘re-creation’ as opposed 
to a fictional ‘creation’” (25).  Dannenberg identifies coincidence in the modern novel 
as an inheritance from earlier narrative forms, but one that has been integrated with 
increasing adeptness through the “naturalization” of coincidence using causal 
explanation, in line with the aesthetic dictates of realism.  The central feature of 
coincidence and the coincidence plot is the moment of recognition, whereby 
characters (and in turn the reader) become aware of connections (usually of kinship) 
between characters in a manner accompanied by surprise and suspense.  For 
Dannenberg, the recognition generated by coincidence is a form of Aristotelian 
anagnorisis that encourages narrative immersion, especially if the effects of 
recognition are amplified through the adept temporal orchestration of surprise and 
suspense.   
                                                 
19 Dannenberg, pg. 93; further references appear in the text. 
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 Dannenberg’s theorization of coincidence is a sophisticated attempt to treat it 
as more than a “hackneyed device” used to resolve formal problems.  However, her 
understanding of coincidence is nevertheless shaped by her view of realism as 
narrative immersion.  In her account, even though realism has found ways of 
accommodating coincidence, ultimately it is still realism’s “other.”  As in Ryan, the 
main issue becomes whether a particular text handles coincidence well or poorly:  “if 
the text’s justification of the implausibilities of the coincidence plot is sloppy, the 
effect is similar to metafiction without the thrill.  Both metafiction and mismanaged 
realism can thus lead to the expulsion of the reader from her imaginary position in the 
narrative world” (23).20  In the end, Dannenberg’s understanding of realism can 
accommodate the effects of coincidence, but since that understanding amounts to the 
narrative world’s correspondence to the real world, coincidence itself becomes 
opposed to realism, threatening to undermine it if not properly occluded. 
 A fourth and final critical account of coincidence can be gleaned from Robert 
Newsom’s detailed exploration of fictional probability in A Likely Story: Probability 
and Play in Fiction (1988).  Newsom is not primarily concerned with coincidence, nor 
does he provide an explicit theorization or definition of realism.  But his study of 
probability within fiction is important because he provides a more sophisticated 
account of the effects of improbable events on a reader’s experience of a text.  As the 
most theoretically rigorous example of probable realism, his model requires more 
                                                 
20 The way Dannenberg links “mismanaged realism” to metafiction indicates the degree to which 
coincidence is assumed to disclose the fictionality of fiction.  In other words, the fact that twentieth-
century experimental fiction so frequently deploys coincidence to explore the nature and meaning of 
fiction illustrates that coincidence has been a site where authors as well as critics have interrogated the 
validity of realism.  While Dannenberg’s historical account of coincidence sees a coherent (or at least 
discernible) line of development from the seventeenth century to the present, one significant drawback 
of this method is that it causes more recent developments and phenomena to influence the interpretation 
of earlier ones.  The fact that works in the past half-century have used coincidence to explore the nature 
of fiction and question the truth-value of narratives does not necessarily mean that the device is 
inherently problematic in the nineteenth-century novel; however, a “narrative of development” like 
Dannenberg’s can very easily become teleological and generate this conclusion. 
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space to elaborate.  The conceptual terminology of the critics I have been discussing 
becomes extremely fuzzy when they attempt to describe how coincidence disrupts the 
correspondence between the narrative world and real world.  For Watt, coincidences 
suggest “manipulated sequences” rather than “ordinary processes,” while for 
Dannenberg they reveal the fictional world to be a “creation” rather than “re-creation.”  
At what point does the “ordinary” appear to be “manipulated,” the “creation” reveal 
itself as “re-creation”?  Coincidence by its very nature is slippery.  Within our modern 
understanding of probability, the difference between the probable and improbable is a 
difference not of kind but of degree.  Rather than providing an explicit description of 
how coincidences threaten realism, these critics seem to rely on a universalizing 
appeal to readers’ experience: these moments just don’t feel right. Newsom’s account 
provides a more precise vocabulary for describing how improbabilities like 
coincidence constitute a failure of realism. 
Newsom begins his discussion of fictional probability by thinking about such 
commonplace statements as “The plot of Oliver Twist is too full of coincidences to be 
probable.”21  Newsom’s contribution to the understanding of fictional probability is to 
point out that such statements are “logically not only unnecessary, but nonsensical” 
(9).  The nonsensical nature of this statement is a consequence of what he defines as 
“the antinomy of fictional probability.”  The antinomy of fictional probability follows 
from the fact that judgments of probability can only be made about things that are 
uncertain (such as the probability of throwing a three on the next roll of a dice).  
However, events within literature are not uncertain, but rather “facts” in the narrative 
presented to the reader: the coincidences within Oliver Twist are neither probable nor 
                                                 
21 A Likely Story, pg. 4; further references appear in the text.  This is only one of several “probabilistic” 
statements Newsom frequently calls upon, most of which are statements about characters rather than 
events, such as the behavior of Kurtz or Lovelace being probable.  The statement about the 
coincidences of Oliver Twist is obviously convenient for my purposes. 
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improbable; they simply happen.  At the same time, however, from the perspective of 
the real world these events are not “facts” since they are clearly fictional.22   The 
result, then: 
Either I enter the fictional world, so to speak, and accept the pretense of the 
fiction, accept the “facts” of the plot as they are presented to me, or I 
remain in the real world, so to speak, and recognize the “facts” of the novel 
as plainly fictional—that is, “false.”  In either case, there ought to be no 
question of ascribing degrees of probability to the novel’s plot, for from the 
standpoint of the world of fiction the events it describes do not put us in 
doubt because they are certainly true, while from the standpoint of the real 
world they do not put us in doubt because they are certainly false. (9) 
Newsom’s incisive articulation of the antinomy of fictional probability seems to reveal 
a logical oddity, even an incoherency in statements of fictional probability from 
Aristotle to the present. 
 For Newsom, however, simply identifying this logical inconsistency is not 
sufficient.  Not only has literary criticism from Aristotle onwards made statements 
about probability, but these statements also make sense on some very basic level.  To 
say that Oliver Twist is too full of coincidences to be probable is the type of judgment 
we encounter in the classroom and also one that critics would accept as conveying a 
certain truth about the text.  Indeed, the critics I have discussed illustrate the degree to 
which statements about probability continue to have critical purchase.  Newsom’s 
project, therefore, becomes understanding the necessary conditions for making such 
                                                 
22 Of course, Newsom’s argument about the antinomy of fictional probability is predicated upon his 
belief that the Aristotelian notion of probability is consistent with the mathematized theory of 
probability.  If one believes that Aristotle’s notion of the probability and the probability that anticipates 
the next throw of the dice are radically different concepts, then Newsom’s whole theoretical edifice 
collapses.  Again, my goal here is not to affirm or refute this claim, but rather to present his account in 
order to identify the fundamental presuppositions about coincidence that inform his account. 
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statements.  In other words, what relationship must obtain between the real world and 
the narrative world in order for statements of probability to be meaningful despite their 
logical incoherency?  Newsom argues that questions of probability are meaningful 
because the reader, in reading fiction, necessarily splits herself between the “real 
world” and the “world of the fiction,” or rather, inhabits both worlds simultaneously 
without consciously recognizing the split: “in imaginatively entertaining [fictions] we 
necessarily split ourselves between real and fictional worlds.  Such a split […] is 
invisible to the game of entertaining fictions, for to recognize the split is to end the 
game” (10).  If, in other words, fictional probability is incoherent from the perspective 
of the real world and the narrative world taken separately, then it must arise from a 
specific type of interaction between the two worlds that involves suspending the 
explicit ontological difference between them. 
 Newsom’s account of what occurs when a reader engages with a fictional text 
differs from Dannenberg’s cognitive account of narrative, which in employing terms 
like “immersion” implies that the reader is either “in” the fictional world or not.  
Realism, for Newsom, is an interaction between the narrative world and the real 
world, rather than the replacement of one by the other.23  In order to substantiate his 
model, Newsom traces the concept of probability from Aristotle to the present and 
engages philosophical literature on the status of fictions.  While the specifics of his 
argument are beyond the scope of this discussion, his critique of the philosopher 
Kendall Walton is important for my purposes.  In a series of articles on the nature of 
                                                 
23 Newsom’s understanding of “probable fiction” (or realism) as an interaction between the narrative 
world and the real world is a more satisfying model than the cognitive immersion account of narrative: 
it accounts for the rhetorical dimension of narrative that entails an interaction or communication 
between reader and text. The cognitive immersion account of narrative is problematic on a basic level.  
What reader—and especially what critic—ever loses sight of “the ultimate, extradiegetical causal level 
of the author”?  If, as I am reading, I am always at least vaguely aware that what I am reading is a 
“creation” rather than a “re-creation,” does that prevent me from experiencing the text’s intended 
effects?   Put differently, what reader of James ever forgets that they are engaged with something highly 
artificial? 
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fiction, Walton develops a theory of fiction which maintains that fictions “are 
unambiguously and fundamentally different from the assertions made about the real 
world” (116).  He denies fictions “any kind of truth like the truth that we know about 
the real world” (124).  It is easy to see why rejecting these claims is essential to 
developing a robust concept of literary realism, for if we erect an impassible barrier 
between the real world and the fictional world, then we must categorically deny fiction 
the ability to communicate anything “true” about the world.24  Newsom refutes 
Walton’s claims by elaborating a model of the interaction between reader and text that 
centers on the operation of “belief.”  Every individual has beliefs about the real world, 
beliefs ranging from matters of scientific certainty to more abstract and probabilistic 
beliefs about human nature or behavior.  These beliefs, Newsom argues, “have an 
obvious relevance to our absorbed reader’s experience of the tale: they at once 
constitute a background against which the tale is read and constitute a field of belief 
that may itself be altered by a reading of a tale” (145).  Opposed to the reader’s body 
of beliefs is a set of beliefs embodied by the literary text as an object.  We may 
disagree or argue about what beliefs inhere in a particular text—indeed, this is often 
what we do as critics—but these beliefs are nevertheless objective features of a text.  
In playing the “game of fiction,” as Newsom calls it, the reader pretends that 
                                                 
24 Brian Richardson critiques Newsom’s study, arguing that “One not only can make probabilistic 
statements concerning fictional events; in some cases, the fiction demands the one do so.”  Richardson 
also asserts that “Newsom’s position depends on a near total separation between fictional worlds and 
the real world.”  Richardson’s critique appears to be a misreading of Newsom.  As I read Newsom, his 
point is that we have to recognize that the narrative world has a different ontological status than the real 
world, yet we must also account for the fact that those worlds do interact on some level and that we do 
make statements of probability about fictional worlds.  Richardson, though, is correct in pointing out 
that Newsom fails to distinguish between texts which purport to adhere to some basic probabilistic 
premises (such as Oliver Twist) and those that do not (such as Gulliver’s Travels).  I think the impetus 
of Richardson’s critique (and hence his misreading of Newsom) stems from his own interest in 
twentieth-century texts that consciously play with or subvert probability.  From my perspective, I think 
we have to assume that in discussing fictional probability Newsom is implicitly referring to “realist” 
texts, meaning those that make a basic claim to reality.  If we do not make this assumption, then his 
model quickly encounters significant problems.  For Richardson’s critique, see Unlikely Stories, pgs. 
50-51. 
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something fictional is real, and precisely by doing so “there is opened up the 
possibility of my ascribing probability to it” (144).  Pretending—that is to say, 
entering the fictional world as if it were real—creates an interaction between the two 
fields of belief, an interaction which defines “a field of play, an area of uncertainty.”  
This interaction is a “movement in and out of the game of make-believe,” a movement 
during which “the boundaries between the real and the fictitious break down,” 
resulting in the potential revision of the reader’s beliefs about the real world (153).   
 Although we seem far from coincidence here, we are now in a position to see 
what happens within Newsom’s model when a reader makes judgments about events 
of low probability like coincidence.  While the beliefs embodied within the fiction 
have a potential to revise beliefs about the real world, these two sets of beliefs are 
always in tension.  Indeed, questions about probability only make sense from “the 
standpoint in which we actively are moving in and out of the game of make-believe” 
(155) insofar as “To speak of probabilities in regard to fictions means that in one sense 
we already grant some reality to the fiction even as that reality is being questioned” 
(156, emphasis in original).  Questions about probability emerge, then, through 
interrelation between two bodies of evidence: the theoretically infinite evidence of the 
real world which we use to make judgments through probabilistic thinking, and the 
finite evidence of the text.  When we say that something within a fiction is probable, 
we are granting it the same status as evidence or knowledge we have about the real 
world.  Doing so, therefore, grants the fictional text the capacity to communicate 
knowledge about the real world.  At the same time, judgments of improbability sever 
the communicative link between the fictional world and the real world: “to say a 
fictional being’s actions”—or, events in the plot, such as coincidence—“are 
improbable is to assert that one is moving out of the game of pretend, away from 
make-believe” (161).  While this seems very close to Dannenberg’s talk of the 
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reader’s expulsion from the narrative world, its consequences within Newsom’s model 
are more explicit.  It is not, as Dannenberg would have it, a question of being 
immersed in the narrative world or not.  Rather, it is a question of whether or not the 
fiction can communicate information about reality to the reader, whether it can convey 
“truths” of any sort.  Thus, when the reader states, “The plot of Oliver Twist is too full 
of coincidences to be probable,” she not only moves out of the “game” of “make-
believe,” but more importantly asserts that the fiction is unable to convey knowledge 
about reality. 
 Of the four critics discussed, then, Newsom most explicitly aligns realism with 
the probable.  Indeed, the two terms are synonymous for him: fiction which is “true” 
to reality or conveys knowledge about reality is by definition probable fiction.  
Moreover, Newsom’s model exhibits the clearest debt to Aristotle, as his discussion of 
fictional probability seems to be a reworking or rearticulation of Aristotle’s discussion 
of well-constructed tragic plots.  Ultimately, however, all of these critics are working 
within an Aristotelian framework and share Aristotle’s basic claim: literature that is 
“true to life” adheres to probability by eschewing chance or the improbable.  The first 
premise of probable realism, then, is that accidental or coincidental events hinder the 
aesthetic aim of realism, which entails some idea of the correspondence between the 
real world and narrative world.  To be sure, what is “true to life” or realistic means 
something different to each of these critics.  What is more important, however, is that 
in each case their notion of the probable differs from Aristotle’s conception of the 
probable as verisimilar.  Recall that for Aristotle, tragedy is an imitation of action 
(mimesis) that produces knowledge of men and events by adhering to probability.  Its 
ability to be “true to life” is a product of its ability to depict the universal and 
transcend “the incalculable vicissitudes of everyday life.”  The exclusion of chance is 
a matter of not simply aesthetic, but philosophic importance for Aristotle.  For Watt 
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and Ryan, however, being “true to life” or realistic is the ability to represent the 
“ordinary” (perhaps even the “everyday”) or to proceed “naturally” through the 
occlusion of the manipulating hand of the author.  For Dannenberg it is the ability of 
the narrative world to replicate and consequently replace the real world.  Therefore, 
even though these critics abandon the philosophic stakes of Aristotle’s account by 
adopting a different notion of probability, they all retain the principle that chance or 
coincidence by its very nature inhibits the aims of literature that attempts to be “true to 
life.”          
 The second, less explicit premise of probable realism involves a historical 
claim.  Each of these critics relies on a basic understanding of literary history that sees 
realism as a gradual movement toward this correspondence between worlds resulting 
in the exclusion (or occlusion) of coincidence.  This historical dimension is absent 
from Newsom’s account, though the texts he references in discussing fictional 
probability—Clarissa, Oliver Twist, Heart of Darkness—imply such a historical 
trajectory. For Watt, the emergence of the novel form in the eighteenth century is this 
moment of exclusion: the development of “formal realism” entails, among other 
things, the exclusion of coincidence.  In contrast, Ryan and Dannenberg both rely on 
evolutionary frameworks—the claim that “our tolerance toward extraordinary 
coincidence has grown lower through the ages, as the demand for realism has grown 
higher” (“Cheap Plot Tricks” 58), or the claim that coincidence has been increasingly 
naturalized through causal explanation.  In his study of causality in narrative, Brian 
Richardson categorizes “the four basic types of probability that govern fictional 
worlds”: supernatural causation, naturalistic causation, chance, and metafictional 
systems of causation.25  The predominance of a particular type of probability at a 
                                                 
25 Unlikely Stories, pg. 15; further references occur in the text. 
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particular moment certainly has a historical dimension.  “It is no coincidence,” 
Richardson remarks, “that the role of chance becomes prominent in fiction at the same 
time that theories of probability begin to emerge” (14).  This insight leads to the 
construction of a basic narrative of development.  Richardson explains this 
development as such:  
In the eighteenth century, the balance [between forms of probability] 
shifted from the extraordinary to more diurnal notions of probability. […] 
Romantic authors loosened the connection between events to include 
interstices for the mysterious and the fortuitious. […] The rise of 
nineteenth-century realism led to the suppression of providential teleology 
and the marginalization of chance. […] By contrast, many twentieth-
century works assert the objectivity of chance and the arbitrariness of 
human destinies. (40-2) 
Most critics, especially those I’ve discussed, would agree with this “rough outline” 
(42).  The problem is not with this basic narrative, as Richardson’s “rough” account 
taken as such conveys some basic, if abstract, truth about literary history.26  The 
problem arises, however, when this abstract narrative comes into contact with 
individual works.  Richardson, for example, goes on to say that in nineteenth-century 
realism “divine intervention and fortunate coincidences are equally excluded so that 
the extensive effects of social and biological forces can be shown in all their 
complexity and self-sufficiency” (41).  What conclusions does this statement force us 
to make when we are confronted by “fortunate coincidences” in a novel by Dickens?  
Do we conclude that the novel is not “realism”?  Or that it is not able to show the 
                                                 
26 These narratives resemble Northrop Frye’s theory of modes, in which he identifies the five classes of 
fictions (myth, romance, high mimetic, low mimetic, and ironic) and suggests that “European fiction, 
during the last fifteen centuries, has steadily moved its center of gravity down the list.”  See Anatomy of 
Criticism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), pgs. 31-67. 
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effect of social forces in their self-sufficiency?  Although all of these critics are quick 
to eschew teleological readings and allow for historical complexity and deviation, they 
all nevertheless rely on the premise that coincidence becomes “excluded” at a certain 
moment in the development of the novel. 
 
II.  Moving Beyond Probable Realism: Accidents and the Eighteenth-Century Novel 
 In providing an overview of probable realism and identifying its basic 
premises, I have also hinted at some theoretical objections to the prevalent notion that 
realism is by its very nature “probable.”  On one hand, the critical prejudice against 
coincidence seems unjustified since it clearly draws on Aristotle’s aesthetic principles 
but abandons the philosophic grounding of those principles.  Aristotle’s exclusion of 
chance from plot was an aesthetic principle grounded in a philosophic system: critics 
seem to have retained the aesthetic principle while jettisoning the system.  On the 
other hand, aligning realism with the probable requires us to tell a certain type of story 
about the development of the novel and how coincidence becomes excluded.  
Although we might swallow this story on a very general level, it inhibits our 
understanding when we are confronted with individual texts and their coincidences.  
More importantly, if we are interested in the specific ways in which particular realist 
texts operate, then this story can only get in our way.   
While these objections alone seem sufficient to indicate the necessity of 
rethinking the relationship between realism and probability, further reason involves 
the understanding of coincidences and accidents in the age in which the novel 
emerged.  Whereas for Aristotle accidental events were categorically opposed to 
knowledge, recent work in the field of intellectual history has shown that accidents 
occupied an important place in the cultural and intellectual climate of eighteenth-
century continental thought.  In a history that traces the concept of “accident” from 
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Aristotle’s categorical distinction between “accident” and “substance” to the present 
day, Ross Hamilton identifies an emerging connection between accidental events and 
accidental qualities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Whereas the central 
category for Aristotle and Aquinas was substance, accident not only replaced 
substance as the central category in modernity, but accidental events gained increasing 
significance as sites of self-definition and transformation.  Hamilton links the 
emergence of print culture in the eighteenth century to this expanding importance of 
accidents.  “One of the stated functions of the new journalism was to help readers 
understand human behavior,” and print culture offered people the opportunity to “read 
and reflect on stories in which characters where hit by the shock of experience”: “By 
following the narrative implications of mishaps or coincidences under the guidance of 
the author, people became more conscious of self-determining acts.”27   
Michael Witmore has also emphasized this emerging link between accidents, 
narrative, and self-determination.  Although Witmore is primarily concerned with the 
relationship between accidents and knowledge in early modern England, his study 
provides an essential insight into the potential range of meanings the term can 
encompass in later periods as well.  Witmore argues that the “curious status” of 
accidents in the early modern period arises from their two primary features.  The first 
feature is their “categorical instability,” or the way they “straddle important 
ontological divisions”—the fact that accidents have begun to enter the realm of the 
knowable.28  The second feature of accidents is their “rhetoricity”:  accidents require a 
narrative framework in order to be recognized as accidents.  This narrative framework, 
in turn, shapes the meaning to be drawn from such events; as Witmore observes, 
                                                 
27 Accident: A Philosophical and Literary History (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008), pg. 
135. 
28 Culture of Accidents: Unexpected Knowledges in Early Modern England (Stanford: Stanford Univ. 
Press, 2001), pg. 5. 
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Accidents thus do not happen in a cultural void, but result when certain 
narrative conventions (what we usually describe as plot) come into contact 
with communal beliefs about what is likely, valuable or purposive.  This is 
tantamount to saying that the accident is a narrative artifact, one that draws 
its power to astonish from presumptions about what is usually the case and, 
more important, assumptions about the value of certain outcomes or 
events.29   
Accidents, in other words, stage a conflict between expectations of “the probable” and 
the experience of “the real.”  It is the very slipperiness of probability that enables 
accidents to potentially revise an individual’s or even a culture’s understanding of the 
real and the probable.   
Rather than being resistant to knowledge, then, accidents in modernity 
increasingly became sites for the production of knowledge.  This explains their 
importance to modern narrative forms such as the novel.  In Aristotle’s conception of 
tragedy, all the accidents must be “stripped away,” so that “we can learn, and enjoy, to 
see, what sense we can make of events that are not the products of chance, but are a 
matter of the individual’s own decisions, not in spite but because they have, as human 
beings, only limited knowledge and limited power over their own circumstances.”30  
Whereas for Aristotle tragedy draws its power from its capacity to explore self-
determination by transcending contingent circumstances, the increasing recognition in 
modernity of the significance of those contingent circumstances on self-determination 
requires the reintegration of accidents into narrative fiction.  Put simply, self-
determination can no longer be divorced from contingency.  Moreover, the link 
                                                 
29 Witmore, pg. 11. 
30 Frede, pg. 215, emphasis in original. 
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between accidents and narrative helps explain the particular importance of coincidence 
to the emerging novel.  Coincidences are a special subset of accidents that enrich 
narrative coherence.  As will become more clear in my reading of Tom Jones in 
Chapter One, if accidents disrupt the course of events in a manner which elicits our 
narrative capacities to make sense of the world, then coincidences lend themselves to 
the formation of patterns and converging narrative arcs characteristic of the novel 
form.31 
 The opening chapter of Fielding’s Amelia (1751) demonstrates and even 
thematizes this importance of accidents to the causal and descriptive features of the 
emerging novel: 
The various accidents which befel [sic] a very worthy couple after their 
uniting in the state of matrimony will be the subject of the following 
history.  The distresses which they waded through were some of them so 
exquisite, and the incidents which produced these so extraordinary, that 
they seemed to require not only the utmost malice, but the utmost 
intervention, which superstition hath ever attributed to Fortune: though 
whether any such being interfered in the case, or, indeed, whether there be 
any such being in the universe, is a matter which I by no means presume to 
determine in the affirmative.  To speak a bold truth, I am, after much 
mature deliberation, inclined to suspect that the public voice hath, in all 
ages, done much injustice to Fortune, and hath convicted her of many facts 
in which she had not the least concern.  I question whether we may not, by 
natural means, account for the success of knaves, the calamities of fools, 
                                                 
31 Hilary Dannenberg’s identification of the centrality of “convergence plots” in the history of narrative 
fiction is an especially strong part of her study.  See Coincidence and Counterfactuality, pgs. 89-108 
and 141-80.  
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with all the miseries in which men of sense sometimes involve themselves, 
by quitting the directions of Prudence, and following the blind guidance of 
a predominant passion; in short for all the ordinary phenomena which are 
imputed to Fortune; whom, perhaps, men accuse with no less absurdity in 
life, than a bad player complains of ill luck at the game of chess. 
But if men are sometimes guilty of laying improper blame on this 
imaginary being, they are altogether as apt to make her amends by 
ascribing to her honours which she as little deserves.  To retrieve the ill 
consequences of a foolish conduct, and by struggling manfully with 
distress to subdue it, is one of the noblest efforts of wisdom and virtue.  
Whoever, therefore, calls such a man fortunate, is guilty of no less 
impropriety in speech than he would be who should call the statuary or the 
poet fortunate who carved a Venus or who writ an Iliad. 
Life may as properly be called an art as any other; and the great 
incidents in it are no more to be considered as mere accidents than the 
several members of a fine statue or a noble poem.  The critics in all these 
are not content with seeing anything to be great without knowing why and 
how it came to be so.  By examining carefully the several gradations which 
conduce to bring every model to perfection, we learn truly to know that 
science in which the model is formed: as histories of this kind, therefore, 
may properly be called models of HUMAN LIFE, so, by observing minutely 
the several incidents which tend to the catastrophe or completion of the 
whole, and the minute causes whence those incidents are produced, we 
shall best be instructed in this most useful of all arts, which I call the ART 
of LIFE.32 
                                                 
32 Amelia, 2 vols. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1962), pgs. 3-4. 
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The transformation of Aristotelian principles here is striking.  While plot in this 
passage, as in the Poetics, is understood to be a complete action providing instruction 
in the “art of life,” accidents are presented as integral rather than antagonistic to this 
process.  It is “by observing minutely the several incidents which tend to the 
catastrophe or completion of the whole, and the minute causes whence those incidents 
are produced” that this instruction is produced.  This passage, in fact, enacts this 
transformation in the status of accidents.  The narrator begins by identifying his work 
as a history which relates the events and accidents that “befel” a couple upon their 
marriage.  These “accidents” are initially positioned as external to the individuals, as 
events which befall or happen to them, implying contingency.33  Moreover, many of 
these incidents are “so extraordinary” that accounting for them “seem[s] to require” 
the attribution of them to the intervention of Fortune.  However, the narrator discredits 
this interpretation, having concluded “after much mature deliberation” that we can 
account “by natural means” for events that at first seem to defy our sense of justice.  
This assertion causes these “extraordinary” incidents to suddenly become “ordinary 
phenomena.”  Fortune is relegated to the status of an “imaginary being,” and in the 
process “Fortune”—a force that shapes an individual’s life—becomes “fortunate”—a 
state of being that follows causally from one’s actions. 
This passage, then, shows how accidents become integral to the early novel’s 
exploration of self-determination.  It also shows how accidents are closely related to 
two other defining features of the emerging novel.  First, its reliance on empiricist 
discourse, which situates authority in the individual observer.34  It is the narrator’s 
                                                 
33 According to the OED, the most frequent modern use of “befall” is “To fall out in the course of 
events, to happen, occur,” taking an indirect object.  The quotations provided describe “heavy 
accidents,” “mischief,” “deplorable misfortune,” and “disaster” befalling individuals or the human  
race.  See OED, s.v. “befall, v.” 4b. 
34 In addition to Watt and Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), see Everett Zimmerman’s The Boundaries of Fiction 
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capacity to “examine” and “observe” that enables him to provide an alternative 
account of the incidents which the “public voice” automatically attributes to Fortune.  
And second, its emphasis on causal connection between events (as identified by Watt).  
This is not simply limited to the question of efficient causes, but also involves a more 
general turn toward an understanding of the social and historical contexts of events.35  
For the narrator of Amelia, the explanatory shift from Fortune to “natural means” 
entails an understanding of the way in which “passions” and “conduct” contribute to 
the “success” and “miseries” of individuals.  All of this focus on accidents, moreover, 
depends on the inherent ambiguity between the improbable and probable—the fact 
that what at first appears “extraordinary” might ultimately be the product of “ordinary 
phenomena.” 
 This passage from Amelia is only one instance of a broader phenomenon, as 
unexpected events and calculations of the probable are an important element of many 
early novels.  Accidents, in fact, become an important site for tracing continuities 
between what are otherwise vastly different fictional techniques in the eighteenth 
century.   While stranded on the island, Robinson Crusoe not only uses probabilistic 
reasoning after the shipwreck to infer the existence of God, but at other points in his 
narrative he also occupies himself with systematic observation and more empirical 
matters of cause and effect.36  Before the seemingly miraculous appearance of the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) for an account of how, in the early eighteenth century, the 
novel “mediates between figural and empiricist discourses, those founded on the biblical master 
narrative and those connecting themselves to the new ideology of systematic observation” (pg. 4). 
35 For a discussion of how Fielding’s works—and, in particular, Tom Jones—reflect an emerging 
consciousness of the historical and social contexts of character, see George Drake, “Historical Space in 
the ‘History of’: Between Public and Private in Tom Jones,” ELH 66.3 (1999): 707-737, and Ruth 
Mack,  Literary Historicity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009), pgs. 59-87. 
36 For accounts of Crusoe’s use of probabilistic thinking, see Hamilton, pgs. 133-144 and Paul 
Alkon,“The Odds Against Friday: Defoe, Bayes, and Inverse Probability” [in Probability, Time, and 
Space in Eighteenth-Century Literature, ed. Paula Backscheider (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1979), 
pgs. 29-62]. 
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corn, Crusoe “had hitherto acted upon no religious Foundation at all, indeed [he] had 
very few Notions of Religion in [his] Head, or had entertain’d any Sense of any Thing 
that had befallen [him], otherwise than as a Chance.”37  Although Crusoe initially 
believes “that God had miraculously caus’d this Grain to grow without any Help of 
Seed sown,” after “peering in every Corner, and under every Rock,” he remembers 
having “shook a Bag of Chickens Meat out in that Place.”  “Discovering that all this 
was nothing but what was common” causes his “Wonder” to cease, though he still 
manages to believe it a “Work of Providence… that 10 or 12 Grains of Corn should 
remain unspoil’d, (when the Rats had destroy’d all the rest,) as if it had been drop 
from Heaven.”  As is the case with Amelia, these and other unforeseen events in 
Robinson Crusoe (1719)—the footprint on the beach, the encounter with the old he-
goat in the cave, the appearance of Friday, and even his rescue from the island itself—
are significant in relation to narrative form.  Similarly, in Tristram Shandy (1767) not 
only is chance a structuring principle of the narration, but the novel also thematizes the 
issue in the “chapter of chances” (Book 4, Chapter 9).  Here Walter not only exclaims, 
“what a long chapter of chances do the events of the world lay open to us,” but also 
ruminates on the effect of accident on Tristram’s life: “Take pen and ink in hand, and 
calculate it fairly, brother Toby, […] and it will turn out a million to one, that of all the 
parts of the body, the edge of the forceps should have the ill luck just to fall upon and 
break down that one part [Tristram’s nose], which should break down the fortunes of 
our house with it.”38   Throughout the eighteenth century, accidental or seemingly 
improbable events are important because occurrences that unsettle or realign notions 
                                                 
37 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. Michael Shinagel (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 
pg. 58. 
38 Laurence Sterne, Tristram Shandy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), pgs. 202-3.  Toby, 
of course, counters with this keen insight: “It might have been worse […] –Suppose the hip had 
presented […] as Dr. Slop foreboded.” 
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of the probable enable these novels to present a rich picture of reality.  This brief 
survey, then, demonstrates that the two basic premises of probable realism—that 
accidental or coincidental events inherently obstruct the attempt to represent life in the 
world and that the emergence of realism entailed the exclusion of such events from 
narrative—are not simply theoretically problematic, but more importantly historically 
inaccurate. 
 
III.  Improbable Realism: A Summary of the Argument 
 Having shown that the simplistic identification of realism with the probable is 
problematic, this dissertation now turns to a consideration of the different ways in 
which improbability is harnessed for realist ends.  Chapter One revisits these 
theoretical and historical issues in the context of a single text:  Fielding’s Tom Jones 
(1749).  The series of coincidences that structure the plot is the one of the constitutive 
features of the novel, yet a feature simultaneously the most troublesome for critics.  
Although the novel describes a range of incidents from mishaps to unexpected 
convergences as “accidents,” there has yet to be a systematic account of the particular 
role of “accidents” in the novel.  This is a consequence, in large part, of critics’ 
assumption that the improbable nature of these events is intended to direct the reader 
either to the intervention of Providence on Tom’s behalf or to Fielding’s clever 
handling of the comic form.  These readings, I shall argue, not only fail to recognize 
the broader importance of accidents to the eighteenth-century imagination, but also 
overlook the intrusive narrator’s own extended discussions of probability.  
Concentrating on an analysis of the relationship between these discussions and the 
narrative’s improbable events, Chapter One demonstrates Tom Jones’s rhetorical 
investment in having the reader perceive accidents as accidents—that is to say, as 
highly contingent events that defy our expectations of the probable (rather than as 
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manifestations of the hand of providence or the hand of the author).  The status of 
accidents in Fielding’s novel is in turn essential to understanding its form:  the novel 
compels us to view the happiness Tom achieves at the novel’s close as a product of 
contingent events, rather than the product of generic or providential necessity.  
Although the novel’s resolution fulfills the expectations generated by its comic form, 
it does so in a manner that directs the reader to the structures of the world in which 
Tom lives.  Therefore, even though the events of Tom Jones are highly improbable, 
these improbabilities contribute to the novel’s realism because they direct the reader to 
the contingencies of life in the world.  
 If Tom Jones demonstrates the importance of improbable events to the 
emergence of the realist novel in the eighteenth century, then Sir Walter Scott’s novels 
illustrate how coincidences contributed to the historicizing capacity of realism.  
Chapter Two examines how Scott uses coincidence in order to put his reader into 
contact with the past.  The chapter begins, however, with a consideration of Georg 
Lukács’s theorization of realism, which, unlike the critical models discussed here in 
the introduction, allocates a role for chance events.  Although Lukács’s discussion of 
chance reflects an important modification of Aristotle’s understanding of plot, it 
nevertheless fails to appreciate the full potential of coincidence for realism.  Whereas 
Lukács argues that chance events are “sublated” by their adequate integration into 
plot, I shall argue that Scott’s historical novels utilize the very chanciness of 
improbable events in the service of historical representation.  Focused on Redgauntlet 
(1824) and The Bride of Lammermoor (1819), Chapter Two demonstrates how Scott 
uses improbable encounters in order to juxtapose the competing interpretations they 
elicit against a rich historical background.  In Redgauntlet, for example, the chance 
encounter that brings Darsie Latimer into contact with his uncle Hugh facilitates the 
novel’s effort to represent Jacobite ideology and the disappearance of the social 
 
 
 
34 
structures that sustained it.  Just as Chapter One demonstrates that coincidence is not 
inherently a signpost of authorial ideology, Chapter Two reveals that coincidence 
enabled Scott to put his reader into contact with history.   
 Chapter Three turns to a consideration of Dickens’s use of coincidence, 
elaborating on the unique representational opportunities coincidence makes possible 
for the realist novel.  Dickens’s use of coincidence has been regarded as either a 
manifestation of his providential ideology or as a by-product of the contingencies of 
serial production—that is to say, as a mechanism at odds with the social realism of his 
novels.  This chapter, however, demonstrates that coincidences in Martin Chuzzlewit 
(1843-4) enable Dickens to represent and historicize selfishness as a product of the 
increasingly mediated nature of social relations in the Victorian milieu.  I argue that 
coincidence in the novel can be read as a response to what Frederic Jameson has called 
“problems of figuration” in the realist novel’s representation of capitalist space—the 
inability to represent individual experience and the social conditions that structure 
experience.  Martin Chuzzlewit  represents selfishness as a response to a  subjective 
experience of social isolation and self-sufficiency, an isolation that is produced and 
simultaneously undermined by intricate webs of social connection that are illegible to 
the individual.  Coincidence is particularly suited to capturing this curious blend of 
connection and disconnection because it juxtaposes the ostensible self-containment of 
characters with the webs of social and narrative connection that challenge selfishness.  
By emphasizing the primacy of these connections, Martin Chuzzlewit not only 
represents the social conditions which produce selfishness, but also attempts to rebuke 
selfishness by altering the readers’ perspective on the social order.  While Dickens 
drew on coincidence early in his career as a means of generating narrative structure, 
my reading suggests that by Martin Chuzzlewit he understood that coincidence could 
be harnessed for realist ends.  This chapter, therefore, not only recuperates a novel that 
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has been read as structurally problematic, but in doing so demonstrates that Dickens’s 
use of coincidence can help us to link his increasing emphasis on the larger design of 
his novels with his development as a mature social realist. 
 The fourth and final chapter of the dissertation builds on the insights of the 
previous chapters in order to identify the importance of coincidence to the form of 
Hardy’s novels.  Of all the authors I consider, Hardy is the one whose use of chance 
and coincidence has received the most critical attention.  Yet—perhaps not 
surprisingly—he is also the author whose use of coincidence has been read most 
consistently as a direct manifestation of his ideology.  Critics have consistently read 
chance in Hardy as manifestation of his pessimism or agnosticism.  This stems not 
only from the shortsighted critical view of coincidence I have discussed here, but also 
from emphasis on Darwin’s influence on Hardy’s habit of mind.  Chapter Four, in 
contrast, argues that Hardy’s use of coincidence is best read in relation to his 
historicist habit of mind—that is to say, Hardy’s deep interest in how particular social 
formations shape human agency.  The chapter argues that the particular importance 
Hardy attached to the concept of relics embodies this aspect of his thought.  Relics in 
Hardy juxtapose the past and present in a manner that illuminates the unique features 
of both.  In Hardy’s novels, coincidences frequently involve encounters with relics, 
and these encounters draw our attention to particular social forces such as class which 
attenuate the freedom of his protagonists.  The chapter centers on a detailed reading of 
The Return of the Native, which examines how the novel’s intricate and coincidence-
filled narrative structure works in conjunction with other formal features such as free 
indirect discourse in order to cultivate a historicist perspective in the reader.  This final 
chapter, then, draws on the insights developed throughout the dissertation, 
demonstrating how a reconsideration of the role of coincidence in the realist novel can 
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fundamentally alter some of our most deep-seated critical assumptions about realism 
and its practitioners. 
 A brief conclusion follows the final chapter, in which I draw together the 
various threads that run through the individual chapters and address the broader 
questions explored here in the Introduction.  The Conclusion considers some of the 
critical and methodological implications that attend my theorization of literary realism 
as improbable. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Playing With Probability:  
“Accidents” and the Intrusive Narrator of Tom Jones 
 
 
 The survey of existing critical treatments of narrative coincidence in the 
Introduction suggested that the ongoing critical disdain toward coincidence in realist 
narratives is unwarranted on both theoretical and historical grounds.  The idea that 
accidental or unlikely events inhibit the aesthetic aims of realism is clearly predicated 
upon Aristotle’s exclusion of accidental events from well-constructed plots.  However, 
when modern critics claim that “the improbable violates verisimilitude,” they mean 
something categorically different from what Aristotle means when he says that “the 
improbable violates verisimilitude.”  Whereas Aristotle’s conception of verisimilitude 
was philosophically grounded and invoked the universal, modern critics tend to mean 
something like an “illusion of reality” involving rich particularity.  Perhaps more 
importantly, whereas accidental events were categorically opposed to knowledge for 
Aristotle, as a result of cultural and intellectual transformations such events became an 
important site for the production of knowledge in modernity.  A brief glance at a range 
of eighteenth-century novels revealed that, far from being excluded, accidental events 
that challenge the division between the probable and the improbable were of central 
importance to narrative form in the eighteenth century. 
 This chapter examines in detail the role of coincidence in Henry Fielding’s The 
History of Tom Jones, A Foundling in order both to further substantiate and specify 
these claims, as well as to demonstrate how coincidence functions as an instrument of 
emerging realist technique in the eighteenth century.  Tom Jones is an important text 
for such an examination; accidents and coincidences are at once a central feature of its 
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notoriously well-constructed plot, but also one of the primary reasons the novel 
occupies such a vexed status in the history of the novel.  As J. Paul Hunter has argued, 
Tom Jones is the “first self-conscious example” of this “new species” of writing in the 
middle of the eighteenth century, positioning it as “a test case of just what the new 
realism consists in.”39  Whereas accidents are interpretively significant events that 
occasionally impinge upon Robinson Crusoe’s quotidian existence on the island, they 
are the preoccupation of Tom Jones.  The word appears at least eighty-five times in the 
text and is used to describe a variety of events.  These range from the “odd 
Accident”40 that befalls Squire Allworthy in which he finds Tom in his bed, to the 
more coincidental events that bring about the union of Tom and Sophia.  These 
include, for instance, the “accident… of a very extraordinary kind” (769) whereby 
Allworthy catches sight of the £500 lost by Tom and stolen by George Seagrim, 
initiating the sudden reversal of Allworthy’s opinion of Tom.  As seen in the 
Introduction, these coincidences have unsettled critics such as Ian Watt because they 
fly in the face of basic notions of realism by suggesting “the manipulated sequences of 
literature” rather than “the ordinary processes of life.”  However, many critics 
overlook the fact that Tom Jones explicitly thematizes the problem of probability: the 
novel not only presents the reader with accidents and coincidences, but explores the 
                                                 
39 Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1990), pg. 31.  Hunter succinctly identifies the problematic status of improbable 
events in criticism of the early novel, and Fielding in particular: “The critical reluctance to examine the 
strange and surprising aspects of novels stems, in part, from insecurities among students of eighteenth-
century fiction and, among students of the novel more generally, from anxieties about ‘realism.’  
Realism is a relative matter, but in discussions of the novel, the term has tended to become normative, 
so that novels tend to be judged qualitatively on the degree or amount of realism to be found in each, as 
if more is better. […] In this normative context, it is no wonder that instances in novels of the 
supernatural or para-natural, the miraculous or the magical, the inexplicable or the uncertain, the 
improbable or the coincidental—varieties all of the strange and surprising—tend to be seen as flaws, or 
explained away, or overlooked” (32).   
40 The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling, ed. R.P.C. Mutter (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), pg. 
27.  Further references are to this edition and appear in the text. 
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question of how such events ought to be read.  Indeed, although countless critics of the 
novel have commented on its events being “probable” or “improbable,” “fortuitous” or 
“providential,” there has yet to be a rigorous account of the role of “accident” in the 
text.  This inattention, which reflects a broader critical discomfort with improbable 
events, is mysterious precisely because of the particularly important and complex 
status of accidents in the eighteenth century.  Therefore, reexamining the relationship 
between coincidence and realism in Tom Jones through closer attention to the novel’s 
negotiation of accidents has important consequences.  It enables us both to rethink 
specific trajectories of the historical development of the novel and also to better 
understand the particular formal means by which that literary form represents life in 
the world.   
 The central argument of this chapter is that coincidences in Tom Jones 
illuminate aspects of lived reality and ultimately point the reader toward the 
contingencies of the world.  Far from detracting from or disrupting the novel’s 
realism, they are in fact the site at which to best understand how Tom Jones 
contributes to the development of realism.  The first section of this chapter examines 
the way in which critics have dealt with the unlikely chain of events that brings about 
the marriage of Tom and Sophia at the novel’s end.  Faced with a seeming 
contradiction between the novel’s claim to historicity and its very unlikely sequence of 
events, critics have been guided by their preconceptions about the relationship 
between realism and coincidence rather than by the novel’s explicit engagement with 
this problem.  Relying on an understanding of realism as probable, critics tend to focus 
on the larger structure generated by the novel’s accidents, ignoring or downplaying the 
contingency of individual coincidences.  In doing so, they read accidents as pointing 
the reader either to the hand of providence or the hand of the author, attributing 
accidents either to (Fielding’s belief in) providential intervention or to Fielding’s deft 
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use of an inherited comic form.  Both interpretations, I shall argue, require forfeiting 
the novel’s claim to historicity.   
The second section of the chapter provides an alternative reading of the novel’s 
coincidences divested of preconceptions that require coincidence to be explained 
away.  My reading focuses on how the intrusive narrator shapes the presentation of 
events in order to have the reader see accidents as accidents, that is, as events which 
defy expectations or systems of explanation.  Far from pointing us to supernatural 
frameworks of determination, the rhetorical structure of the novel pries accidents loose 
from such frameworks in order to show how they can be markers of human freedom 
and responsibility.  While the novel promotes a basic Christian ideal of goodness, it 
shows that such an ideal is not a guarantee of human happiness.  Even though the 
novel has a comic form, it complicates that comic form precisely through those 
accidents which turn us toward the contingencies of the world.  The chapter concludes 
with a third and final section that, in addition to identifying why coincidences rather 
than accidents become particularly important for the emerging novel, also explores 
some of the theoretical and historical implications of this reading of Tom Jones for 
broader considerations of realism.   
     
I.  Interpretations of the Improbable in Tom Jones  
 One particularly knotty problem for critics of Tom Jones has been the 
ostensible contradiction between the novel’s presentation of its events as “history” and 
the events of the narrative themselves, which seem highly improbable.  Not only does 
the novel’s title present the narrative as a history, but the narrator repeatedly asserts 
that his narrative is a “kind of history” (59) containing a truth categorically distinct 
“from those idle romances which are filled with monsters, the productions, not of 
nature, but of distempered brains” (119).  While the narrator’s claim that the novel is a 
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“history” is clearly not a claim that these events really happened, it does assert that the 
narrative offers a kind of “truth” about human nature or about life in the world.  At the 
same time, however, this claim appears to be at odds with a chain of events that seem 
decidedly unhistorical.  Put differently, the unrealistic complications of the plot seems 
to belie J. Paul Hunter’s claim that the novel is a “self-conscious example” of “the 
new realism.” 
 In their emphasis on the cumulative chain of events in the novel, rather than 
individual events themselves, critics clearly demonstrate the influence of the modern 
mathematical notion of probability on theorizations of realism.  As seen in the 
Introduction, Ian Watt concedes that the novel’s events “do not violate verisimilitude 
so obviously as the supernatural interventions that are common in Homer or Virgil,” 
but he still asserts that “it is surely evident that they nevertheless tend to compromise 
the narrative’s general air of literal authenticity.”41  Watt, of course, was not the first 
to be unsettled by the unlikely events through which the novel’s resolution is brought 
about.  In 1821, Richard Whately criticized Tom Jones on the grounds that its 
“circumstances are such as it is incalculably improbable should ever exist: several of 
the events, taken singly, are much against the chances of probability; but the 
combination of the whole in a connected series, is next to impossible.”42  None of the 
novel’s events—the convergence of all of the characters at Upton, Black George’s 
discovery of Tom’s lost pocketbook containing £500, Allworthy’s fortuitous 
recognition of the same lost banknotes, etc.—are in themselves impossible, unlikely as 
they may be.  However, taken together, these events seem “next to impossible.”  The 
logic behind this line of thinking is that the cumulative total of possible but unlikely 
                                                 
41 Watt, pg. 253. 
42 Quoted in Robert Wess, “The Probable and the Marvelous in Tom Jones” [Modern Philology 68.1 
(1970): 32]. 
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events somehow equates to an impossible series of events, which in turn undermines 
the novel’s realism.43 
 Having concluded that the novel presents a highly improbable, if not 
impossible chain of events, critics then assume that our interpretations of the novel 
should be guided by what we perceive as Fielding’s intention behind creating such a 
structure.  In other words, since these improbable events seem to contradict the novel’s 
explicit claim to historicity, then they must be there as signposts.  Such interpretations 
tend to fall into two broad categories.  Some critics read the novel’s coincidences as a 
sign of the hand of providence, arguing that they demonstrate Fielding’s belief in a 
providence that intervenes to ensure justice is served in the world.  Martin Battestin, 
for example, suggests that the world of the novel “is a universe not only full and 
various, but regular, created by a just and benevolent Deity whose genial Providence 
governs all contingencies, comprehends every catastrophe, from the bursting of a 
world to the fall of a sparrow.”44  Providential interpretations rely on contemporary 
theological debates about the role of providence in the world and often cite Fielding’s 
1752 tract, Examples of the Interposition of Providence in the Detection and 
Punishment of Murder, as proof of Fielding’s belief in an intervening providence.45  
                                                 
43 The logic here is clearly mathematical.  By way of analogy, the odds of throwing a six on two 
consecutive throws of a die is 1-and-36—surely possible but still unlikely.  However, the odds of 
rolling a six 100 times consecutively is 1-and-6^100 (or 1-and-6.533 × 10^77), which approaches zero 
probability.  Critics, I am suggesting, employ this same logic when interpreting the growing chain of the 
novel’s coincidences or improbabilities.  Aubrey Williams demonstrates a similar logic in a comment 
on the plot of Joseph Andrews: “When one considers the geography involved (the space between 
Somerset and London), and the fact that the encounters take place off the main road, once in complete 
darkness, and also the nice and exact requirements of timing, then the probabilities of such conjunctions 
are most unlikely, indeed incalculable and practically unthinkable” [“Interpositions of Providence and 
the Design of Fielding’s Novels,” South Atlantic Quarterly 70 (1971): 272].   
44 The Providence of Wit (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pg. 141. 
45 Richard Rosengarten provides a more nuanced articulation of this position in Henry Fielding and the 
Narration of Providence (New York: Palgrave, 2000).  He suggests that Fielding’s novels explore “the 
degree to which experience supports the idea of a directly interposing providence” (17).  Whereas 
Battestin emphasizes Fielding’s belief in “the world as a fully realized theater of divine providence,” 
Rosengarten argues that Fielding’s novels “demonstrate both a confident belief in the divine creation 
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While providential interpretations take the novel’s claim to historicity seriously and 
emphasize the role of providence in the world, other critics read coincidences as a sign 
of the hand of the author.  For instance, Leopold Damrosch, Jr. believes that such 
claims to historicity are facetious and are thus intended to reveal the shaping activity 
of the author: “When Defoe asserts providential pattern we may protest that we see his 
hand behind the arras […] But Fielding openly admits that his hand is behind the 
arras, and offers the great structure of Tom Jones as an analogue of God’s structure, 
not as a literal instance of it.”46  While this interpretation also relies on Fielding’s 
Christian beliefs, it emphasizes the novel’s comic form and its reliance on the 
conventions of prior narrative forms, such as those of romance.  The novel’s 
coincidences, in other words, do not point the reader toward divine justice, but rather 
to Fielding’s artistry in deploying narrative conventions. 
 Both of these interpretations neglect how much rhetorical energy the narrator 
expends in directly challenging the attribution of the narrative’s events to the hand of 
providence or the hand of the author.  For now, however, my objective is to identify 
the assumptions that have guided interpretations of Tom Jones and the critical and 
                                                                                                                                            
and the final judgment, and an uncertainty about what claims might be made for providence within 
those framing events of divine activity” (8, 17).  Rosengarten’s study is particularly helpful in orienting 
Fielding’s novels in the context of the deism controversy.  At stake in arguments about natural and 
revealed religion was the status of providence, or God’s active involvement in the world.  Beginning 
with the theological triad of creation-providence-eschatology, Rosengarten demonstrates how 
providence became absorbed into either creation or eschatology in response to concerns over free will.  
For Rosengarten, the keystone of Fielding’s fiction is what he calls Fielding’s “principled diffidence,” 
that is, a principled belief in the Christian worldview accompanied by a diffidence regarding our ability 
to claim God’s active involvement in the world.  I find Rosengarten’s study extremely convincing in 
many respects, and my interpretation of Tom Jones can certainly be reconciled with his understanding 
of Fielding’s “principled diffidence.”  However, my most fundamental disagreement with Rosengarten 
is on the question of how we arrive at certain conclusions about the novel.  He begins with an 
understanding of Fielding’s beliefs and then shows how the novel accords with that position, whereas I 
am concerned with demonstrating how our interpretation of the novel’s events must be informed by the 
narrator’s examination and presentation of those events. 
46 Quoted in Zimmerman, fn. 2, page 137.  Zimmerman provides a brief summary of the various 
positions regarding the novel’s coincidences.  
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methodological consequences which attend these assumptions.  First, these 
interpretations operate on the assumption, which in the Introduction I called the tenet 
of probable realism, that unlikely or improbable events inherently detract from the 
representation of life in the world.  In the case of Tom Jones, this entails reading 
coincidences as an indication of authorial ideology.  Critics assume that the novel’s 
coincidences tell us more about Fielding’s beliefs than about the world he represents.   
Second, these interpretations assume a simple or at least unproblematic 
relationship between textual phenomena and authorial belief.  Reading coincidences in 
the novel as providential intervention amounts to the statement:  Because Fielding 
believed X, he created a novel with the structure Y, or Because Fielding’s novel has 
the structure Y, we can conclude that it demonstrates his belief X.  One important 
consequence of this assumption is that it reduces the extreme complexity of the 
novel’s plot to the exemplification of some basic principle or statement, something 
along the lines of “good intentions are rewarded by providence.”47  Aubrey Williams’s 
article, “Interpositions of Providence and the Design of Fielding’s Novels,” clearly 
exemplifies the reductionist nature of this move.  Williams spends numerous pages 
summarizing the complicated plots of Fielding’s novels in order to support his 
conclusion:  “How could Fielding more vividly represent in fictive terms [the 
conviction of Rev. Isaac Barrow…] that the hand of God’s Providence could be best 
                                                 
47 A notable exception is Sheldon Sacks’s important study, Fiction and the Shape of Belief (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964), which delineates the complicated and nuanced process of moving 
from textual phenomena to authorial belief.  In Sacks’s terms, the problem with the simple providential 
interpretation of Tom Jones is that it mistakenly reads the text as an apologue rather than as represented 
action (i.e., a novel).  My reading follows Sacks’s reading of Fielding’s ethical position, as deduced 
from Tom Jones—namely, that happiness is neither the product of fortuitous circumstances nor of 
complete chance.  In other words, we cannot infer that providence, in Fielding’s view, always 
intervenes for the deserving, but, at the same time, happiness has some correlation to individual 
behavior and is not the product of mere chance.  Ultimately, though, my concern is widely different 
from Sacks’s.  His book is concerned with the methodological (and theoretical) problem of deducing 
authorial beliefs from textual phenomena.  My concern, however, is to provide an accurate account of 
the rhetorical effects of those textual phenomena and how those effects should be understood in relation 
to the development of literary realism.   
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discerned when ‘that which in itself is not ordinary, nor could well be expected, doth 
fall out happily, in the nick of an exigency, for the relief of innocence, the 
encouragement of goodness, the support of a good cause, the furtherance of any good 
purpose?’”48  In other words, the convoluted and detailed circumstances of the plot 
become secondary to the abstract proposition they are seen to support or exemplify.   
Third and finally, these interpretations assume that confident discriminations 
can be made between the probable and the improbable, the ordinary and extraordinary.    
Williams’s statement presupposes that that which is extraordinary (and consequently a 
manifestation of providential activity) can be confidently discerned from the everyday, 
just as Ian Watt’s reading of Tom Jones assumes a discernible distinction between “the 
manipulated sequences of literature” and “the ordinary processes of life.”  As I 
suggested in the Introduction, however, such confident discrimination on the part of 
critics overlooks the fact that accidents straddled these epistemological boundaries in 
the eighteenth century.  The meaning or significance of accidents was far from 
obvious, as the novel form developed in part as a way of giving meaning to and 
exploring the implications of such events.   
 
II.  Credible Yet Suppressed Narration: The Presentation of Accidents in Tom Jones 
 The tension between the narrator’s claim that his narrative is a kind of history 
distinct from romance and the narrative itself, which appears to be decidedly the stuff 
of romance, has thus been an interpretive crux of Tom Jones.  Critics have 
downplayed the novel’s claim to historicity and have offered interpretations of 
Fielding’s purpose behind presenting us with such an improbable chain of events.  
These interpretations, however, require taking a step back from individual events in 
                                                 
48 Williams, pg. 275 
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the novel and instead reflecting on the cumulative chain of events.  I want to argue that 
this goes against the grain of the narrative—indeed, the narrator engages in extended 
discussions of probability and often turns our attention to individual events 
themselves.  To perhaps oversimplify matters, when confronted with the question, 
“How should we interpret improbable events in Tom Jones?” critics have overlooked 
the novel’s own discussions of probability or causation and have elected instead to 
search for answers in contemporary theological arguments, or in speculations about 
Fielding’s beliefs, or in modern notions of realism derived from Fielding’s successors.   
In what follows, I provide an analysis of how the novel negotiates improbable 
events, offering an account of the function of coincidence in the texture of the reader’s 
experience of the novel.  This reading entails focusing both on the local effects of 
coincidences (rather than their cumulative force) and on the particular manner in 
which the narrator frames accidental events.  I begin with an analysis of the narrator’s 
discussion of the marvelous, in which he establishes criteria by which his “new 
species” of writing can maintain its credibility in the face of events that defy our sense 
of the probable.  Analyzing moments in the text that potentially violate the bounds of 
probability shows how the narrator establishes credibility by asserting his authority 
over the presentation of events but at the same time by demarcating the limits of his 
knowledge.  This, in turn, will lead to a consideration of the retrospective element of 
the narration, where I will suggest that the narrator’s practice of withholding 
information by presenting incidents without indicating the end to which they 
ultimately lead foregrounds the highly contingent nature of these events.  
Understanding the narrator’s presentation of accidents through credible yet suppressed 
narration reveals how he pries accidents loose from supernatural frameworks of 
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determination in order to present accidents as accidents.49  Accidents thus impinge 
upon the reader’s experience of the novel by disrupting expectations or conclusions 
generated not only by romance conventions but by providential history as well.  While 
these expectations reemerge, subsequent accidents continue to disrupt, suggesting that 
the rhetorical effects of accidents are best understood iteratively rather than 
cumulatively. This links the narrator’s commentary and the texture of the reading 
experience to the form of the novel, which represents a world in which the alignment 
of merit and fortune is not guaranteed, but rather subject to the contingencies and 
complexities of the social world. 
The most extended discussion of probability in Tom Jones comes in the 
introductory chapter of Book VIII, which the narrator identifies as “much the longest 
of all of our introductory Chapters” (Tom Jones 323).  Here, the narrator addresses the 
status of the marvelous in the type of writing in which he is engaged, a discussion 
which leads to conclusions about the relationship between probability and historical 
credibility.  Prior to this point, the narrator repeatedly has distinguished his work from 
romance, a form of writing in which the invention of the author removes the story 
from the province of fact.  However, an extended discussion of the marvelous 
becomes necessary at this point because the narrative is coming upon “matters of a 
                                                 
49 I borrow the term suppressed narration from James Phelan, who defines it as narration that “omits 
significant information that the narrative itself otherwise indicates is relevant to the character, situation, 
or event being reported on, thereby creating either a gap in the text that cannot be filled or a discrepancy 
between what is reported in one place and not reported in another” [Living to Tell About It: A Rhetoric 
and Ethics of Character Narration (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005), pg. 138].  While Phelan is 
primarily concerned with readerly evaluation of characters, the term is suited to the effect I am trying to 
analyze in Tom Jones because it describes the way in which information is withheld from readers, 
thereby shaping their interpretation of narrated events.   Phelan, for example, distinguishes suppressed 
narration from restricted narration, in which the narrator’s communicative function is limited but 
supplemented by communications made by the implied author.  In other words, in restricted narration 
the narrator creates gaps, but the reader can confidently fill them in; those gaps remain in suppressed 
narration.  My point is that even though the narrator of Tom Jones has knowledge of how the accidents 
in the novel create a sequence that brings about a determinate end, he narrates them in such a way that 
withholds that sequence from the reader.   
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more strange and surprising kind than any which have hitherto occurred.”  The 
narrator argues that a necessity for setting “bounds” arises because readers “run into 
very different extremes” when confronted with the marvelous.  On one hand, some 
readers are “ready to allow, that the same thing which is impossible may yet be 
probable”—meaning that they are ready to believe mistakenly in events which defy 
natural laws.  On the other hand, other readers “have so little historic or poetic faith, 
that they believe nothing to be either possible or probable, the like to which hath not 
occurred to their own observation”—meaning that they only find credible that which 
they have experienced personally.  The narrator’s treatment of the marvelous and 
literary probability thus foregrounds the important yet problematic nature of readerly 
expectations and beliefs. 
In a discussion which invokes yet clearly plays with the terms of Aristotle’s 
Poetics, the narrator identifies the criteria of possibility, probability, and conservation 
of character as means by which writing can maintain its historical credibility.  His 
discussion, however, also identifies why the two extremes of readerly reaction are 
mistaken, thus making the chapter as much about how readers ought to read as about 
how writers ought to write.  By possibility, the narrator means “not exceed[ing] the 
capacity of the agent we describe” (325).  The need to correlate action with agent led 
ancient authors to introduce into their fictions “ancient heathen deities” who were able 
to perform actions of which humans are incapable (323).  Such supernatural agents, 
however, are off limits to the modern writer, as are “ghosts,” “elves,” “fairies, and 
other such mummery” (324).  Because mankind is “the highest subject (unless on very 
extraordinary occasions indeed) which presents itself to the pen of our historian,” all 
actions depicted in a novel must be those capable of being performed by humans 
(325).  Although the narrator here attempts to establish a determinate criterion, his 
qualification—“unless on very extraordinary occasions indeed”—destabilizes the 
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boundaries set upon the subject matter of the historian.  A clear guideline becomes 
fuzzy, open to interpretation or modification. 
 The subsequent discussion of probability not only increases this ambiguity, but 
also marks the narrator’s most relevant departure from Aristotelian aesthetic 
principles.  While it is the opinion of Aristotle or “some wise man”50 that “‘it is no 
excuse for a poet who relates what is incredible, that the thing related is really a matter 
of fact,’” it is “impracticable” to extend this dictum to the historian, because the 
historian “is obliged to record matters as he find them; though they may be of so 
extraordinary a nature as will require no small degree of historical faith to swallow 
them.”  The historian must record matters as he finds them, even if they be incredible 
or astonishing.  Indeed, if these facts “constitute the essential parts of [the story], the 
historian is not only justifiable in recording [them] as they really happened; but indeed 
[it] would be unpardonable, should he omit or alter them.”  Therefore, by “confin[ing] 
himself to what really happened, […] he will sometimes fall into the marvellous, but 
never into the incredible”: “He will often raise the wonder and surprise of his reader, 
but never that incredulous hatred mentioned by Horace” (325-6).  Although this seems 
to locate authority in the reader (insofar as the reader’s “incredulous hatred” becomes 
a sign that the writer has “desert[ed] probability” and become “a writer of romance”), 
this authority is immediately qualified.  The narrator notes that historians of public life 
have an advantage over those such as himself who “confine ourselves to scenes of 
private life.”  Because historians of private life deal with “private characters” and 
explore “the most retired recesses,” they have “no publick notoriety, no concurrent 
                                                 
50 The failure of the narrator’s memory here is one of many ironies that prevent this chapter from being 
considered as a straightforward essay on aesthetics.  However, the narrator’s spurious gestures toward 
authority do not make the discussion of the probable mere jest, as they contribute to the overall effect of 
the chapter, which is to demonstrate the discrepancy between the reader’s expectations of “the 
probable” and “what really happens.”  Reading the whole chapter as merely ironic overlooks the 
specific work that the passage is performing.   
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testimony, no records to support and corroborate what we deliver.”  The private 
historian must reconcile the facts of private history as he finds them with the reader’s 
conception of the probable or real, which may not be able to accommodate such facts.  
This means that the author must take special care to remain within the limits of 
probability.  The narrator provides two examples of men he knew—one of 
extraordinary vice and one of extraordinary virtue—and says that even though such 
men existed, the sheer fact of their existence is “not sufficient to justify us [in writing 
about them], while we are writing to thousands who never heard of the person, nor of 
anything like him” (327).  While the discussion of the man of extraordinary virtue is 
an elaborate compliment by Fielding to his patron, it contributes to this larger 
exploration of probability.  Whereas the reader is previously posited as the ultimate 
arbiter of a story’s status, the self-limitations imposed by the historian disarm the 
reader’s “incredulous hatred” because the historian has already subjected his material 
to the marvelous/incredible test.  The historian of private life is obliged to relate facts 
as he finds them, but only if those facts can be seen as “marvelous” and not 
“incredible.”  This distinction is indefinite, if not empty.  As with the discussion of 
possibility, then, the discussion of probability gestures toward defining determinate 
criteria only to undermine such criteria. 
  The final criterion, conservation of character, dictates that “the actions should 
be such as may not only be within the compass of human agency, and which human 
agents may probably be supposed to do; but they should be likely for the very actors 
and characters themselves to have performed: for what may be only wonderful and 
surprising in one man, may become improbable, or indeed impossible, when related of 
another” (328).  This simply means that any “monstrous change and incongruity” in a 
character must be accounted for.  The conclusion reached by the narrator is that, as 
long as he adheres to these restrictions, the writer may “deal as much in the wonderful 
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as he pleases.”  Indeed, “the more he can surprise the reader, if he thus keeps within 
the rules of credibility, the more he will engage his attention, and the more he will 
charm him” (328-9).  Therefore, staying within the bounds of probability does not 
entail confining the narrative to “trite, common, or vulgar” incidents “such as happen 
in every street, or in every house, or which may be met with in the home articles of a 
newspaper” (329).  Nor does it inhibit the historian “from shewing many persons and 
things, which may possibly have never fallen within the knowledge of great part of his 
readers.”  Rather than establishing explicit criteria regarding the marvelous, this 
discussion simply creates a pact between writer and reader, for by observing these 
rules, the writer becomes “intitled to some faith from his reader, who is indeed guilty 
of critical infidelity if he disbelieves him.”   
 This chapter has several important implications for how we interpret and 
evaluate the events of the novel.  Not only is “the possibility of providential activity 
[…] coyly left open”51 in the discussion of possibility, but, as Robert Wess argues, 
these rules are “all prescriptions about agents involved in events, not about relations 
between events.”52  Most importantly, however, these rules deprive the reader of his 
capacity to evaluate events because comparison to past experience, the absence of 
public record, and subjective response are all insufficient grounds for challenging the 
historical integrity of the narrative.  In other words, the readerly responses “I have 
never seen something like this before,” “The likes of this have never been recorded in 
the public annals,” and “Surely these events are most extraordinary” are all 
insufficient for judging events improbable.  The marvelous thus becomes admissible 
in historical writing provided that the author retains his credibility.  This chapter 
                                                 
51 Rosengarten, pg. 78. 
52 Wess, pg. 34.   
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highlights the highly unstable boundaries of probability.  Indeed, the narrator’s 
discussion is an important instance of the complex status of accidents in the period.  
Far from being clear-cut, the boundary between the probable and improbable is fluid, 
with improbable events often causing a direct confrontation between the reader’s 
understanding or expectations of the world and experience of the world itself.   
 With this understanding of the indeterminate status of the probable, we can 
better appreciate how the narrator maintains his credibility by commenting, sometimes 
extensively, on events or incidents which threaten to violate the criteria discussed 
above.  The manner in which the narrator handles such incidents through local 
assertions and denials of certainty demonstrates how the issue of probability is 
negotiated in the novel.  The criterion of possibility is maintained by showing how 
seemingly miraculous events can be explained through natural means.  For instance, 
after Mr. Western arrives at Upton, Sophia flees and stops a man on the road to inquire 
about the road to London.  At this point, the narrator intrudes with this parody of epic 
style: 
Reader, I am not superstitious, nor any great believer in modern 
miracles.  I do not, therefore, deliver the following as a certain truth; for, 
indeed, I can scarce credit it myself: but the fidelity of an historian obliges 
me to relate what hath been confidently asserted.  The horse, then, on 
which the guide rode, is reported to have been so charmed by Sophia’s 
voice, that he made a full stop, and exprest an unwillingness to proceed any 
further.  
Perhaps, however, the fact may be true, and less miraculous than it hath 
been represented; since the natural cause seems adequate to the effect: for 
as the guide at that moment desisted from a constant application of his 
armed right heel, (for, like Hudibras, he wore but one spur) it is more than 
 
 
 
53 
possible, that this omission alone might occasion the beast to stop, 
especially as this was very frequent with him at other times. (456-7) 
While this funny passage reiterates Sophia’s charm and beauty, it also shows the 
narrator staging a conflict between “private history” and “public record,” a conflict 
which operates to acclimatize the reader to a certain way of viewing the world.  The 
historian is obliged to relate the superstitious, “reported” account of the event, but then 
immediately demystifies it by providing a causal explanation that stays within the 
bounds of possibility.  This dual presentation of events raises certain questions about 
the narrator's strategy.  It seems strange that, possessed of a natural explanation of an 
event, the narrator would even bother to entertain the possibility of a superstitious one.  
However, this rhetorical strategy also establishes the fact that a certain chain of 
events—such as the sound of Sophia's voice, immediately followed by the horse 
coming to a “full stop”—might elicit multiple causal interpretations, some of which 
entertain the miraculous (e.g., Sophia's voice causes the horse to stop) and some of 
which are more probable (e.g., Sophia's voice causes the man to remove his spur from 
the horse, which in turn causes the horse to stop). 
 This dual presentation of events is also the narrator's primary strategy for 
dealing with the conservation of character.  Throughout the novel, the reader is 
presented with events and actions that seem inconsistent with their understanding of 
how certain characters ought to behave in particular situations.  Why, for example, 
does Allworthy repeatedly make judgments that challenge our understanding of him as 
wise and judicious?  The narrator takes great pains to explain the differences between 
the way circumstances are perceived by the reader and the way they are perceived by 
characters embroiled in them.  While narrating the events that lead to Thwackum and 
Square overseeing the education of Tom and Blifil, the narrator remarks: 
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Thwackum, at his first arrival, was extremely agreeable to Allworthy; 
and indeed he perfectly answered the character which had been given of 
him.  Upon longer acquaintance, however, and more intimate conversation, 
this worthy man saw infirmities in the tutor, which he could have wished 
him to have been without; tho’ as these seemed greatly over-balanced by 
his good qualities, they did not incline Mr Allworthy to part with him; nor 
would they indeed have justified such a proceeding: for the reader is 
greatly mistaken, if he conceives that Thwackum appeared to Mr 
Allworthy in the same light as he doth to him in this history; and he is as 
much deceived, if he imagines, that the most intimate acquaintance which 
he himself could have had with that divine, would have informed him of 
those things which we, from our inspiration, are enabled to open and 
discover.  Of readers who from such conceits as these, condemn the 
wisdom or penetration of Mr Allworthy, I shall not scruple to say, that they 
make a very bad and ungrateful use of that knowledge which we have 
communicated to them. (106) 
And, again, after Allworthy dismisses Tom, the narrator tells the reader that he “must 
be very weak, if, when he considers the light in which Jones then appeared to Mr 
Allworthy, he should blame the rigour of his sentence” (253).  These apparent 
inconsistencies in character are eradicated by making explicit this dual presentation of 
events: our perception of Thwackum or Tom at a particular moment is different than 
Allworthy’s, allowing us to understand the rationale behind Allworthy’s decisions but 
also the limitations on the perspective which was the foundation of those decisions.   
 This strategy not only contributes to the conservation of character, but also 
participates in the larger exploration of deception in the novel.  Again and again it is 
shown that what looks like virtue may in fact just be a disguise and that what looks 
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like vice might in fact be a product of the manner in which particular events and 
circumstances are presented to the viewer.  While the position of the narrator, and 
consequently the position of the reader “behind the scenes,” provides a perspective 
that grants us more precise knowledge about actions and events, this is still a particular 
perspective and thus subject to certain limitations: it provides better knowledge but 
not complete knowledge (265).  There are numerous places where the narrator 
indicates particular limitations on his knowledge, and these limitations become the 
place where the issues of probability and conservation of character intersect, 
ultimately shaping how we read coincidence in the novel.   
 Let us consider two places in the text where the narrator relates events while 
claiming ignorance of causality.  The first occurs in VII.xv, following Tom’s argument 
with ensign Northerton, which leaves Tom on the brink of death and Northerton taken 
into custody.  Finding that Northerton has escaped, the lieutenant of the regiment 
arrests the sentinel who was guarding the ensign, suspecting him of abetting the 
escape.  In order to explain these events, the narrator informs the reader that it was not 
the sentinel, but the landlady who helped Northerton escape.  Charmed by 
Northerton’s appearance and moved to compassion, the landlady devises a plan that 
enables Northerton to obtain his freedom:      
But lest our readers, of a different complexion, should take this 
occasion of too hastily condemning all compassion as a folly, and 
pernicious to society, we think proper to mention another particular, which 
might possibly have some little share in this action.  The ensign happened 
to be at this time possessed of the sum of fifty pounds, which did indeed 
belong to the whole company […] This money, however, he thought proper 
to deposite [sic] in my landlady’s hand, possibly by way of bail or security 
that he would hereafter appear and answer to the charge against him; but 
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whatever were the conditions, certain it is, that she had the money, and the 
ensign his liberty. 
The reader may, perhaps, expect, from the compassionate temper of 
this good woman, that when she saw the poor centinel taken prisoner for a 
fact of which she knew him innocent, she should immediately have 
interposed in his behalf; but whether it was that she had already exhausted 
all her compassion in the above-mentioned instance, or that the features of 
this fellow, tho’ not very different from those of the ensign, could not raise 
it, I will not determine; but far from being an advocate for the present 
prisoner, she urged his guilt to his officer, declaring with uplifted eyes and 
hands, that she would not have had any concern in the escape of a murderer 
for all the world. (320) 
The second passage occurs in V.v when Tom, having fallen deeply in love with 
Sophia, visits Molly in an attempt to convince her of “the fatal consequences which 
must attend their amour” (182).  Molly begins to berate Tom for trying to desert her 
after ruining her, but “an accident put a stop to her tongue, before it had run out half 
its career,” as the rug serving as a door to her closet falls, revealing Square: 
Now, whether Molly in the agonies of her rage, pushed this rug with her 
feet; or, Jones might touch it; or whether the pin or nail gave way of its 
own accord, I am not certain; but as Molly pronounced those last words, 
which are recorded above, the wicked rug got loose from its fastning, and 
discovered everything hid behind it; where among other female utensils 
appeared—(with shame I write it, and with sorrow will it be read)—the 
philosopher Square, in a posture (for the place would not near admit his 
standing upright) as ridiculous as can possibly be conceived. (183) 
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While both of these passages are suffused with irony, the effect in each case is slightly 
different.  In the first passage, the narrator’s disavowal of knowledge about causality is 
clearly ironic.  Although the narrator withholds judgment about the causal relationship 
between two facts—“that she had the money, and the ensign his liberty”—the reader is 
called upon to see it as a bribe, a determination that subsequently explains the 
landlady’s refusal to help the sentinel.  On one hand, the sentinel does not possess the 
money necessary to excite the compassion of the landlady, and, on the other hand, 
asserting the innocence of the sentinel would involve implicating herself in 
Northerton’s escape. Thus, while the narrator “will not determine” the cause of the 
landlady’s behavior, he presents information in such a way that enables the reader to 
confidently determine causality: she helps Northerton not because she is moved by 
misguided compassion, but simply because he bribes her, thus explaining why she 
refuses to help the sentinel.  The situation is different in the second passage, where the 
narrator’s assertion of “I am not certain” must be taken more seriously, as it is 
impossible for the reader to infer what caused the rug to fall at that particular moment.  
While it seems irrelevant whether Molly pushed the rug, or whether Tom touched it, 
or whether “the pin or nail gave way of its own accord,” the incident is so fortuitous 
that its cause seems important to how we interpret it: the nail giving way of its own 
accord at that precise moment certainly seems more incredible that Molly simply 
stepping on the rug.  An exact material cause would demystify the event in the same 
way that the removal of the guide’s spurs from the horse’s flank helps explain the 
potentially miraculous event above.  The surprise elicited by the appearance of a man 
in Molly’s closet is compounded by the fact that it presents Square in a situation that 
“may seem so inconsistent with that character, which he hath, doubtless, maintain’d 
hitherto” (183).  The narrator, however, takes this opportunity to say that this 
inconsistency is “rather imaginary than real,” as Square, like all philosophers, is 
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“composed of flesh and blood” and therefore just as susceptible to the appetites of the 
flesh as anyone else.  The humor that arises from the deflation of Square’s purported 
stature not only “conserves” his character, but it also tempers the wonder and potential 
incredulity aroused by the fortuitous “accident” of the rug’s fall. 
 As Wayne Booth suggests, Fielding’s novel relies on “‘training’ the reader to 
draw up short, to move bank and forth from ironic to straight readings.”53  These 
passages not only “train” readers to distinguish ironic from straight readings, but also 
train them to interpret events or actions that potentially defy their expectations or 
sense of probability.  As the chapter on the marvelous demonstrates, authors in this 
“new province of writing” cannot maintain their “historic integrity” simply by 
following determinate criteria: because the reader’s past experience, their immediate 
subjective responses, nor public record can be used to determine when a work has 
abandoned truth by leaving the realm of history and entering that of romance, the 
credibility of the historian inheres in a pact established between the writer and reader.  
What I am suggesting, then, is that the narrator’s rhetorical framing of improbable 
events trains the reader to deal with events that might threaten that credibility.  The 
narrator thus keeps his work within the very unstable boundaries of probability by 
constantly reminding us of the indeterminate nature of those boundaries.  Actions or 
incidents that at first might seem “incredible” or impossible become simply 
“marvelous” when the narrator frequently—but not always—explains them through 
“natural means.” 
 While the full implications of this training might not be felt in local passages, 
its importance becomes clear as the novel draws toward its conclusion and the reader 
is confronted by a series of events that seriously push the already tenuous bounds of 
                                                 
53 The Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974), pg. 185.   
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probability.  In the introductory chapter to Book XVII, the narrator remarks that “it is 
more than probable” that Sophia will end up married to Blifil or some lord, and that, 
given the current circumstances in which Jones finds himself, “we almost despair of 
bringing him to any good” (729).  The narrator then “faithfully promise[s]” that 
“notwithstanding any affection” we may have for Tom, “we will lend him none of that 
supernatural assistance with which we are entrusted, upon condition that we use it 
only on very important occasions,” concluding, “If he doth not therefore find some 
natural means of fairly extricating himself from all his distressing, we will do no 
violence to the truth and dignity of history for his sake” (729-30).  A similar passage 
occurs in XVIII.iii after the narrator tells of the seemingly improbable change that has 
occurred in Allworthy’s attitude toward Tom:  
Revolutions of this kind, it is true, do frequently occur in histories and 
dramatic writers, for no other reason than because the history or play draws 
to a conclusion, and are justified by the authority of authors; yet though we 
insist upon as much authority as any author whatever, we shall use this 
power very sparingly, and never but when we are driven to it by necessity, 
which we do not at present foresee will happen in this work. (772)   
He then goes on to relate the circumstances which led to this “revolution”: the 
coincidental reappearance of the £500, Square’s death-bed confession (which 
counteracts the pernicious stories of Tom’s behavior circulated by Blifil), and the full 
exposure of Blifil’s dishonesty.  While the narrator’s assertion of the ability to lend his 
characters “supernatural assistance” seems to undermine his ostensibly sincere 
adherence to the “dignity of history,” such a strategy can be read as an attempt to 
disarm the incredulity which the improbable events are likely to elicit in the reader.  
Since the mere absence of monsters, ghosts and elves is not enough to differentiate a 
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history from romance, such rhetorical maneuvers become the only means to 
distinguish a “history” from the creations of “distempered brains.”      
 If, as I am suggesting, we take seriously the narrator’s—and by extension, the 
implied author’s—claims that the events of the narrative are not “mere invention” and 
have a claim toward truth, we must nevertheless make sense of the manner in which 
the narrator controls the presentation of those events.  The narrator, of course, 
frequently reveals his shaping presence, such as in II.i, where in “Shewing what Kind 
of History this is,” the narrator distinguishes his work from a newspaper, “which 
consists of just the same number of words, whether there be any news in it or not” 
(59).  What makes this history different from a newspaper, among other things, is its 
retrospective element, which enables the narrator to relate events with knowledge of 
the end to which they ultimately lead and allows him both to exclude irrelevant 
passages of time and to locate seemingly trivial events that are in fact critical to that 
end.  Thus, in X.i, the narrator warns the reader to “not too hastily condemn any of the 
incidents in this our history, as impertinent and foreign to our main design,” 
simultaneously dismissing those critics who “presume to find fault with any of its 
parts, without knowing the manner in which the whole is connected” (425).  The 
narration, then, is suppressed insofar as the narrator overtly acknowledges the action is 
a “design” and “whole,” but refuses to disclose the ultimate nature of that design.54  
This suppression involves withholding information not only in local instances, but also 
in more important and sustained cases, such as withholding the essential information 
regarding the circumstances of Tom’s birth and the existence of Bridget’s confession.  
                                                 
54 J.F. Smith suggests that the narrator is involved “in an extended act of narrative deception,” and he 
links the narrator’s practices and habits to those of Bridget [An Inquiry into Narrative Deception and Its 
Uses in Fielding’s Tom Jones (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1993), pg. ix].  The 
connotations of calling the narrator’s withholding of information “deception” are clearly inconsistent 
with the function of the narrator as I understand it.     
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Although the disclosure of this information would obviously “ruin the game,” its 
suppression clearly seems at odds with the narrator’s attempt to establish and maintain 
his credibility.  
  Understanding the nature of the narrator’s credible yet suppressed narration 
illuminates the particular manner in which accidents are presented to the reader.  The 
manner in which the narrator mediates the reader’s perception of the narrative’s events 
is an effort to have the reader perceive accidents as accidents, that is, as highly 
contingent events that either challenge our notions of probability or reveal a conflict 
between our expectations and a reality that defies those expectations.  If the happy 
union of Tom and Sophia is the end toward which the narrative moves, it is essential 
that the reader appreciate the nature of the incidents which potentially thwart but 
ultimately result in that union.  The narrator repeatedly calls our attention to the 
seemingly insignificant events that produce large effects in the overall “design.”  Early 
in the novel, for example, Jones resolves to abandon Sophia and remain faithful to 
Molly when “a very trifling accident set all his passions again on float,” as he learns of 
the incident of the muff from Honour (177).  The narrator reflects that although this 
incident appears of “little consequence,” “there are many little circumstances too often 
omitted by injudicious historians, from which events of the utmost importance arise” 
(179).  This leads the narrator to compare the world to “a vast machine, in which the 
great wheels are originally set in motion by those which are very minute, and almost 
imperceptible to any but the strongest eyes.”  This emphasis on the significance of 
trifling events appears again at the end of the text, when the narrator notes “the many 
strange accidents” that prevented Partridge from seeing Mrs. Waters/Jenny Jones at 
Upton and led to the presumed incestuous encounter between Jones and Mrs. Waters: 
“Instances of this kind we may frequently observe in life, where the greatest events are 
produced by a nice train of little circumstances; and more than one example of this 
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may be discovered by the accurate eye, in this our history” (765).  The narrator’s 
emphasis on vision foregrounds the way in which he shapes our perception of events, 
putting into proper perspective the “trifling accidents” that set the “great wheels” in 
motion.  Perceiving accidents as accidents requires credible yet suppressed narration.  
Without the credibility of the historian, the accidents and coincidences which bring 
about the conclusion might appear simply as the “supernatural” intervention of the 
author engaged in imaginative romance.  Without the suppression of information, our 
perception of the “minute” causes might be too greatly colored by the end at which 
they arrive.  In other words, with knowledge of the end in hand, we might overlook the 
causality of natural means and attribute “a nice little train of circumstances” to 
providential intervention. 
 It is necessary to describe in more detail the specific nature of the function I 
am attributing to accidents in relation to the texture of the reader’s experience of the 
novel.  This is best accomplished through comparison to readings that understand 
accidents as manifestations of either the hand of providence or the hand of the author.  
The providential reading would describe the texture of the reader’s experience as 
follows:  the reader begins with confidence yet uncertainty about Tom’s ultimate fate 
(about whether Tom is deserving of happiness and about whether he will achieve it); 
however, as accidents accumulate, the reader becomes increasingly certain that Tom is 
both deserving and destined for happiness because the world of the novel is one in 
which divine justice prevails—the fortuitous accidents assure us of Tom’s merit as 
they work toward his happiness.  The generic reading—that is, reading accidents as 
manifestations of the author working within the conventions of an established genre—
would describe the texture of the reader’s experience as such:  the reader, 
understanding the prevailing comic form of the novel, confidently knows that the 
novel will end with Tom’s happiness; accidents which divert the trajectory unsettle 
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this confidence, but only in a manner that creates more suspense.  This, I would argue, 
approximates R.S. Crane’s famous reading of the novel.55  The texture I am describing 
is as follows:  the reader, realizing the novel’s comic form, has confidence in Tom’s 
ultimate happiness; accidents, however, not only divert this trajectory, but do so in a 
manner that generates skepticism about the certainty or adequacy of the comic form 
itself.  While we remain confident that Tom, despite his indiscretions, is deserving of 
happiness, accidents provide us with a rich picture of the world in which lives, where 
the alignment of merit and fortune is not guaranteed.  In other words, the ebbs and 
flows of confidence and uncertainty in the comic plot are not just about suspense, but 
also about the production of a particular ideational content.  While my reading is 
certainly closer to the generic reading, it differs from both the generic and providential 
readings insofar as it insists on this ideational content regarding the nature of the 
world he inhabits.  As William Empson says of Crane’s reading, it ultimately 
“assume[s] the basic impulse behind the book to be pretty trivial.”56  Whereas Crane 
sees the accidents and indiscretions that divert the trajectory of the narrative as mere 
occasions for the production of suspense and laughter, I am suggesting that they divert 
the trajectory in a manner that reveals a conflict between generic or ideological 
expectations and lived reality. 
 This understanding of the effect produced by accidents sees both accidents and 
the narrator’s intrusive presence as integral to the form of the novel.  It is not just the 
reader’s sense of probability that is undermined by accidents.  The novel shows how 
unexpected events can also undermine attempts to anticipate or control the outcome of 
                                                 
55 See “The Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom Jones,” reprinted in Critics and Criticism (Abridged 
Edition), ed. R.S. Crane (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), Crane, pgs. 62-93. 
56 “Tom Jones,” The Kenyon Review 20.2 (1958): 217.  The providential reading, of course, attributes 
an ideational content to the novel, but, as I suggested above, it is content in the form of an abstract, 
formulable statement.   
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other events.  Just as Tom’s virtuous intentions toward Molly are overpowered by the 
incident of the muff, characters’ plans perpetually fail to account for events beyond 
their control.  Such a dynamic cuts both ways:  it produces the failure of Blifil’s 
malicious plot to deceive Allworthy and assume Tom’s place, but at the same time it 
creates the necessary limitations on Allworthy’s judiciousness that result in Tom’s 
expulsion from Paradise Hall.  These limitations are thematized in a variety of ways.  
Although doctors are satirized throughout the novel, they are themselves keenly aware 
of their inability to anticipate the progress of a disease.  After Allworthy’s seemingly 
improbable return from the brink of death, we learn that  his “situation had never been 
so bad, as the great caution of the doctor had represented it”:  like a “wise general,” a 
good doctor “never despises his enemy, however inferior his force may be” and with 
good reason, for “by these means the greater glory redounds to them if they gain the 
victory, and the less disgrace if by any unlucky accident they should happen to be 
conquered” (Tom Jones 200).57  In discussing how to discover the deceit of others, the 
narrator’s story of the Wiltshire thief inculcates the same point: 
Three countrymen were pursuing a Wiltshire thief through Brentford.  The 
simplest of them seeing the Wiltshire House written under a sign, advised 
his companions to enter it, for there most probably they would find their 
countryman.  The second, who was wiser, laughed at this simplicity; but 
the third, who was wiser still, answered, ‘Let us go in, however, for he may 
think we should not suspect him of going amongst his own countrymen.’  
They accordingly went in and searched the house, and by that means 
missed overtaking the thief, who was, at that time, but a little way before 
                                                 
57 This, of course, also helps explain Fitzpatrick’s seemingly “improbable” recovery from the wounds 
he receives in his fight with Tom.  
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them; and who, as they all knew, but had never once reflected, could not 
read. (226) 
Even the episode of the Man of the Hill reiterates this point, as his misanthropy is 
shown to result from a misguided attempt to deduce universal human nature from the 
isolated instances of his experience.  As Tom points out to him, “if there was indeed 
much more wickedness in the world than there is, it would not prove such general 
assertions against human nature, since much of this arrives by mere accident and many 
a man who commits evil, is not totally bad and corrupt in his heart” (392).  Accidents, 
therefore, undermine the various systems of knowledge that attempt to impose order 
onto the world (by moving from individual incidents to principles of knowledge).  At 
the same time, accidents also challenge the generic expectations readers use to 
organize and interpret events presented to them in narrative. 
 It is important to note, within the context of my reading, the novel’s explicit 
critique of the providential reading of events.  In introducing the “accident […] of a 
very extraordinary kind” that brings about the revolution in Allworthy’s opinion of 
Tom, the narrator describes it as one “of those strange chances, whence very good and 
grave men have concluded that Providence often interposes in the discovery of the 
most secret villainy, in order to caution men from quitting the paths of honesty, 
however warily they tread in those of vice” (769).  While “very good and grave men” 
might discern providential intention behind such “strange chances,” the narrator is 
reluctant to draw such conclusions.  Furthermore, the providential interpretation of 
events is embodied by Partridge, whose superstitious beliefs are a constant source of 
humor and ridicule.  When Tom fortuitously catches scent of Sophia’s path toward 
London, Partridge “assured Jones, that he would certainly have good success in the 
end: for, he said, ‘two such accidents could never have happened to direct him after 
 
 
 
66 
his mistress, if Providence had not designed to bring them together at last’” (535).58  
More importantly, even though things work out for Tom and Sophia in the end, that 
conclusion cannot be read as illustrating the operations or even a confident belief in a 
benign providence.  As Robert Wess puts it, “Merit and fortune are finally aligned not 
because ‘poetic justice’ rules in the world of Tom Jones but because things just happen 
to turn out that way.”59 Didactic readings of the novel that understand the happy union 
to be a consequence of Tom’s acquisition of prudence fail to recognize not only that 
Tom changes little during the course of the novel, but also that prudence in the novel 
is not the unequivocally positive value that some critics take it to be.60  While Tom is 
ultimately rewarded for his goodness, the reader is forced to recognize that that reward 
is not a consequence of moral or generic necessity.  The novel promotes a Christian 
ideal of goodness, but in doing so demonstrates that it is not a guaranty of earthly 
happiness.  Far from undermining the novel’s rhetorical force, appreciating the highly 
contingent nature of the novel’s conclusion actually heightens the comic delight it 
produces: we are pleased by Tom’s fate precisely because we grasp that it is 
contingent rather than necessary. 
 The novel’s accidents, therefore, direct the reader to the vicissitudes of human 
freedom and responsibility in a material world whose complexity exceeds our 
                                                 
58 Aubrey Williams curiously reads Patridge’s comment as proof of the providential design of the 
novel’s events.  After presenting Patridge’s comment, he remarks, “And to underscore his point here, 
Fielding adds that ‘this was the first time that Jones lent any attention to the superstitious doctrines of 
his companion’” (280).  The fact that this is the first time Tom heeds Patridge’s superstitious beliefs is 
clearly a sign of a failure on Tom’s part, rather than a sign of the truth of Partridge’s statement.  Tom, 
of course, gives credence to Partridge’s superstitions at this moment because they happen to coincide 
with his desires. 
59 Wess, pg. 44. 
60 See Dwigth Codr, “In the Interest of Saving Time: Tom Jones and the Prudence of the Serpent” (A 
Store Yet Untouched: Speculative Ideologies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature [diss., Cornell 
University, 2006], pgs. 104-161) for a perceptive account of how goodness and prudence are inherently 
conflicting, yet ultimately reconcileable qualities in the novel. 
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capacities of anticipation.  In XII.viii, the narrator remarks that Sophia is more upset at 
“freedoms which she thought, and not without good reason [Tom] had taken with her 
name and character, than at any freedoms, in which, under his present circumstances, 
he had indulged himself with the person of another woman.”  Although Sophia’s 
aversion is founded on mistaken grounds (as it was Partridge and not Tom who 
indulged in the specific freedoms that offend her), the narrator notes that this situation 
“must please all”: 
For wise and good men may consider what happened to Jones at Upton as a 
just punishment for his wickedness, with regard to women, of which it was 
indeed the immediate consequence; and silly and bad persons may comfort 
themselves in their vices, by flattering their own hearts that the characters 
of men are rather owing to accident than to virtue.  Now perhaps the 
reflections which we should be here inclined to draw, would alike 
contradict both these conclusions, and would shew that these incidents 
contribute to confirm the great, useful and uncommon doctrine, which it is 
the purpose of this whole work to inculcate, and which we must not fill up 
our pages by frequently repeating, as an ordinary parson fills his sermon by 
repeating his text at the end of every paragraph. (536) 
Far from “frequently repeating” the “great, useful and uncommon doctrine,” the 
narrator famously never specifies what it may actually be, and this refusal is 
characteristic of the way in which our hopes and expectations are continually aroused 
only to be thwarted or diverted.  More importantly, in suggesting that there is some but 
no direct correlation between action and consequence, the narrator highlights the 
problems and possibilities of human freedom and happiness in a contingent world.  
The probabilities and improbabilities of the world require us neither to believe in 
accidents as “just punishment” nor to completely abandon principles and give 
 
 
 
68 
ourselves over entirely to chance.  The most we can do is to cultivate a certain 
disposition toward accidents.  What ultimately distinguishes Tom’s virtue is not 
prudence but his “naturally sanguine” temper (582).  It is this temper which the 
narrator hopes his reader is “possessed of,” “since, after having read much, and 
considered long on that subject of happiness which hath employed so many great pens, 
I am almost inclined to fix it in the possession of this temper; which puts us, in a 
manner, out of the reach of Fortune, and makes us happy without her assistance.”  
While accidents that potentially remove Tom from all that is good in the novel 
threaten this sanguinity, the accidents that bring about the happy union at the end 
encourage this sanguinity, tempered, of course, by a profound understanding of that 
union’s contingency.61   
 
III.  Conclusion: From Accident to Coincidence 
 This reading of the importance of accidents to Tom Jones has several 
implications for both theoretical conceptualizations of literary realism and historical 
considerations of the development of the novel form.  First, it casts further doubt upon 
the widely held critical assumption that realism is, by its very nature, “probable.”  
While Tom Jones has always existed on the margins of literary realism, my reading 
has suggested that what can be understood as its realism emerges precisely through its 
treatment of accidents.   As events which defy expectations of the probable or likely, 
accidents have the potential to stage a confrontation between those expectations and 
the world as it is.  It is precisely through improbable events that Tom Jones directs the 
                                                 
61 William Empson comes to a similar conclusion about Fielding’s “doctrine” in the novel.  My 
argument differs from his primarily in terms of its focus: whereas Empson is concerned with describing 
how Fielding’s “doctrine” can be inferred through a proper understanding of the novel’s habitual use of 
double irony, my point has been to suggest that the novel’s ideational content is best approached 
through its deployment of accidents.  Of course, part of my point has also been to suggest that the novel 
itself complicates the very adequacy of doctrines in the face of the contingencies of the world.   
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reader’s attention to the contingencies of a world in a manner that complicates a 
simplistic understanding of the relationship between Tom’s goodness and his fate.  
This suggests that what is at stake for literary realism in discussions of improbable 
events is not whether events themselves are “probable” or whether they disrupt an 
“illusion of reality,” but rather what kind of representational opportunities such events 
make possible.  Indeed, it is the effects of the novel’s improbable events and its 
intrusive narrator that help us to understand just how Tom Jones participates in 
establishing this “new province” of writing in the eighteenth century. 
 Second, this reading illustrates Tom Jones to be a special case of a general 
phenomenon whereby improbable events became an important site for the exploration 
of issues of agency and self-determination in modernity.  This phenomenon includes 
considerations of the importance of accidental events on individual fate, such as 
whether the flattening of Tristram’s nose at birth has any effect on his identity, or 
whether Crusoe’s success is a product of hard work or divine intervention, or whether 
Tom’s potential demise results from his actions or chance.  More importantly, 
however, it also includes an understanding of how those events are shaped by 
narrative form.  Since accidents elicit competing interpretive frameworks, we can see 
how the novel emerges as a narrative form precisely through negotiating such 
frameworks.  Like Tom Jones, Robinson Crusoe is structured around a series of 
accidental events.  More importantly, however, the effort to shape the reader’s 
interpretation of these accidents also significantly influences the form of Defoe’s 
novel.  While Crusoe’s journal describes improbable events such as the miraculous 
appearance of the corn, his narrative embeds these descriptions in a framework that 
gives his experience on the island meaning.  Just as our reading of Crusoe (as either a 
spiritual autobiography or capitalist allegory, for example) depends largely on how we 
read this dynamic between accidents and their interpretive framework, so too does our 
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understanding of Tom Jones hinge upon how we read its coincidences.  Accidents 
direct our attention to the way in which Tom’s happiness is neither destined by an 
intervening providence nor entirely the subject of chance, but rather embroiled in the 
contingencies of a complex social world.  To be sure, Tom Jones’s representation of 
the social and historical forces shaping Tom’s agency is not nearly as rich as that 
provided by the nineteenth-century novel, but it nevertheless demonstrates how 
improbable events become an important site where the influence of those forces can be 
represented.  As I will argue in Chapter Two, it is this same capacity of coincidence to 
elicit competing interpretative frameworks that Scott utilizes to more thoroughly 
historicize human agency in particular social milieus in his historical novels. 
 Third and finally, if Tom Jones demonstrates the importance of accidents to 
both the cultural imagination and the exploration of self-determination in the 
eighteenth century, it also elucidates why coincidence—as a special subset of the 
accidental event—becomes integral to the emerging narrative form we call the novel.  
If accidents disrupt the course of events in a manner that elicits our narrative 
capacities to make sense of our world, coincidences lend themselves to narrative form 
precisely because they direct us to other events.  Out of all the accidents in Tom Jones, 
the most significant are those which coincidentally tie together seemingly disparate 
events: accidents create or disrupt sequences, but coincidences generate the patterns 
and narrative arcs that become an important feature of the novel form.  Accidents and 
coincidences in Tom Jones divert the trajectory of the plot, threatening Tom’s 
happiness, but they also function to bring about that happy resolution.  As I have 
argued, the effect of the novel emerges through a complex critique and affirmation of 
readerly expectations.  If accidents disrupt expectations generated by generic 
conventions, coincidences generate a plot with a new shape and function, one which 
directs the reader’s attention toward complex features of a particularized reality. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Improbability and the Representation of the Past:  
Reading Coincidence in Sir Walter Scott 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I both substantiated and provided a historical 
framework for the theoretical claims I made in the Introduction about the relationship 
between realism and improbability, and more particularly, coincidence.  Prevalent 
critical accounts of realism are predicated upon the (either explicit or assumed) 
premise that realism as a literary mode emerged in part through the adoption of 
standards of probability that prohibit the use of mechanisms such as coincidence.  My 
reading of Tom Jones, however, demonstrated that from its earliest days the modern 
novel actually incorporated and harnessed coincidence.  More importantly, I suggested 
that the novel’s treatment of coincidence constitutes an important contribution to the 
development of realism because the novel’s rhetorical deployment of coincidence 
points the reader toward the structures of the material world.   In this chapter, I 
turn to the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott to argue that understanding Scott’s use 
of coincidence can help us better understand the formal means by which the 
nineteenth-century novel represents reality.  In doing so, I will be both following and 
complicating Georg Lukács’s reading of Scott in The Historical Novel (1937), which 
despite its initial impact has had less influence than befits the work of one of most 
important Marxist philosophers of the twentieth century.  Lukács remains an important 
theoretician of realism, and his work is especially significant to my concerns for two 
reasons.  First, Lukács identifies “what was new in Scott’s art” in relation to his 
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predecessors.62  Although certain writers of the eighteenth century such as Fielding 
were able to “grasp the salient features of their world with a bold and penetrating 
realism” (20), Lukács argues that the emergence and spread of historicist thinking in 
the wake of the French Revolution generated “the concrete possibilities for men to 
comprehend their own existence as something historically conditioned” (24).  Scott’s 
historical novel marks an important moment in the history of the novel not because it 
represents history but because it represents a historicized reality.  Second, Lukács’s 
writings on realism are important because he addresses—both in The Historical Novel 
and elsewhere—the status of chance or accidental events in the realist novel.  Even 
though Lukács sees chance events and coincidental encounters as foundational to the 
realist mode, he ultimately treats them in a manner that negates their accidental 
quality.  I want to suggest that it is this very accidental or chance quality of 
coincidence that Scott harnesses in order to represent and historicize the past.63 
                                                 
62 Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 
1989) pg. 30.  Further references are to this edition and appear in the text. 
63 My emphasis here on “representation” is important.  One prevalent critique of realism (as well as 
historical writing) raises the question of the adequacy of language to grasp (or reference) reality—
whether it can be “true” in any objective capacity.  In an analysis of the effect of “the linguistic turn” in 
literary theory on historical writing, historiographer Frank Ankersmit argues that this linguistic critique 
of historical writing mistakenly introduces epistemological questions into the problem of representation.  
Ankersmit argues that critiques of historical representation on the basis of language mistakenly treat 
historical representation as historical description.  Description involves the epistemological relationship 
between language and the world, whereas representation is a relationship between two things (a thing 
made of words and the world).  Historical writing, in other words, is not a description of things (the 
world or the past), but rather a representation of those things.  The critical problem is not the adequacy 
of language to grasp the world, but rather about the relative adequacy of different representations:  a 
historical account cannot stand in for the past, but different historical accounts more or less adequately 
represent that past.  When I say that Scott’s novels represent the past, I mean that a representation of the 
past that is both fictional and improbable has the potential to represent features of the past as adequately 
as a representation of the past that is non-fictional.  See Ankersmit, Historical Representation 
(Stanford:  Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), pgs. 29-74.  Ankersmit has recently made the explicit 
connection between historical writing and the historical novel (and by extension, literary realism) in his 
article “Truth in History and Literature” [Narrative 18.1 (2010): 29-50].  For another, more rigorous 
consideration of the problem of reference in realist representation, see Harry Shaw, Narrating Reality: 
Austen, Scott, Eliot (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1999), pgs. 38-89. 
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 My argument—both here and in the remaining chapters of this dissertation—
will be that coincidence generates opportunities for representation particularly suited 
to the historicizing inclination characteristic of the nineteenth-century realist novel.  
Although Scott, Dickens, and Hardy each develop unique fictional forms, they all use 
coincidence to cultivate a historicist consciousness in their readers.  I begin this 
chapter with a discussion of Scott’s story “The Two Drovers” in the context of 
Lukács’s various comments on the status of chance events in the realist novel.  While 
Lukács’s theoretical framework can help us understand how chance is productive for 
realism, Scott’s story demonstrates the limitations of his framework.  More 
importantly, the story reveals the two distinct functions of coincidence in Scott: 
coincidence is a basic narrative mechanism that highlights unique features of a 
particular milieu, and it is used to historicize that milieu by juxtaposing two competing 
interpretations of coincidence against each other.  After identifying these two 
functions, I turn to Redgauntlet to illustrate in more detail how that novel makes use of 
coincidence in its representation of historical process in the decades following the ’45 
Jacobite rebellion.  The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of The Bride of 
Lammermoor, which shows the different ways in which Scott’s novels pit competing 
readings of coincidence against each other for different ends.     
  
I.  “The Two Drovers” and Lukács on Chance in Realism 
 Scott’s story “The Two Drovers,” published as part of the Chronicles of the 
Canongate in 1827, provides a helpful starting point for considering the function of 
coincidence in Scott’s works.  It also provides an example through which to evaluate 
Lukács’s comments on the status and function of the accidental in realism.  These 
comments offer a productive alternative to the theoretical accounts of coincidence I 
have discussed in the preceding chapters, yet ultimately reflect many of their 
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shortcomings.  “The Two Drovers” represents a conflict between the eponymous 
drovers—the Highlandman Robin Oig and his English friend, Harry Wakefield—that 
causes Robin to kill his friend in an effort to avenge his reputation, a sense of pride 
which is shaped by his social position within his Highland culture.  The story opens 
with an extended portrait of Robin that shows him to be very much a “cultural 
middleman,”64 straddling the boundaries of both the Highlands and modernity as a 
result of his trade.  Robin is proud of both his reputation and birth, as we learn that his 
grandfather was friends with the famous Highland marauder Rob Roy.  Although 
Robin is “proud accordingly,” his trips to England and the Lowlands “had given him 
tact enough to know that pretensions, which still gave him a little right to distinction in 
his own lonely glen, might be both obnoxious and ridiculous if preferred elsewhere.”65  
His pride of birth, therefore, exists merely as “the secret subject of his contemplation.”  
Our sense of Robin’s self-consciousness is heightened when, as he is about to depart 
on his journey, his aunt Janet appears and insists on performing an ancient ritualistic 
blessing.  Although Robin is “rather impatient of her presence,” he nevertheless allows 
her to perform the ritual, “half embarrassed, half laughing, and signing to those around 
that he only complied with the old woman to soothe her humour” (127).  Her presence 
becomes even more irritating to Robin when during the ritual she stops in “alarm and 
horror” and claims through her “second sight” that there is “English blood” on Robin’s 
hands, insisting that he not set off on his journey.  Impatient to meet up with his friend 
Harry and “determined to close [the scene] at any sacrifice,” Robin refuses to abort his 
journey but placates his aunt by surrendering his dirk to a fellow drover (128). 
                                                 
64 Shaw, Narrating Reality, pg. 198.  See pgs. 197-212 for a thorough discussion of the story’s 
exploration of cultural embeddedness. 
65 Chronicles of the Canongate (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), pg. 126.  Further references are to 
this edition and appear in the text. 
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 The central conflict of the story occurs as the two friends travel south into 
England.  When they attempt to secure fields in which to rest their droves, “unhappily 
it chanced that both of them, unknown to each other,” coincidentally secure the same 
field on a gentleman’s property, as Oig makes a deal with the squire himself and 
Wakefield with the squire’s bailiff (131).  Wakefield acknowledges the primacy of 
Oig’s claim when the coincidence comes to light, but the misunderstanding 
temporarily wounds Wakefield’s pride.  His resentment rises later in the evening at an 
alehouse, where the prejudices of his fellow countrymen against the Highlander and 
the influence of whiskey lead him to assault Oig.  Wakefield’s anger is mollified by 
the brief pugilistic encounter, leaving him quite willing to let bygones be bygones.  
For Robin, however, the encounter has indelibly marked his reputation since he has 
been assaulted without having recourse to his weapon for defense.  Indeed, as the men 
go their separate ways, 
there remained one party from whose mind that recollection [of the 
unpleasant scuffle] could not have been wiped away by the possession of 
every head of cattle betwixt Esk and Eden. 
 This was Robin Oig McCombich.—“That I should have had no 
weapon,” he said, “and for the first time in my life!—Blighted be the 
tongue that bids the Highlander part with the dirk—the dirk—ha! the 
English blood!—My muhme’s word—when did her word fall to the 
ground?” 
 The recollection of the fatal prophecy confirmed the deadly intention 
which instantly sprang up in his mind. (138) 
Robin’s recollection of his aunt’s prophecy gives his “impetuous spirit […] a fixed 
purpose and motive of action” (139).  He walks a dozen miles round trip to retrieve his 
dirk, returning to the alehouse to slay Wakefield.  It is the contingency of Robin’s 
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walk to retrieve his weapon that ultimately condemns him in the eyes of the English 
law to which he is subjected.  In the extended description of Robin’s trial that 
concludes the story, the judge recognizes that Robin’s “rooted national 
prejudices…made him consider himself as stained with indelible dishonor” (142).  
This leads the “English audience […] to regard his crime as the wayward aberration of 
a false idea of honour rather than as flowing from a heart naturally savage, or 
perverted by habitual vice.”  Yet the English law cannot fully recognize Robin’s sense 
of honor or countenance his action.  While immediate retaliation may have been 
justifiable, “the pinch of the case [lay] in the interval of two hours interposed betwixt 
the reception of the injury and the fatal retaliation”—Robin’s act is viewed as 
“predetermined revenge” and necessitates his execution (144-5). 
 If a central feature of this story is the complex exploration of the incongruity 
between Robin’s character and English cultural and legal codes, then it is the 
“unhappy” coincidence of Robin and Harry accidentally contracting the same field 
that enables such an exploration.  It not only sets in motion the conflict between Robin 
and Harry, but its highly coincidental nature is essential for the story to unfold in the 
way that it does.  The bystanders at the alehouse are horrified by Robin’s retaliatory 
assault on Harry, “the provocation being, in their opinion, so utterly inadequate to the 
excess of vengeance” (142).   Similarly, the dissonance between the initiating action 
(an “unhappy” coincidence) and its ultimate effects (a murder and an execution) is 
essential to how the story develops our capacity to understand Robin’s identity:  even 
though he has one foot in modernity, his agency and identity are nevertheless shaped 
by the traditional Highland culture from which he comes.  To invoke the critical 
terminology I have been attempting to complicate, the story is certainly structured by a 
“cheap plot trick,” but it is one that enables the story to do some serious 
representational work.   
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 In the Introduction, I demonstrated that while many critics have recognized the 
structural utility of coincidence, they have simultaneously argued that coincidence 
must be “naturalized” in order to be productive for realism: texts either use 
coincidence well or poorly depending on whether it appears “natural” or “artificial.”  
This categorical distinction was shown to be theoretically problematic; more 
importantly, it is on a pragmatic level clearly of little use in helping us understand how 
“The Two Drovers” works.  In contrast, Georg Lukács’s discussions of the role of 
chance in realism can move us closer toward describing the relationship between 
coincidence and realism in this story.  Lukács begins his 1936 essay “Narrate or 
Describe?” with a comparison of the way in which two important novels—Zola’s 
Nana (1880) and Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1875-7)—utilize a horseracing scene at a 
critical juncture in the plot.  The horserace is important to both plots even though 
“objectively, attendance at or participation in the race is only an incident in life.”66  
The difference between the two scenes for Lukács lies in how the two novelists 
integrate the horserace into the larger fabric of the novel’s representation of reality.  In 
Zola’s novel, the scene is ultimately “mere filler” because its link to the main plot is a 
“tenuous chance association”: the meaning that emerges through the connection 
between the heroine (Nana) and the victorious horse (also named Nana) is merely 
“symbolic.”  In Tolstoy’s novel, however, the race is “no mere tableau but rather a 
series of intensely dramatic scenes which provide a turning point in the plot” (111).  In 
the categorical terms of Lukács’s essay, the scene is narrated in Tolstoy rather than 
described (as in Zola), enabling the reader to “experience” events and grasp “the 
general social significance emerging in the unfolding of the characters’ lives” (116).  
Therefore, even though in both novels the linkage between the race and the 
                                                 
66 “Narrate or Describe?” in Writer and Critic, trans. Arthur Kahn (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 
1971), pg. 112.  Subsequent references are to this edition and appear in the text.   
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protagonists’ lives is “itself a chance event,” Tolstoy’s handling of the scene “go[es] 
beyond crass accident and elevate[s] chance to the inevitable” (112).  This has 
something to do both with the way in which the scene is presented and also with the 
relationship between the meaning of the scene and the content of the rest of the 
novel.67 
 In this analysis Lukács simply seems to be replacing a problematic distinction 
(natural/artificial) with an equally, if not more problematic one (chance/inevitable).  
One might say, in other words, that the seemingly chance event in Anna Karenina 
appears more “natural” than the one in Nana.  However, Lukács’s terminological shift 
is important because it authorizes an appreciation of chance’s role in realist 
representation.  It moves us beyond conventional denigrations of nineteenth-century 
modes of plotting, critiques which Lukács himself was attempting to combat.  For 
example, in both “Narrate or Describe?” and an essay on Balzac’s Lost Illusions, 
Lukács cites the comment by Sinclair Lewis that appeared at the very beginning of 
this dissertation.  In his review of Dos Passos’s Manhattan Transfer, Lewis comments 
upon the superiority of Dos Passos’s method of plotting over Dickens’s: “And the 
classic method [of plotting]—oh, it was rigged!  By dismal coincidence, Mr. Jones has 
to be produced in the stage-coach at the same time with Mr. Smith, so that something 
very nasty and entertaining might happen.”68  To understand, as Lukács does, that 
“without chance all narration is dead and abstract,” is to appreciate not only that 
chance events promote dramatic intensity but also that they are necessary for 
representing the impact of abstract social forces on the lives of individuals (“Narrate 
or Describe?” 112).  Yes, “The Two Drovers” concocts a “dismal coincidence” so that 
                                                 
67 One might rephrase Lukács’s claim by saying that the relationship is metonymic rather than 
metaphoric.  For a discussion of the importance of metonymy to realist representation, see Shaw, 
Narrating Reality, pgs. 101-9. 
68 John Dos Passos: The Critical Heritage, pg. 70.                        
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“something very nasty and entertaining might happen,” but the more important 
question is whether that coincidence is, as Lukács says in the Balzac essay, 
“artistically productive.”69 
 The essay on Lost Illusions, reprinted as part of Studies in European Realism 
(1948), provides a slightly more robust articulation of the role of chance in the 
representation of social reality.  For Lukács, of course, the importance of the realist 
novel developed by Scott and Balzac dwells in its capacity to “represent social trends 
and historical forces” through the lives of individuals (The Historical Novel 34).  
Thus, in Lost Illusions, Balzac is able to portray “the tragic self-dissolution of 
bourgeois ideals by their own economic basis, by the forces of capitalism” (Studies in 
European Realism 47).  Crucially, however, “the unfolding of material problems is 
always indissolubly bound up with the consequences arising from the personal 
passions” of characters (51).  The decisive aesthetic question is how to accurately 
grasp the interplay of concrete individual action and abstract social determinants.  For 
Lukács, the “dialectics of freedom and necessity” in realism consists in a proper 
representation of how the individual is determined by and determines social processes 
(The Historical Novel 147).   
 In Lukács’s estimation, for example, historical necessity in Scott is “of the 
most severe, implacable kind,” but “this necessity is no otherworldly fate divorced 
from men; it is the complex interaction of concrete historical circumstances in their 
process of transformation, in their interaction with the concrete human beings, who 
have grown up in these circumstances” (58).   Lost Illusions, Lukács suggests, 
negotiates this problem successfully because “the aggregate of social determinates is 
expressed in an uneven, intricate, confused and contradictory pattern, in a labyrinth of 
                                                 
69 Studies in European Realism, trans. Alfred Kazin (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), pg. 55. 
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personal passions and chance happenings” (Studies in European Realism 53).  In other 
words, the relationship between the level of the general (the processes of capitalism) 
and the particular (Lucien’s passions) is represented obliquely rather than directly.  
Chance events are suited to such a mediation of levels because they can generate 
“chain[s] of necessity” that represent the material out of which those chains are forged 
(57).  The chance event thus comes to appear as “inevitable” not because it represents 
an abstract fatalism but because the chance event illustrates or makes accessible social 
forces whose impact cannot be represented directly.70                
 A crucial aspect of Lukács’s discussion—and one that I want to challenge—is 
his claim that the character of the chance event is actually transformed through its 
adequate integration into novelistic representation.  While Lukács recognizes that 
realism must utilize chance events to represent how the larger processes of capitalism 
concretely impact the lives of individuals, he also asserts, consistent with his Hegelian 
framework, that such representation ultimately negates the accidental quality of these 
events.  What is objectively or categorically chance no longer appears so: “the 
necessity which nullifies chance consists of an intricate network of causal 
connections” so that “an entire trend of developments constitutes a poetic necessity” 
(Studies in European Realism 56, emphasis in original).  As a result, chance is—and, 
more importantly, must be—“sublat[ed].”71   
                                                 
70 Lukács also discusses this dialectic of causality and chance in his treatment of biography in The 
Historical Novel.  There, he writes, “It is characteristic of human life that the occasions which produce 
the most important feelings, experiences or deeds are accidental.  If, however, the real character of the 
given literary figure is properly revealed in his deed, then although the occasion of the deed remains 
accidental it occupies precisely the position which would be required of it in reality.  For it is part of life 
that necessity asserts itself through accidents of this kind” (306).  His point of reference here is the 
historical necessity of Marx’s discovery of the class struggle: “From the viewpoint of objective 
necessity it is a matter of pure accident whether Marx came to his formulation in a conversation with 
Engels, on his own walking up and down his study or elsewhere” (305).  Lukács’s point is that 
important (“necessary”) events always appear as purely accidental unless we understand the various 
forces which make that event a necessity despite its irreducible contingency.     
71 Kazin translates this as “sublimat[ed].”  However, in the original German, the sentence reads: 
“Balzacs Form der dichterischen Aufhebung des Zufalls ist also noch ‘altmodisch’ und unterscheidet 
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Lukács’s critique of “the non-dialectical approach to causality and chance” 
reflects the same insight that has motivated my critique of more recent critical 
accounts of the role of chance in realism (Studies in European Realism 56).  In the 
Introduction, I demonstrated that prevalent accounts of realism assume or argue that 
realism represents the processes of the world by reflecting or mirroring these 
processes, and as a consequence see improbable or unlikely events like coincidence as 
“rigged” and antagonistic to the mode.  This model, I suggested, is heavily indebted to 
Aristotle’s understanding of a well-constructed plot in the Poetics.  For Aristotle, plot 
in tragedy accomplishes its end by stripping away the contingencies of situation so 
that the consequences of actions can be traced according to the laws of probability and 
necessity.  Chance is excluded from plot on philosophical grounds—for Aristotle, 
tragedy’s virtue is its capacity to transcend the realm of the particular and access the 
universal.  Adopting this model for realism is problematic because the situation of 
modernity—and representing that situation in its particularity—requires understanding 
how the contingencies of circumstance shape self-determination, not stripping them 
away.  Grasping the relationship between Lucien’s passions and his fate requires 
understanding how those passions interact with Lucien’s concrete material situation.  
Lukács, therefore, recognizes that chance events not only facilitate but are in fact 
necessary to representing this relationship:  access to the universal (or for Lukács, 
totality) now requires a passage through the accidental, the contingent. 
However, if it is Lukács’s Hegelian framework that enables him to recognize 
the importance of chance, it is this same framework that causes deficiencies in his 
                                                                                                                                            
sich grundsätzlich von der Art neuerer Schriftsteller” (“Balzac’s mode of the poetic sublation of chance 
is thus still ‘old-fashioned’ and differs in principle from the method of recent writers”) [Balzac und der 
Französische Realismus (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1952), pg. 55]. 
 
 
 
82 
treatment of it.72  Lukács may modify Aristotle’s framework in order to incorporate 
chance, but he does not abandon that framework, leading him into similar conceptual 
territory as those he critiques.  On one level, we might challenge the validity (or 
practicality) of his Hegelian framework and ask what it means for chance to be 
sublated—both preserved and negated.  On a more basic level, however, we can see 
that Lukács’s framework forces him to make fairly rigid and evaluative distinctions 
between different instances of chance.  Although Lukács and Hilary Dannenberg have 
very different conceptions of realism, they end up with similar frameworks for 
understanding the relationship between chance or coincidence and realism.  Both show 
how coincidental events contribute to effects they understand realism to produce—for 
Dannenberg, immersion in the narrative world and for Lukács, the representation of 
the “totality of the social process” (Studies in European Realism 55).  Somewhat 
paradoxically, however, coincidences for both contribute to these effects in a self-
negating fashion: the coincidental character of the event is ultimately occluded or 
sublated.  In the same way that, for Dannenberg, mismanaged realism leads to 
expulsion of the reader from the narrative world, mismanaged realism for Lukács can 
lead to chance events (like the horserace in Nana) whose relationship to the 
representation of the total social fabric is “symbolic” or tangential rather than 
dialectical.     
 Therefore, while Lukács makes an important effort to recuperate chance for 
realism, that effort is constrained by his philosophical commitments.  Ultimately, we 
might say that his philosophical commitments get in the way of his aesthetic insights.  
Recognizing this fact, I want to argue for the importance of his insight that chance 
                                                 
72 Lukács’s idea that necessity asserts itself through contingency is drawn from Hegel.  For Hegel’s 
discussion of contingency and necessity, see Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanity 
Books, 1969), pgs. 541-71.  
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events are “artistically productive” because they enable complex relationships between 
the social base and individual identity to come into view.   What I am interested in is 
how certain authors—namely, those I deal with in this dissertation—make coincidence 
“artistically productive” for the realist novel.  A brief comparison of the methods Scott 
and Tolstoy use to represent history can bring Scott’s specific use of coincidence into 
sharper focus.  War and Peace (1869) is concerned, like Scott’s novels, with 
understanding the “dialectics of freedom and necessity” and how social forces and 
historical events shape the lives of individuals.  However, Tolstoy’s novel makes no 
attempt to mediate levels as disparate as the lives of individuals and the movement of 
history.  According to Tolsoty’s narrator, attributing the French invasion of Russia to 
“Napoleon’s love of power, [or] Alexander’s firmness” mistakenly presupposes the 
capacity of individual actors to bring about enormous events, just as attributing the 
French loss at Borodino to Napoleon’s cold overestimates the influence the decisions 
of general have on the outcome of wars.73  For Tolstoy, large events can be understood 
only as the product of innumerable coinciding causes; necessity, therefore, asserts 
itself only on a very general level.  This philosophical position determines the 
representational method of the novel: individuals in their daily lives are represented as 
acting freely according to their own wills, while the narrator shows how historical 
necessity asserts itself through the collective force of these individual actions.  There 
are, of course, coincidences in the novel—such as when Pierre sees Natasha as she 
flees Moscow—but they have little to do with uniting the two sides of the novel’s 
representation of history.  Scott, however, “shifts the primary focus of attention away 
from the individual and toward the social, and this allows him to concentrate on that 
area of human experience where history is most likely to reveal its influence—on the 
                                                 
73Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007), pg. 603. 
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forces that bind together individuals into historically distinctive societies.”74  Scott is 
concerned with particular social milieus rather than with individual lives or the 
causality of large historical events.  Chance events provide him with a particular way 
into those milieus: they create situations and chains of events that enable the influence 
of social and historical forces to reveal themselves.  Even though the brevity of “The 
Two Drovers” prevents us from taking it as representative of Scott’s novelistic 
methods, we can nevertheless see how the coincidence structuring the story is 
artistically productive, an enabling mechanism. 
 However—and here is where the limitations of Lukács’s account come into 
focus—coincidental events are productive in Scott precisely through their coincidental 
nature.  Scott harnesses coincidences not by sublating them but by utilizing the 
inherent tension in the chance/inevitable distinction.  Coincidences for Scott are 
productive precisely through their capacity to create conflict and highlight contrasts 
between different social and cultural formations.75  As I’ve already suggested, part of 
the effect of “The Two Drovers” is a consequence of the disparity between Robin’s 
actions and the nature of the events that generate those actions.  More important, 
                                                 
74 Harry E. Shaw, The Forms of Historical Fiction: Sir Walter Scott and His Successors (Ithaca: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1983), pg. 128. 
75 Scott himself noted that his historical novels frequently utilize such tensions.  In the 1831 Preface to 
The Fortunes of Nigel, he wrote, “The most picturesque period of history is that when the ancient rough 
and wild manners of a barbarous age are just becoming innovated upon, and contrasted, by the 
illumination of increased or revived learning, and the instructions of renewed or reformed religion.  The 
strong contrast produced by the opposition of ancient manners to those which are gradually subduing 
them, affords the lights and shadows necessary to give effect to fictitious narrative; and while such a 
period entitles the author to introduce incidents of a marvelous and improbable character, as arising out 
of the turbulence, independence and ferocity, belonging to old habits of violence, still influencing the 
manners of a people who had been so lately in a barbarous state; yet, on the other hand, the characters  
and sentiments of many of the actors may, with the utmost probability, be described with great variety 
of shading and delineation, which belongs to the newer and more improved period, of which the world 
has but lately received the light” [Novelists on the Novel, ed. Miriam Allott (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1959), pg. 50].  This, of coruse, is an attempt to justify the inclusion of “marvelous and 
improbable” events in historical fiction, but one of his points is that such events highlight the contrast 
between ancient “manners” and modern ones.   
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though, is the fact that the story relies upon what we might call a second-order 
coincidence—namely, the juxtaposition of Janet’s prophecy against the conflict 
between Robin and Harry.  As Robin laments the absence of his dirk after being 
beaten by Harry, his train of thought leads him back to the prophecy: “‘Blighted be the 
tongue that bids the Highlander part with the dirk—the dirk—ha! the English blood!—
My muhme’s word—when did her word fall to the ground?’”  Not only does Robin’s 
attitude toward his aunt change radically in this moment, but “the recollection of the 
fatal prophecy confirmed the deadly intention which instantly sprang up in his mind.”  
The causality here is peculiar: although Robin’s “deadly intention” exists prior to and 
independently of his recollection of the prophecy, it is this recollection that confirms 
his intention and causes him to carry it out.  If it is the duration of Robin’s murderous 
intention through his two-hour walk that both marks his cultural embeddedness and 
his otherness to the English legal code, it is his reaction to Janet’s prophecy that 
causes his immediate impulse to harden into fixed purpose.  If Robin, like the reader, 
regards Janet’s prophecy at the time of its utterance with skepticism, then presumably 
such a judgment would still be available to him at the moment he recollects it.  In 
other words, Robin could read, as the reader does, the relationship between Janet’s 
prophecy and his fight with Harry as a mere coincidence.  Such an interpretation on 
Robin’s part would, of course, have opened the possibility of an alternative response 
to the situation.  The fact that he takes Janet’s words seriously at this moment causes 
the prophecy to become self-fulfilling.  Robin’s agency is determined not by a 
predestined ‘fate’ to which Janet has prophetic access, but rather by his response to the 
prophecy itself, a response that is a product of the Highland culture that has shaped his 
self-understanding and pride.  Part of the effect of the story, then, relies on the reader’s 
capacity to see the relationship between the prophecy and the initial altercation as 
potentially coincidental.  Recognizing that the relationship between the prophecy and 
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the altercation is open to interpretation enables us to understand that Robin’s response 
to the prophecy is a possible (rather than necessary) reaction that discloses the degree 
to which Robin remains a product of the traditional Highland culture.  Put differently, 
if—as I suggested in the last chapter—Tom Jones must do considerable rhetorical 
work to have readers interpret coincidences in a particular manner (as accidents rather 
than as providential intervention), then Scott’s story both presupposes and utilizes the 
reader’s capacity to make such discriminations.76   
 
II.  Coincidence and the Movement of History in Redgauntlet 
 Although different in form from Scott’s novels, “The Two Drovers” 
nevertheless illustrates the way in which Scott utilizes coincidence and makes it 
artistically productive in “specifying cultural-historical typologies of character and 
agency.”77  More importantly, the story shows how coincidence functions on two 
distinct levels in Scott’s works.  On one hand, the story makes use of what we might 
call a highly artificial event to initiate the narrative sequence.  Coincidence operates as 
a plot mechanism that grants a particular type of access to a milieu and enables 
particular features of that milieu to manifest themselves.  On the other hand, the story 
also utilizes coincidence to juxtapose two distinct ways of seeing the world.  
Coincidences become productive for Scott because their causally-ambiguous nature 
inherently elicits larger frameworks and structures of meaning.  Coincidences by their 
nature prompt discriminations between “mere chance” or “intentionally motivated,” 
interpretations which are themselves manifestations of cultural differentiation.  Is the 
                                                 
76 In his comments on the Gothic and the supernatural—which I discuss later in this chapter—Scott 
remarks that he lives in “an age of universal incredulity” [Sir Walter Scott on Novelists and Fiction, ed. 
Ioan Williams (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1968), pg. 115].  
77 James Chandler, England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic 
Historicism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pg. 96. 
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relationship between Janet’s prophecy and the conflict between Robin and his English 
friend meaningful or merely coincidental?  Although the story only presents one 
reading of this coincidence, I suggested that the effect of the story relies upon the 
reader implicitly supplying an alternative reading:  we do not read the coincidence as 
the negation of Robin’s agency (i.e., that his actions are determined by “otherworldly 
fate”) but rather as the attenuation of his agency insofar as his response to the 
prophecy demonstrates the degree to which he is shaped by his Highland culture.  The 
fact that the story relies upon the interaction between two readings or understandings 
of coincidence demonstrates that Scott’s realism does not “sublate” chance events into 
a higher order of necessity—sublation would negate the very feature of coincidence 
that makes it productive. 
 With these two functions of coincidence in hand, I turn now to Redgauntlet to 
demonstrate how Scott uses coincidence as an instrument in the representation of 
historical processes.  The third and final of Scott’s Jacobite novels, Redgauntlet stages 
a fictional Jacobite rebellion two decades after the ’45 in order to portray how and 
why Jacobitism is no longer a viable historical force.   It is through the failure of this 
rebellion that the novel is able to represent the processes through which Jacobitism has 
become obsolete.  Like Waverley (1814), Redgauntlet is about both an individual’s 
search for identity and larger historical processes. Whereas Waverley explores 
Jacobitism by having Edward Waverley come into contact with the opposing sides of 
the ’45 rebellion, Redgauntlet does so by bringing Darsie Latimer into contact with his 
uncle Hugh Redgauntlet, the chief leader of the fictional rebellion.  However, what is 
important for my analysis is the particular way in which Darsie comes into contact 
with Hugh:  the coincidence—or, as Darsie says, the “‘accident’”78—that brings them 
                                                 
78 Redgauntlet (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), page 301.   Further references are to this edition and 
appear in then text. 
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into contact on the Solway Firth early in the novel.  As in “The Two Drovers,” this 
coincidence serves two functions: on a basic level, it is an enabling mechanism that 
sets things in motion, but, more importantly, it also enables the novel to juxtapose two 
distinct understandings of identity.  The coincidence pits Hugh’s Jacobite ideology 
and its notion of hereditary determination against Darsie’s notion of bourgeois self-
determination.  Whereas Hugh reads the coincidence as a sign of the forces of history 
determining the actions both he and Darsie must perform, Darsie believes the 
encounter has no bearing on his freedom.  It is through the interaction of these two 
readings that the novel is able to represent Jacobite ideology and its necessary 
obsolescence.   As with “The Two Drovers,” then, Redgauntlet utilizes the interaction 
between two potential readings of a chance event in the service of historical 
representation.  However, whereas “The Two Drovers” calls upon the reader to supply 
one of those interpretations, Redgauntlet has individual characters voice those 
competing interpretations.   
 Many critics have demonstrated that Scott’s novelistic technique is predicated 
upon the interaction of two modes or forms of representing the world.  James Kerr, for 
example, sees “fiction” and “history” as two competing forms of understanding that 
Scott makes use of to both grasp and shape the past.  According to Kerr, “while Scott 
rejects the language of romance as a means of grasping the movements of history, he 
uses romance plots as a way of reshaping the past, of mastering history.”79  While Kerr 
focuses on the tension between the particularities of historical fact and the literary 
forms which shape our understanding of those facts, both Ian Duncan and Fiona 
Robertson emphasize Scott’s use and transformation of the conventions of his Gothic 
predecessors.  In Duncan’s estimation, the opposition between “romance” and 
                                                 
79 Fiction Against History: Scott as Storyteller (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), pg. 9.   
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“history” in the Waverley novels is “complicated and delusive” since “neither carries 
total authority, [and] their dialectical complicity is insisted upon”: “history is 
compounded of romance tropes, figures, episodes; a romance is historically 
embedded.”80  Waverley, for example, begins with the narrator’s discussion of the 
novel’s subtitle, “’Tis Sixty Years Since,” and the problem of the reader’s generic 
expectations.  “Had I,” the narrator remarks, “announced in my frontspiece, 
‘Waverley, a Tale of other Days,’ must not every novel-reader have anticipated a 
castle scarce less than that of Udolpho […]?”81  More importantly, the novel stages the 
conflict between romance and history through Edward’s experience. While his 
romantic imagination “communicates to [occurrences] a tincture of its own romantic 
tone and colouring,” those romantic colorings are subsequently tempered by more 
realistic apprehension (55). 
 Whereas Waverley represents the past through the interaction of Edward’s 
romantic imagination and the reality he encounters, Redgauntlet gives voice to various 
modes of seeing through its form, which includes not only the epistolary 
correspondence between Darsie Latimer and Alan Fairford, but also the editor’s 
narration and the interpolation of “Wandering Willie’s Tale.”  Indeed, Kerr reads 
Redgauntlet as “an elaborate study [by Scott] of his own methods as historian and 
romancer” not only because it “elid[es] the historical referent” (by representing a 
fictional event) but also because the reader’s experience of the narrative’s events is 
mediated by characters themselves.  Whereas in Scott’s previous novels, the reader’s 
“access to the past is always mediated by one of Scott’s editor-figures,” in Redgauntlet 
                                                 
80 Modern Romance and Transformations of the Novel: The Gothic, Scott, Dickens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), pgs. 59-60.  See Robertson, Legitimate Histories: Scott, Gothic, and the 
Authorities of Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), for a much more extensive discussion 
of Scott’s relationship to particular Gothic authors and tropes. 
81 Waverley (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), pg. 33.  Further references are to this edition and 
appear in the text. 
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that access comes—at least initially—through the dialogue between Darsie and Alan.82  
From the beginning, Alan identifies Darsie’s imagination as the “point of [his] 
character most pregnant with peril” and implores him to “View things as they are, and 
not as they may be magnified through thy teeming fancy” (Redgauntlet 14, 13).  This 
tension only increases between Darsie and Alan’s ways of interpreting and describing 
their experience as the narrative progresses.  Both men offer accounts of their 
encounters with the mysterious Hugh Redgauntlet and equally intriguing Green 
Mantle, and the differences between these accounts makes explicit the fact that access 
to reality is always mediated.  The novel, in other words, foregrounds and makes 
explicit use of the incongruities between different modes of seeing the world.   
 If it is through the interaction of Darsie and Alan’s ways of seeing that Scott 
reflects upon his novelistic techniques, it is through the interaction of Darsie and Hugh 
that the novel represents the obsolescence of Jacobitism and the disappearance of the 
social structures which sustained its ideological force.  Darsie and Hugh articulate two 
distinct and competing conceptions of identity, and the very ideological estrangement 
of Darsie (the rightful heir of Redgauntlet) from his uncle reveals the processes 
through which Jacobitism has become obsolete.  On one hand, Redgauntlet, whom 
Darsie describes as living in the abode of “a decayed gentleman,” is devoted to the 
restoration of the Stuart line despite the failure of the ’45 rebellion and the consequent 
necessity of living in hiding (26).  His allegiances structure his understanding of the 
relationship between heredity and social identity, as he believes that the blood flowing 
through his and Darsie’s veins and the “fatal sign” of the horse-shoe on their brows 
link their fate to that of the Stuart cause (192).  The extreme nature of his views is 
revealed when he tells Darsie to “‘Beware […] of struggling with a force sufficient to 
                                                 
82 Kerr, pgs. 102-3.   
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crush [him], [and to] abandon [himself] to that train of events by which we are both 
swept along, and which it is impossible that either of us can resist” (168).  Darsie, on 
the other hand, holds a very different conception of identity, precisely because at the 
beginning of the novel he is ignorant of his heredity.  Far from understanding his 
identity as overdetermined, Darsie feels himself to be a “solitary individual,” who is 
“in the world as a stranger in the crowded coffee-house, where he enters, calls for 
what refreshments he wants, pays his bill, and is forgotten so soon as the waiter’s 
mouth has pronounced his ‘Thank ye, sir’” (4).  Darsie’s social identity is a product of 
both his ignorance of his genealogy and his legal education, and it reflects the process 
which Andrew Lincoln has called the “disembedding” of identity “from the social, 
material, and cultural grounds that governed individuals in earlier ages.”83  The 
disembedding of Darsie’s identity subverts Redgauntlet’s attempt to put Prince 
Charles Edward Stuart on the throne since the remaining Jacobites require Darsie’s 
participation in the rebellion as a condition of their own.   
 Of course, it is not Darsie’s mere ambivalence that dooms Redgauntlet’s plot, 
as the novel represents the various social and legal processes that have led to the 
vanishing of Jacobitism and the necessary failure of the fictional rebellion.84  These 
processes enter the novel in large part as a consequence of the conflict that 
                                                 
83 Walter Scott and Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2007), pg. 9. 
84 In a 1958 essay on Redgauntlet, David Daiches argues that the novel “exposes the widening gap 
between sentimental Jacobitism and active rebellion” [“Scott’s Redgauntlet,” reprinted in Critical 
Essays on Sir Walter Scott, ed. Harry E. Shaw (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1996), pg. 142].  What is 
most interesting about Daiches essay for my purposes is his claim that “the Dickensian complications 
and resolutions of the plot, though done with considerable adroitness, are somewhat mechanical” (147).  
Although Daiches is not perhaps referring explicitly to the coincidence I discuss, his anachronistic 
application of “Dickensian complications and resolutions” to Scott’s work is significant in showing the 
degree to which Dickens’s methods of plotting become representative in critical analysis of 
“mechanical” plotting (as in the statement from Sinclair Lewis above).  Although to apply here my 
analysis of Dickens that occurs in the following chapter would be similarly anachronistic, I will simply 
suggest that the rethinking of Dickens’s realist techniques that I perform in the next chapter is intended 
to have repercussions on critical presuppositions about the methods and modes of the nineteenth-
century novel more broadly.  
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materializes between Darsie and Hugh over the question of who has legal right over 
Darsie’s body.  This conflict, in turn, is a product of the particular manner in which the 
two men come into contact:  their chance encounter on the Solway Firth that occurs 
during Darsie’s journey from Edinburgh to Dumfries in search of knowledge about his 
identity.  Redgauntlet’s rescue of Darsie from the tides and the subsequent necessity of 
boarding him for the evening are significant not simply because they give Redgauntlet 
an inkling that Darsie is his sought-after nephew.  The encounter, in which Darsie 
meets the woman he later learns to be his sister, also causes Darsie to linger in the area 
despite warnings of imminent danger to himself.  Although Lilias later suggests that 
Hugh’s eventual capture of Darsie was “‘doomed to be,’” the consequences of this 
chance encounter are far different than if, for example, Redgauntlet had simply gone 
to Edinburgh and kidnapped Darsie (311).  Redgauntlet interprets Darsie’s sudden 
appearance in his vicinity as another sign of the forces of destiny conspiring to create 
the ideal conditions for his contemplated rebellion.  Lilias tells Darsie, “‘Just before 
you came to the country, my uncle’s desire to find you out, became, if possible, more 
eager than ever—he talked of men to be presently brought together, and of your name 
and influence for raising them.  At this very time, your first visit to Brokenburn took 
place’” (310).  While Hugh interprets the event that brings him into contact with 
Darsie providentially, Darsie’s response to what he deems an “‘accident’” acquires 
significance in his search for a social identity (301).  His refusal to leave the area 
despite warnings of personal danger intimates his passive complicity in his 
kidnapping, a passive complicity that will come to epitomize his relationship to the 
processes of history.  Although he knows that he cannot enter England without 
forfeiting certain legal rights, by lingering near the utmost geographical boundary 
where he retains legal independence, Darsie resigns himself to the course of external 
events. 
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 As in “The Two Drovers,” then, Scott utilizes a coincidence as a way of 
entering into a particular milieu, in this case the decades following the ’45 rebellion.  
The chance encounter is important not simply because it sets the plot in motion, but 
also because it enables two culturally embedded understandings of identity to come 
into contact.85  After he is kidnapped by Hugh, Darsie explicitly articulates the conflict 
between these competing ideologies: “‘I, as well as you, am actuated by impulses, the 
result either of my own free will, or the consequences of the part which is assigned to 
me by my destiny.  These may be—nay, at present are—in direct contradiction to 
those by which you are actuated […]—You perhaps feel yourself destined to act as my 
jailor.  I feel myself, on the contrary, destined to attempt and effect my escape’” (194, 
emphasis in original).  As in “The Two Drovers,” the coincidence draws our attention 
to agency, but it is not to agency as a philosophical or theological conflict between 
free will and destiny, but rather to agency as a product of social and cultural 
differentiation.  The question here is not whether Darsie is actuated by “free will” or 
“destiny,” any more than whether in “The Two Drovers” Robin is “fated” to kill Harry 
or not.  The point is that the social and cultural conditions that compel Redgauntlet to 
conceive of his destiny in a particular manner simply do not obtain for Darsie.   
The obsolescence of Hugh’s self-understanding manifests itself when the 
ideological conflict between Hugh and Darsie acquires an explicitly legal character.  
When Darsie learns from Lilias the full extent of the plot which Hugh is planning with 
the other residual Jacobites, he exclaims, “‘they cannot, at this time of day, think of 
subjecting their necks again to the feudal yoke, which was effectually broken by the 
                                                 
85 As Rohan Maitzen remarks, “Darsie’s and Redgauntlet’s worlds are at once simultaneous and 
incompatible, and their juxtaposition reveals the heterogeneity, the fragmentation, that each individual 
narrative conceals” [“‘By No Means an Improbable Fiction’: Redgauntlet’s Novel Historicism,” 
reprinted in Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott, ed. Harry E. Shaw ( New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1996) 
pg. 129]. 
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Act in 1748, abolishing vassalage and hereditary jurisdictions’” (309).  Darsie’s 
allusion to the Heritable Jurisdictions Act is significant.  The Act—which was passed 
in 1747 in the wake of the ’45 and took effect in 1748—worked to dissolve the social 
influence of the clans and contributed to the development of the legal structures 
through which Darsie secures his self-understanding.86  Lilias’s reply that Redgauntlet 
sees it “‘as it the act of an usurping government’” intimates the inherent contradictions 
in his self-understanding (Redgauntlet 309).  Redgauntlet must appeal to the very legal 
structures he purportedly rejects to secure Darsie’s participation in the rebellion. 
During his confinement, Darsie writes in his journal that “under a legal pretext, I am 
detained in what must be a most illegal manner, by a person, too, whose own political 
immunities have been forfeited by his conduct” (198).  Although Redgauntlet is able 
to make Justice Foxley recognize his legal right of guardianship over Darsie, Darsie 
views this as a mere “pretext” that violates his inherent legal right of self-possession.  
Redgauntlet can physically compel Darsie’s participation, but he cannot command 
Darsie’s ideological assent.  The fact that he must use a “legal pretext” to secure the 
“rightful” heir of the Redgauntlets to the Jacobite cause indicates that the cause is 
doomed.   
Furthermore, the scene with Justice Foxley concretely demonstrates the futility 
of Redgauntlet’s endeavors.  As Redgauntlet takes measures to secure guardianship 
over Darsie, his own identity is revealed to the magistrate and he is nearly arrested.  
When the magistrate’s clerk informs him that there are warrants issued against him, 
                                                 
86 See Ann Whetstone, “The Reform of the Scottish Sheriffdoms in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth 
Centuries” [Albion 9:1 (1977): 61-71], for a longer account of the effects of the reform of the Scottish 
sheriffdoms on Scottish legal practice.  Whetstone suggests that “there was no real reason to suppose 
that the system [of heritable jurisdictions] was related to Jacobitism, but with attention finally turned to 
Scottish affairs such obvious anachronisms became a clear target for reform.”  In other words, the legal 
and social reforms that took place in response to the ’45 rebellion worked both explicitly and in more 
diffuse ways to dissolve the influence of the clan system.   
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Redgauntlet claims he is surprised “‘that, at the distance of so many years, the 
Secretary of State should trouble himself about the unfortunate relics of a ruined 
cause’” (182).  And when the clerk produces the warrant itself, Redgauntlet attempts 
to escape the predicament by destroying it: “he flung the warrant into the fire with one 
hand, and fixed the other, with a stern and irresistible gripe, on the breast of the 
attorney, who, totally unable to contend with him, in either personal struggle or mental 
energy, trembled like a chicken in the raven’s clutch” (183).  While Redgauntlet can 
destroy the warrant and intimidate whoever attempts to serve the warrant, he cannot 
destroy the social structures which guarantee the authority of the warrant.  Indeed, the 
doomed rebellion ends with General Campbell deciding “‘to make no arrests, nay, to 
make no farther inquiries of any kind’” because such measures are unnecessary:  the 
force of the law need not be physically invoked to quash the Jacobites because the 
social and cultural structures that sustained Jacobitism have disappeared (373).  
Ironically, then, Redgauntlet is ultimately correct in his estimation that the government 
need not trouble itself about “the unfortunate relics of a ruined cause.” 
Through the coincidence on the Solway Firth that brings Darsie into contact 
with his uncle, Redgauntlet is able to represent how and why Hugh is merely a relic of 
a ruined cause.  In showing the cultural transformations that make Redgauntlet’s self-
understanding a thing of the past, the novel also shows how such transformations have 
altered the individual’s relationship to history.  As I suggested above, Darsie’s 
curiosity about his identity, aroused by his coincidental encounter with Hugh, causes 
him to respond to that meeting in a way that suggests his passive complicity in the 
processes of history.  After learning of the history of his family from Lilias later in the 
novel, Darsie is unsure whether he should consider this meeting with his uncle “‘lucky 
or unlucky’” (301).  Even though he begins the novel as an individual on a “wild-
goose jaunt” in search of his identity, he eventually finds himself embroiled in matters 
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of political and national importance (6).  After Darsie learns of his personal history 
and the role Redgauntlet has assigned to him, the narrator notes: 
His station in society was changed from that of a wandering, unowned 
youth, in whom none appeared to take an interest, excepting the strangers 
by whom he had been educated, to the heir of a noble house, possessed of 
such influence and such property, that it seemed as if the progress or arrest 
of important political events were likely to depend upon his resolution.  
Even this sudden elevation, the more than fulfilment [sic] of those wishes 
which had haunted him since ever he was able to form a wish on the 
subject, was contemplated by Darsie, volatile as his disposition was, 
without more than a few thrills of gratified vanity. (312) 
The “influence” Darsie believes he acquires after learning of his heredity, a power that 
both gratifies and frightens him, turns out to be another of those “romantic visions” 
that he must continually caution himself against.  He eventually realizes that “his 
resolution” has absolutely no effect on “the progress or arrest of important political 
events.”  Meeting with the conspirators, “He began to believe that the conspiracy 
would dissolve of itself, without the necessity of his placing himself in direct 
opposition to so violent a character as his uncle, and incurring the hazard with which 
such opposition must need be attended” (346).  Just as the events of the novel affirm 
the claims to free will and self-possession Darsie asserts in his ideological conflict 
with his uncle, they also demonstrate the circumscribed nature of that freedom. 
 While Redgauntlet utilizes the ideological displacement of Darsie from his 
uncle to represent the processes that have led to the disappearance of Jacobitism, this 
displacement is predicated upon a geographical displacement.  It is Darsie’s childhood 
and education in Edinburgh that have assimilated him to the modern world and 
“disembedded” his identity from the structures that inform Redgauntlet’s worldview.  
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The decidedly legal character of his education emphasizes that his identity is one 
predicated upon and determined by rights rather than by specific forms of inheritance.  
While Darsie may have inherited the horse-shoe mark of the Redgauntlets on his 
brow, he did not “inherit” the ideology that interprets that mark as a determinant of 
identity.  On a basic level, then, the chance encounter between Darsie and Hugh on 
Solway Firth serves an important function in the novel’s narrative structure.  I have 
shown, however, that much of the importance of that encounter inheres in its particular 
texture.  The conflict that results between the different ways Darsie and Hugh read the 
import of the encounter generates a series of events that demonstrate the status of their 
respective conceptions of identity, conceptions that have a concrete relationship to 
their reading of the coincidence.  Redgauntlet’s providential reading of the encounter 
as a sign of history working toward the restoration of the Stuart line is contradicted not 
simply because things happen to unfold otherwise.  His view is contradicted insofar as 
it is shown to be divorced from social and historical reality.  Coincidence, therefore, 
facilitates the novel’s effort to put us into contact with history.  James Kerr, as I noted 
above, argues that Scott uses “romance plots as a way of reshaping the past, of 
mastering history.”  Although coincidence is generally regarded as a trope of the 
romance plot, it does not follow that coincidence is therefore a manifestation of Scott 
attempting to “reshape” history.  Redgauntlet’s use of coincidence is not Scott 
imposing form onto history (by consigning Jacobitism to the past), but rather Scott 
representing historical process in order to help us understand why Jacobitism has 
become a thing of the past.87       
                                                 
87 The question of whether narrative inherently imposes ideological form onto history has its origin in 
the work of Hayden White in the field of historiography.  For a concise discussion of White’s main 
points, including a discussion of Lukács and a refutation of common misreadings of his work, see his 
essay “Storytelling: Historical and Ideological,” in The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, 
Literature, and Theory 1957-2007 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2010), pgs. 273-292. 
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Redgauntlet thus also demonstrates how Scott’s use of coincidence marks a 
development from Fielding’s use in Tom Jones.  As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, Tom Jones asks us to question Partridge’s providential interpretation of the 
chain of events that appear to portend the union of Tom and Sophia.  We question 
Partridge’s claim that “‘two such accidents could never have happened to direct him 
after his mistress, if Providence had not designed to bring them together at last’” 
because Partridge himself and his superstitious beliefs are a constant source of ridicule 
in the novel.  In Tom Jones, the question is primarily an epistemological one—do “two 
such accidents” necessarily imply “design” of a particular kind?  Fielding uses 
coincidences to explore different ways of thinking about and interpreting the world:  
“two such accidents” do not guarantee providential design, just as prudence does not 
guarantee happiness.    In Redgauntlet, however, Hugh’s providential interpretation is 
called into question by a wealth of concrete details that reveal it to be in conflict with 
the context in which it is made.  What is presented as a conflict between two forms of 
thinking in Fielding is presented as a conflict between a form of thinking and its 
historical context in Scott.  In this way, then, Scott presents Redgauntlet’s reading of 
coincidence and the worldview that informs it in order to historicize them, showing 
that they belong to a particular period and place, developing under historical 
conditions which no longer obtain.   
 
III.  Coincidence, the Gothic, and Indeterminacy in The Bride of Lammermoor 
 Both “The Two Drovers” and Redgauntlet, then, deploy coincidences in order 
to make use of the conflicting interpretations which they generate.  In both cases, the 
text makes coincidence “artistically productive” in its representation of historical 
particularity or historical process.  While in “The Two Drovers” Robin’s interpretation 
of the power of his aunt’s prophecy is pitted against a competing interpretation which 
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I suggested the reader implicitly supplies, in Redgauntlet those competing 
interpretations are voiced by characters in the novel.  In both texts, however, the 
“conflict” is resolved in a manner that contributes to the text’s attempt to historicize 
the “cultural-historical typologies of character and agencies” embodied by Robin, 
Redgauntlent, and Darsie.  In this final section, I would like to briefly consider The 
Bride of Lammermoor as a text in which no such resolution occurs in order to 
demonstrate the different ends toward which Scott utilizes coincidence.  The Bride 
certainly uses coincidence as a plot mechanism—most notably in the “‘singular 
event’”88 where Edgar Ravenswood goes to kill William Ashton but is diverted when 
he finds Ashton and his daughter threatened by a bull.  However, it is more 
noteworthy for its use of what I called second-order coincidences in my analysis of 
“The Two Drovers.”  Just as “The Two Drovers” juxtaposes the conflict between 
Robin and Harry with Janet’s prophecy about the “English blood” on Robin’s hands, 
The Bride juxtaposes concrete events with prophecies or omens which seem to predict 
their occurrence: the legend of the Mermaiden’s Well, Old Alice’s prophesies, and of 
course, Edgar’s death in the quicksands of Kelpie’s Flow, a death which fulfills the 
prophecy of Thomas the Rhymer.  In both texts, the reader is compelled to make a 
determination about the relationship between the event and the prophecy, a 
determination which informs a broader interpretation of the text.  Whereas 
interpretation is straightforward in “The Two Drovers” (we regard Robin as 
determined by his response to the prophecy rather than by the prophecy itself), the 
issue is less decisive in The Bride.  The indeterminacy that ultimately surrounds the 
novel’s coincidences, I want to suggest, is a product of the novel’s relationship to the 
                                                 
88 The Bride of Lammermoor (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), pg. 45.  Further references are to this 
edition and appear in the text. 
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Gothic and its use of Gothic elements, which establish a different relationship with the 
past than that present in Scott’s other works.   
 Recent critics of Scott all agree that The Bride is distinct among his major 
works.  Fiona Robertson, for example, suggests that of all Scott’s novels, The Bride 
“follows most closely the historicizing of terror which characterizes the Gothic.”89  
While Robertson characterizes the novel’s uniqueness in terms of its relationship to 
the Gothic, Harry Shaw understands this uniqueness in terms of the status of history in 
the novel, arguing that “The Bride thus turns out to be the only major novel by Scott in 
which history does not function as the primary subject.”90  Ian Duncan, finally, 
understands the novel’s distinctiveness to be a product of the particular historical 
period which the novel represents.  Whereas Scott’s novels generally depict “the 
middle road” of compromise in the process of British history, the action of the novel 
takes place during the period of social and political instability between the 1688 
Revolution and the 1707 Act of Union.  Therefore, “the utopian settlement” that 
generally occurs in Scott “cannot take place in private life because it has not arrived in 
public life.”91  These identifications of the novel’s Gothic and subjective elements, as 
well as its formal refusals, are all in turn bolstered by consensus over the novel’s 
uniquely biographical status:  critics have long recognized that elements of the novel 
reflect Scott’s devastation over his unhappy relationship with Williamina Belsches. 
 Therefore, while critics agree about The Bride’s distinctiveness, they tend to 
disagree about how best to describe or account for this distinctiveness.  This 
disagreement is a product of certain ambiguities or ambivalences within the text itself, 
and it can in part be traced to residual ambiguity in the novel’s representation of 
                                                 
89 Robertson, pg. 215. 
90 The Forms of Historical Fiction, pg. 225. 
91 Duncan, pg.136. 
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supernatural elements.  On one hand, certain elements of the text suggest that the 
demise of Edgar Ravenswood is the product of what  Lukács would call “otherworldly 
fate.”  Analyzing the betrothal scene between Edgar and Lucy at the Mermaiden’s 
Well, Kathryn Sutherland writes, “What the heavy irony of the Well legend implies 
for the novel’s characters, of course, is the impossibility of acting for or as oneself, of 
taking control of one’s actions.” 92  Sutherland continues, “either fate or hereditary law 
or the workings of his own superstitious imagination—it is any and all of these—
consign him to the impotent repetition of past deeds and surrender him finally to a 
gruesome personal identity, fulfilling the prophecy of Thomas the Rhymer, told by 
Caleb Balderstone.”  On the other hand, there is too much social and historical 
particularity in the novel to simply reduce Edgar’s tale to one of otherworldly fate.  
James Kerr, for example, analyzes the same betrothal scene as Sutherland and 
concludes that “Ravenswood’s gestures in this scene are to be regarded as the result of 
his own choice, rather than of the pattern of fatality embodied in the family legend.”93  
How can a novel generate such diametrically opposed readings of the same scene, and, 
more importantly, how can we adjudicate between these competing interpretations? 
 There is, of course, enough fodder in the text to at least suggest the 
supernatural reading of events.  The sense of doom hanging over the text is cultivated 
by the frame narrative, which foregrounds the impending tragedy of the events being 
narrated.  This sense of fatality is furthered by the various myths, legends, and 
prophesies that surround Edgar’s courtship of Lucy.  These are compounded by 
symbolically charged scenes, such as the scene where, on the way to avenge his kith 
and kin by killing William Ashton, Ravenswood instead saves Lucy by shooting the 
                                                 
92 “Introduction” to The Bride of Lammermoor (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), pgs. xxiv-xxv.   
93 Kerr, pg. 94. 
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wild bull that threatens her and her father.  There is also the visit by the Ashtons to 
Ravenswood’s abode, a meeting which Ashton purportedly desires, but is only made 
possible by the “accident of the storm,” which forces him to seek shelter with Edgar 
(The Bride of Lammermoor 92).  This visit leads to a provisional reconciliation 
between the two families, but it is accompanied by an ominous bolt of lightning, 
making it appear “as if the ancient founder of the castle was bestriding the thunder-
storm, and proclaiming his displeasure at the reconciliation of his descendent with the 
enemy of his house” (93).  And the novel ends with the literal fulfillment of the 
prophecy by Thomas Rhymer that “‘When the last Laird of Ravenswood to 
Ravenswood shall ride, / And wooe a dead maiden to be his bride, / He shall stable his 
steed on the Kelpie’s flow, / And his name shall be lost for evermoe!’” (139).   
 At the same time, however, the novel complicates the novel’s Gothic elements 
by placing the relationship between Edgar and Lucy in a definite historical context.  
Indeed, for Kerr this context significantly alters our interpretation of those elements, 
as he argues that “Scott deploys the Gothic in order to expose it as the irrational and 
therefore false consciousness of a moribund feudal order, as he places the myth of 
supernatural necessity in the service of his realism.”94  From this perspective, Edgar’s 
plight is not the product of supernatural necessity but of determinate social and 
historical forces.  As Edgar takes possession of the castle after his father’s funeral, it is 
a “scene of desolation” (The Bride of Lammermoor 63).  This is a product not simply 
of the debaucheries that follow the funeral, but also of the changing economic 
conditions that have dissolved the basis of the Ravenswood estate.  This economic 
shift is exemplified in Caleb’s trip to Wolfshope in the middle of the novel, where he 
attempts to secure a meal for those stranded in the barren castle after the storm.  The 
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economic structure whereby the inhabitants of the village provided food to the castle 
through feu-rights is no longer in place, and Caleb is forced to steal a hen in a paltry 
effort to maintain the dignity of the Ravenswood name.  “Emancipated from the 
chains of feudal dependence,” the local inhabitants “began to grumble, to resist, and at 
length to positively refuse compliance with the exactions of Caleb,” eventually 
presenting him with a lawyer rather than eggs and butter (101).  Just as Redgauntlet’s 
“fate” is inscribed in his appeal to the very legal structures he is attempting to 
overthrow, the fate of Ravenswood and his estate is inscribed in Caleb’s need to steal 
that which was once the Ravenswoods’ by right.  Furthermore, the novel explicitly 
describes how the courtship of Edgar and Lucy is fueled by their romantic 
imaginations and also shows how it is caught up in the political turmoil at the fringes 
of the novel.  Ashton’s desire to seek reconciliation with Ravenswood is motivated by 
his “useful and practical” nature, for it had been his “policy on all occasions to watch 
the changes in the political horizon, and, ere yet the conflict was decided, to negociate 
some interest for himself with the party most likely to prove victorious” (121).  Thus, 
while Edgar’s fate is linked to a series of prophecies and omens, it is also embedded 
within political and economic circumstances whose significance he largely fails to 
recognize throughout the text.   If we privilege this aspect of the novel—as Kerr 
does—then we might argue that The Bride uses coincidence in a manner similar to 
Redgauntlet.  Just as Redgauntlet historicizes Hugh’s interpretation of his encounter 
with Darsie on Solway Firth by showing it to be in conflict with his social and 
historical context, The Bride elicits a particular worldview in order to historicize it.  
For Kerr, to view Edgar’s demise as a product of supernatural fate is to indulge in the 
“false consciousness of a moribund feudal order.”   
 However, while the novel certainly shows Caleb’s worldview to be tied to a 
passing order, such a tidy resolution of the indeterminacy surrounding the novel’s 
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Gothic elements and its representation of historical context remains unsatisfying.   The 
Bride of Lammermoor is, ultimately, a different kind of novel than Redgauntlet, and 
Scott’s various comments on the Gothic novel can help us understand the ends to 
which he puts coincidence in The Bride of Lammermoor.  In the chapter on Ann 
Radcliffe in Lives of the Novelists (1821-4), Scott discusses the status of the 
supernatural in “an age of universal incredulity.”  One characteristic of modern 
romances particularly distasteful to Scott is the rule that all circumstances of the novel 
“however mysterious, and apparently superhuman, [must] be accounted for on natural 
principles, at the winding up of the story.” 95  While the bulk of such novels excite 
“interest and apprehension,” the concluding chapters disappoint because authors must 
“unravel the skein of adventures which they have been so industrious to perplex, and 
account for all the incidents which they have been at so much pains to render 
unaccountable.”  The alternative offered to the author is simply to claim “the knot as 
worthy of being severed by supernatural aid,” and Scott goes on to say that there is a 
claim to be made for this “more simple mode” of “boldly avowing the use of 
supernatural machinery” (116).  Although this might seem an odd statement from a 
novelist committed to realism, Scott argues that since “ghosts and witches, and the 
whole tenets of superstition” were once the matter of “universal belief,” then “it would 
seem no great stretch upon the reader’s credulity to require him, while reading of what 
his ancestors did, to credit for the time what those ancestors devoutly believed in.”  
Thus, even though the reader may be naturally skeptical, asking him or her to indulge 
in the supernatural is ultimately more palatable than feeling compelled to unravel a 
complex skein through trite explanation. 
                                                 
95 Sir Walter Scott on Novelists and Fiction, pg. 115.  Further references are to this edition and appear in 
the text. 
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 Interestingly, however, Scott then goes on to note that some authors have 
endeavored “to compound betwixt ancient faith and modern incredulity.”  Rather than 
either boldly avow the supernatural or fall back on natural explanation, these authors 
have exhibited phantoms, and narrated prophecies strangely accomplished, 
without giving a defined or absolute opinion, whether these are to be 
referred to supernatural agency, or whether the apparitions were produced 
(no uncommon case) by an overheated imagination, and the presages 
apparently verified by a casual, though singular, coincidence of 
circumstances.             
 While this method is “an evasion of the difficulty, not a solution,” Scott nevertheless 
suggests that is perhaps “the most artful mode of terminating such a tale of wonder.”  
This is not simply because it appeals to readers both credulous and incredulous, but 
also because, as he suggests in a review of Maturin’s Fatal Revenge (1807), 
supernatural agency “appeals to the belief of all ages but our own; and still produces, 
when well managed, some effect even upon those who are most disposed to contemn 
its influence.”96  It is not, then, just that the incredulous reader might be asked to 
indulge in the beliefs of his ancestors, but that he or she might in fact be affected by 
such beliefs. 
 Scott’s comments, then, help us to understand the unique form of The Bride 
and, more specifically, its use of coincidence.  As in the other texts I’ve examined, the 
novel utilizes the chance/inevitable tension elicited by coincidence, but instead of 
harnessing the “fateful” interpretation in order to historicize it, the novel leaves both 
interpretations in play. 97  The power of this indeterminacy is seen most clearly in the 
                                                 
96 Sir Walter Scott on Novelists and Fiction, pg. 210. 
97 David Brown also suggests that two modes of vision exist side by side in the novel:  “For Edgar, a 
product of the feudal system, and for the other feudal characters, however, the economic causes of their 
downfall remain obscure: instead, Scott dramatizes their decline in the way they themselves experience 
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novel’s conclusion, as Edgar’s disappearance into the quicksands of Kelpie’s Flow 
fulfills the prophecy of Thomas the Rhymer.  Although our modern incredulity causes 
us to be skeptical of this “prophecy strangely accomplished,” the “singular 
coincidence of circumstances” nevertheless has an effect over us, in keeping with the 
irreducible element of Gothic terror in the narrative.  To be sure, we can read Edgar’s 
death in relation to the decline of the feudal order to which he belongs.   His failed 
attempt to reach the site upon which he is to defend his honor signifies the 
disappearance of the socio-historical grounds of that honor, just as much as it 
represents the fulfillment of the prophecy.  And the quicksands of Kelpie’s Flow can 
be seen as representing the shifting economic and political basis that has displaced the 
Ravenwoods from their ancestral estate and necessitates the demise, if not the death, 
of Edgar.  Such readings, however, remain suggestive; or, to put it in Lukács’s terms, 
the event remains only symbolic of larger historical forces.98 
                                                                                                                                            
it, as an inexplicable, fatal, eclipse.  For this reason the realistic action of the novel is juxtaposed with 
supernatural omens, legends and prophecies, all of which offer a superstitious ‘explanation’ of events.  
Thus, Scott’s ambivalent attitude towards the social transition he treats is reflected not only by his 
attitude towards the protagonists in the main and sub-plots, but by the conflicting modes of writing” 
[Walter Scott and the Historical Imagination (London: London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pgs 
149-50].  My interest, of course, is not to understand Scott’s “ambivalent attitude towards the social 
transition he treats,” but rather to understand how his use of coincidence contributes to the form of the 
novel and the effects it produces. 
98 Fiona Robertson, for example, suggests that Edgar’s death “metaphorically suggests his shifting and 
ambiguous social status” (216, emphasis added).  Similarly, Bruce Beiderwell suggests that “it seems 
fitting that Ravenswood’s own death is emptied of dramatic moment,” meaning that his literal 
disappearance is symbolic of the disappearance of his social standing [“Death and Disappearance in The 
Bride of Lammermoor,” reprinted in Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott, ed. Harry E. Shaw (New York: 
G.K. Hall & Co., 1996), pg. 200, emphasis added]. One might argue that the ending of The Bride of 
Lammermoor is no more “symbolic” or “metaphorical” than the conclusion of Redgauntlet or Waverley:  
the departure of Hugh and Charles Edward Stuart from the shores of England is symbolic of the 
disappearance of Jacobitism, just as the painting of Edward Waverley and Fergus MacIvor is symbolic 
of the mediation of certain historical forces.  However, I would argue that these endings are 
qualitatively different.  The particular events or scenes in Waverley and Redgauntlet can be understood 
in direct relation to historical contexts represented in the texts.  Hugh’s departure is not so much 
symbolic of the disappearance of Jacobitism so much as it represents the disappearance of Jacobitism, 
just as the painting represents the aesthetic mediation of certain historical forces at war in Waverley.  
Such a claim could not be made about the particular nature of Edgar’s death and its historical context: 
the quicksands have no concrete or metonymical relation to the historical context of the novel.    
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 Understanding The Bride’s unique use of coincidence can, in turn, help us 
articulate its difference from Scott’s other works.  Both “The Two Drovers” and 
Redgauntlet juxtapose competing readings of coincidence for specific ends.  In the 
case of “The Two Drovers,” it was to represent the historical particularity of a cultural 
middleman such as Robin Oig, whereas in Redgauntlet it was to grasp and represent 
the disappearance of Jacobitism and the social structures that supported it.  In both 
instances, such effects were predicated upon an interaction of these competing 
readings of coincidence in a manner that generated certain forms of resolution 
(enabling the reader to make determinate judgments about the events, their causes, and 
their consequences).  The Bride similarly juxtaposes readings of coincidences, but the 
effects of this juxtaposition are contingent upon indeterminacy—the compound 
“betwixt ancient faith and modern incredulity.”  The manner in which the reader not 
only indulges, but is affected by ancient ways of seeing reflects the novel’s broader 
engagement with the past.  Whereas Redgauntlet, like most of Scott’s works, attempts 
to circumscribe and make peace with the past, in The Bride of Lammermoor the past 
and its mode of seeing still retain an ability to haunt and destabilize the present.  This 
not only shows that Scott harnessed coincidence in a variety of ways throughout his 
novelistic career, but more importantly that coincidence is a key site through which to 
understand the form and function of particular works. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the particular ways in which Scott makes 
coincidence “artistically productive” for the realist novel.  A fundamental critical 
debate about Scott’s historical novel—and by extension, the realist novel more 
generally—is its capacity to represent reality.  This debate is frequently staged in 
terms of a conflict between the “stuff” of reality and literary form.  Many of the critics 
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I have cited in this chapter see in Scott’s novels a tension between historical facts and 
the literary tropes and narrative structures which shape and impose ideological 
structure onto those facts.  Depending on their particular methodological or critical 
position, these critics emphasize either the capacity of Scott’s novels to put the reader 
into contact with history or the fact that Scott’s novels shape that history for particular 
ideological ends.  My concern has not been the specific contours of this broader 
problem of realist representation—all literary representation is ultimately ideological 
in a weak sense.99  Rather, my concern has been to demonstrate that coincidence, as 
deployed by Scott, falls onto the side of history rather than ideology:  it is a narrative 
mechanism that enables him to put his reader into contact with history, rather than a 
manifestation of Scott deploying romance tropes in order to shape history.  Because 
coincidence appears alien to the “stuff” of everyday reality, critics have almost 
exclusively taken it to be a sign or manifestation of ideology.  It has been regarded as 
a narrative mechanism through which the author imposes ideological meaning (via 
narrative structure) onto reality.  By showing that coincidence in both Fielding and 
Scott shows us more about the reality they represent in their novels than about their 
beliefs, I have suggested that narrative structure can be thought of as providing a way 
into a particular social milieu, rather than simply imposing form onto that milieu. 
While Scott’s use of coincidence has not been a preeminent concern for those critics 
eager to critique the realist novel and its methods of representation, the matter is quite 
different for the two authors that I will discuss in the following chapters.  As in 
Fielding, coincidence in Dickens and Hardy has been read almost exclusively as a 
manifestation of their beliefs getting in the way of their representation of reality.  The 
reading of coincidence in Scott that I have provided in this chapter, however, can 
                                                 
99 See fn. 63 above. 
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perhaps help us begin to see how coincidence might actually be a way for these 
authors to get into that representation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Improbability and the Reform of the Present: 
Coincidence and the Representation of Selfishness in Martin Chuzzlewit 
 
 
The function of coincidence in Scott’s novels supports Georg Lukács’s idea 
that chance events are “artistically productive” for realism because they enable the 
novel to represent complex relationships between the social base and individual 
agency, relationships which cannot be represented through the straightforward, 
“inventorial” depiction of reality.  However, Scott’s use of coincidence challenges 
Lukács’s claim that the successful integration of chance events causes them to be 
“sublated” by a higher aesthetic unity.  As I suggested, it was the causally-ambiguous 
nature of coincidence—its very chanciness—that Scott harnessed in his representation 
of the past.  In this chapter, I turn to a consideration of Dickens’s use of coincidence, 
developing the claim that coincidence became artistically productive for realism in 
large part through the exploitation of its improbability.  It certainly comes as no 
surprise that the author of Hard Times (1854) would delight in such events that 
capture the fancy and imagination precisely through their defiance of the everyday.  In 
his biography of Dickens, John Forster noted:  “On the coincidences, resemblances 
and surprises of life Dickens liked especially to dwell, and few things moved his fancy 
so pleasantly.  The world, he would say, was so much smaller than we thought it; we 
were all so connected by fate without knowing it; people supposed to be far apart were 
so constantly elbowing each other.”100  Yet interpretations of coincidence in Dickens, 
firmly rooted in the tradition of probable realism, have claimed that its use was at odds 
                                                 
100 The Life of Charles Dickens, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1902), pg. 69. 
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with his development as a realist author.  Neil Forsyth, for example, has argued that 
Dickens’s delight in coincidence became increasingly tempered by his focus on the 
larger design of his plots as his career progressed.101  Similarly, George Levine has 
suggested that “where [Dickens] persists in the contrivances of coincidence, their 
discontinuity with the worlds he is creating is disturbing.  […] In most cases, while 
there are no naturalistic laws by which to account for the ‘chances’ in Dickens’s 
novels, coincidence feels too often like a matter of the conventions of narrative.”102  
Critical practice, in other words, would have us believe that the Dickens who reveled 
in the fact that “people supposed to be far apart were constantly elbowing each other” 
was in conflict with Dickens the mature social realist. 
This chapter challenges this story of Dickens’s development, offering instead 
an account of the way in which Dickens harnessed coincidence for realist ends at an 
important juncture in his career.  More specifically, I argue that in Martin Chuzzlewit 
coincidence enables Dickens to represent and historicize selfishness—that is to say, to 
represent selfishness as a behavior resulting from the increasingly mediated nature of 
social relations in the Victorian milieu.  Dickens’s place in a study such as this which 
seeks to establish coincidence’s contribution to realism seems both obvious and 
problematic.  On one hand, perhaps no other author in the realist mode employed 
coincidence so consistently or with such affective force as Dickens.  On the other 
hand, Dickens’s works are those in which we can most readily explain and perhaps 
even forgive the presence of coincidence.  Not only did he develop the complex multi-
                                                 
101 “Wonderful Chains: Dickens and Coincidence,” Modern Philology, 83.2 (1985): 151-165. 
102 Darwin and the Novelists, pg. 142.  See also W.J. Harvey, “Chance and Design in Bleak House” [in 
Dickens and the Twentieth Century, ed. John Gross and Gabriel Pearson (London: Routledge and 
Keagan Paul, 1962), pgs. 145-57].   Harvey identifies the prevalence of coincidences in Bleak House, 
yet argues that most readers do not recognize them as coincidences because Dickens uses “a good deal 
of naturalistic, rational explanation” and because coincidence is so extensive in the novel that it 
becomes “natural” (155). 
 
 
 
112 
plot novel in which coincidence seems such a necessary device, but he was often quite 
literally making things up as he went along due to the contingencies of serial 
production.    This is especially true of Martin Chuzzlewit, a novel occupying a critical 
juncture in Dickens’s career between the episodic form of his early works and the 
more deliberate and planned design that began to emerge with Dombey and Son 
(1846-8).   Critical assessment of Martin Chuzzlewit has generally echoed Forster, 
who judged the novel “defective” in “construction and conduct,” with “character and 
description constituting the chief part of its strength.”103  From this perspective, the 
staggering number of coincidences in the novel—at least eighteen by my count104—
suggests that Dickens was still struggling to orchestrate a large cast of characters and 
coherently develop a complex plot, belying his claim in the Preface that he had 
“endeavoured in the progress of this Tale, to resist the temptation of the current 
Monthly Number, and to keep a steadier eye upon the general purpose and design.”105   
                                                 
103 Forster, pg. 335.  George Gissing significantly remarked, “No great work of fiction is so ill put 
together as Martin Chuzzlewit” (Critical Studies of the Works of Charles Dickens [New York: Haskell 
House, 1965], pg. 72).  Edwin Benjamin suggests that “plot is subordinated to theme” in the novel, and 
that the novel is divided into three phases “showing the rise, triumph, and fall of hypocrisy” [“The 
Structure of Martin Chuzzlewit,” Philological Quarterly 34.1 (1955): 39-47] 
104 Encounters in the novel that can be categorized as coincidental include: Pecksniff encounters Mr. 
Chuzzlewit at the Blue Dragon (Ch. 3); Tom Pinch encounters Mark Tapley on the road to Salisbury 
(Ch. 5); the Pecksniffs find themselves in the same carriage to London with Jonas and Anthony 
Chuzzlewit (Ch. 8); Jonas runs into Pecksniff in the streets of London (Ch. 11); Martin encounters Tigg 
in the pawnbroker’s shop in London (Ch. 13); Mark passes Martin in the streets of London (Ch. 13); 
Mark sees Mr. Chuzzlewit in London (Ch. 13); Pecksniff overhears Tom and Mary talking in the 
church (Ch. 28); Mark meets the nameless woman from ‘The Screw’ and her husband in Eden (Ch. 33); 
Mark and Martin reencounter Mrs. Hominy on their trip back to New York (Ch. 34); Mark and Martin 
see Pecksniff pass while sitting in a tavern upon their return to England (Ch. 35); Tom gets lost in 
London and runs into Charity Pecksniff by the Monument (Ch. 37); Tom and Nadgett pass each other 
on the street in London (Ch. 38); Tom and Ruth encounter Nadgett on the wharves (Ch. 40); Tom finds 
that the man he is delivering Nadgett’s note to is Jonas (Ch. 40); Tom and Ruth, on their way to Mrs. 
Todgers’s, encounter Charity and Moddle looking into a shop window (Ch. 46); Martin, by chance, 
discovers that Tom’s employer is his grandfather (Ch. 50); Mark encounters his neighbours from Eden 
on the streets of London (Ch. 54). 
105 Martin Chuzzlewit (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), pg. 5.  Further references are to this edition 
and appear in the text. 
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However, it is this very ubiquity of coincidence in the novel that necessitates a 
more nuanced account of its role.  Social space in the novel is notoriously 
labyrinthine, famously embodied in Mrs. Todgers’s boarding house, which “Nobody 
had ever found […] on a verbal direction, though given within a minute’s walk of it” 
(131).  Dickens’s decision to continually deploy unexpected and improbable 
encounters seems not ancillary, but rather intimately connected to this vertiginous 
conception of social space.  Although we might disdain these coincidences as mere 
plot mechanisms, their consistent appearance from the outset of the novel challenges 
such handy dismissals.  As I shall argue, coincidences link the novel’s representation 
of social space to the central theme of selfishness.  Coincidences reveal how the 
complexity and opacity of the social world generate the subjective feelings of 
independence and self-containment from which selfish impulses spring.  Throughout 
the novel, coincidences continually draw our attention to a discrepancy between an 
individual’s sense of self-sufficiency and various webs of social connection.  In other 
words, if characters in the novel exist in a “state of isolation” or a “warm cocoon,” as 
J. Hillis Miller suggests, then coincidences illuminate the fact that this self-
containment is a subjective illusion rather than an objective fact. 106   This reading not 
only suggests a greater coherence to a novel usually seen as disjointed at best, but it 
also shows how Dickens’s increasing emphasis on “general purpose and design” 
developed in tandem with his growing commitment to reform and social realism.  
 
I.  Coincidence, Figuration, and the “Exhibition” of Selfishness in Martin Chuzzlewit 
Throughout this dissertation, Dickens has appeared as a touchstone for those 
critics who find modes of nineteenth-century emplotment aesthetically deficient, 
                                                 
106 Charles Dickens: The World of His Novels (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), pgs. 104, 98. 
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particularly in their reliance on coincidence.  Sinclair Lewis—author and critic—saw 
Dickens’s plots as emblematic of the “rigged,” where “by dismal coincidence, Mr. 
Jones has to be produced in the stage-coach at the same time with Mr. Smith, so that 
something very nasty and entertaining might happen.”  Robert Newsom launched his 
study of fictional probability by reflecting on the implications of statements such as 
“The plot of Oliver Twist is too full of coincidences to be probable.”  And in the 
previous chapter, I noted that David Daiches, in a discussion of Redgauntlet, remarked 
upon the novel’s “Dickensian complications and resolutions.”  The fact that Daiches 
here anachronistically describes the nature of Scott’s plot in terms of his successor 
illustrates the degree to which, for many, Dickens exemplifies an aesthetically 
deficient mode of plotting.  Indeed, even contemporary novelists use Dickens as a 
point of reference in their discussions of narrative aesthetics.  The narrator of Julian 
Barnes’s Flaubert’s Parrot (1984), for example, remarks that “there’s something 
cheap and sentimental about [coincidences in books...] the sudden but convenient 
Dickensian benefactors [...] I’d ban coincidences, if I were a dictator of fiction.”107  
 A coincidence in the early chapters of Martin Chuzzlewit, however, reveals 
that such generalizations can obscure much more than they reveal about Dickens’s 
plotting and his use of coincidence.  At the beginning of Chapter 8, Mr. Pecksniff and 
his daughters are quite literally “produced in the stage-coach at the same time with” 
Misters Anthony and Jonas Chuzzlewit.  This encounter has a clear function for the 
plot, as it initiates the courtship plot between Jonas and Pecksniff’s daughters that 
unfolds during the Pecksniffs’ stay in London.  Yet the encounter also demonstrates 
how the novel deploys coincidence to represent the material foundations of selfishness 
through a striking juxtaposition of connection and disconnection.  As Pecksniff and his 
                                                 
107 London: Picador, 1984.  Pg. 67. 
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daughters enter a heavy coach bound for London, they find the outside of the coach 
crowded with passengers chilled by the weather.   The detachment Pecksniff feels 
from his proximate companions is evinced by the fact that he takes “‘great comfort’” 
in their plight, observing to his daughters that “‘it is always satisfactory to feel, in keen 
weather, that many other people are not as warm as you are’” (Martin Chuzzlewit 
120).  Pecksniff feels that this is a “‘quite natural’” and “‘very beautiful 
arrangement.’”  It is an arrangement, he suggests, “‘not confined to coaches, but 
extending itself into many social ramifications,’” since the sight of others enduring 
hardship nourishes “‘our sense of gratitude, which […] is one of the holiest feelings of 
our common nature.’”  Far from being unsettled by the suffering of his fellow 
passengers, the arch-hypocrite actually feels it is justified because it engenders the 
noblest human sentiments in his breast.  When the coach next stops, Anthony and 
Jonas Chuzzlewit coincidentally enter, making similar use of the beleaguered 
passengers for selfish ends.  The unavailability of seats outside allows them to demand 
seats inside the coach at the lower price: “‘That was lucky!’ whispered the old man 
[…] ‘And a great stroke of policy in you to observe it.  He, he, he! We couldn’t have 
gone outside.  I should have died of the rheumatism!’” (122).  Whereas Pecksniff 
utilizes the suffering of the strangers to cultivate his façade of virtue, Anthony and 
Jonas capitalize upon it for financial gain.  In both instances, their selfishness 
manifests itself as a particular dissociative stance toward the other travelers: only 
because Pecksniff and the Chuzzlewits believe themselves to be independent and 
isolated from those proximately nearest to them can they sever any moral relationship 
between themselves and the other travelers.  Nevertheless, while the mail coach 
appears to generate an anonymity that enables this kind of moral detachment, the 
coincidence that brings Pecksniff face to face with his relatives reveals a deficiency in 
their capacity to confidently assess their relation to others.   Although the three men 
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remain undisturbed by the encounter, the coincidence shows that connections may 
exist between ostensible strangers in such a social space, even if those connections are 
illegible to individuals.   
 This scene exemplifies the manner in which Martin Chuzzlewit’s coincidences 
contribute to the representation and historicization of selfishness.  The coincidence 
draws the reader’s attention to a discrepancy between the subjective experience of 
Pecksniff and the Chuzzlewits (their feeling of independence from their fellow 
travelers) and objective facets of social experience (the fact that connections between 
individuals exist despite the feeling or appearance of anonymity).  The seemingly 
contradictory juxtaposition of connection and disconnection is characteristic of what 
Raymond Williams identifies as a paradox of the emerging urban landscape of the 
nineteenth century:  people appear to be at once grouped into a collectivity or 
aggregate but simultaneously atomized.108  While the individual experiences the social 
world as illegible and even chaotic, the novel also intimates that webs of connection 
exist within that complexity.  In an important passage that will be discussed in more 
detail below, the narrator describes Tom Pinch and Mr. Nadgett bumping elbows in 
the street without knowing that their fates are connected, prompting him to remark that 
“there are a multitude [in London] who shooting arrows over houses as their daily 
business, never know on whom they fall” (554).  Just as the inability to see the 
consequences of one’s actions—to see where one’s arrows fall—does not mean that 
there are no such consequences, Pecksniff’s refusal to acknowledge any connection to 
his fellow travelers does not mean that there are no such connections.  Thus, while 
Hillis Miller asserts that “it is impossible to imagine the process by which this 
                                                 
108 See Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), pgs. 215-32.  
Williams remarks that Dickens “worked to reveal a practical underlying connection, in human love and 
sympathy” (216).  My point is that Dickens is not simply asserting connectedness through mere 
affective cudgeling, but also by expanding his readers’ perception of the conditions of their society.   
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situation [of isolated individuals in the novel] came into existence,” 109 the coincidence 
on the coach shows that this isolation is a social and structural condition of selfishness.  
In other words, Martin Chuzzlewit may not provide an etiology of selfishness, but it 
does represent selfishness as a consequence of particular social conditions.   
In this way, coincidences in the novel can be read as a unique aesthetic 
response to what Frederic Jameson has called “problems of figuration” in the 
representation of capitalist space.  In outlining the three stages of capitalist space, 
Jameson argues that in the first stage—classical or market capitalism—space is still 
organized in a manner that enables it to be represented in an unproblematic manner 
because the conditions of experience are still accessible to individual consciousness.  
As Jameson puts it, “the immediate and limited experience of individuals is still able 
to encompass and coincide with the true economic and social form that governs that 
experience.”110  However, in the passage from market to monopoly capital, problems 
of figuration emerge insofar as there is “a growing contradiction between lived 
experience and structure, or between a phenomenological description of the life of an 
individual and a more properly structural model of the conditions of existence of that 
experience.”  The “lived experience of the individual” no longer “coincide[s] with the 
true economic and social form that governs that experience.”   The “truth” of life in 
the metropolis lies elsewhere—in “Jamaica or Hong Kong”—as that life is predicated 
upon a larger system whose structure is beyond the ken of the individual.  This poses 
problems for the work of art insofar as it suggests that “enormous global realities” are 
no longer accessible to the individual subject and consequently unrepresentable (350).  
Nevertheless, Jameson suggests that the “play of figuration” enables that which is 
                                                 
109 Charles Dickens: The World of His Novels, pg. 101. 
110 “Cognitive Mapping,” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence 
Grossberg (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988), pg. 349.   
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unrepresentable to express itself, to manifest itself “in distorted and symbolic ways” in 
the literary text. 
Jameson is obviously more concerned with the third stage of capitalist space 
and with modernist and post-modernist responses to problems of figuration, 
particularly in the form of the representation of individual consciousness.  
Nevertheless, he illuminates difficulties inherent in the representation of an 
increasingly complex Victorian social milieu.  Indeed, Marx himself located this 
growing gap between social experience and social conditions at a much earlier period.  
In describing the historical genesis of alienation, Marx wrote: “Only in the eighteenth 
century, in ‘civil society,’ do the various forms of social connectedness confront the 
individual as a mere means toward his private purposes, as external necessity.  But the 
epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely 
that of the hitherto most developed social […] relations.”111  The moment at which the 
individual appears capable of manipulating forms of social connectedness is actually 
the moment in which the individual is most mediated by social forms.  Coincidence is 
a particularly apt mechanism for representing such a structure because the unexpected 
and seemingly improbable assertion of narrative and spatial connections between 
characters bursts their bubbles of presumed self-containment. 
Coincidences in Martin Chuzzlewit not only enable the reader to glimpse the 
social conditions that breed selfishness, but also generate opportunities for showing 
how selfishness is a particular response to those conditions.  The coincidental 
encounter in Chapter 3 between Pecksniff and Mr. Chuzzlewit112 initiates the major 
action of the novel, but it also displays how selfishness both depends upon anonymity 
                                                 
111 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), pg. 84.  
112 For the sake of clarity, the younger Martin Chuzzlewit is referred to as Martin, and his grandfather is 
referred to as Mr. Chuzzlewit. 
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and attempts to cultivate it where it does not exist.  The novel opens with Mr. 
Chuzzlewit attempting to distance himself from his family members, whose status as 
his potential legatees has fed their self-interest and corrupted their relationships with 
him.  When Mr. Chuzzlewit falls ill and is forced to stop at the Blue Dragon, Pecksniff 
is coincidentally summoned to attend to the sick man. After Pecksniff recognizes his 
relative in a “consternation of surprise,” the two men immediately contrive to address 
each other as if they were strangers (Martin Chuzzlewit 45).  Although Mr. Chuzzlewit 
is ill-pleased to see his cousin, Pecksniff quickly tries to regain his footing with the 
misanthrope by noting, “‘I should have been, of all things, careful not to address you 
as a relative’” (46).  Pecksniff reassures him that “‘I regard you as a stranger, and I 
have just that amount of interest in you in which I hope I should feel in any stranger, 
circumstanced as you are.’”  Mr. Chuzzlewit only agrees to speak to Pecksniff on the 
condition that he does so “‘as to a stranger: strictly as to a stranger,’” assuming that, 
unlike the blood-relation, the stranger-relation can be disinterested (47).  Just as Mr. 
Chuzzlewit displays his selfishness in his effort to distance himself from his family, so 
too does Pecksniff serve his self-interest by concertedly estranging himself from Mr. 
Chuzzlewit in order to become his confidant.  While the coincidence affirms the ties 
between the two characters, their selfishness causes them to occlude or sever those ties 
through a process of estrangement.  Estrangement is thus not, as Pecksniff would have 
it, a by-word for disinterestedness in the novel, but rather a manifestation of self-
interest attempting to cultivate and exploit anonymity.  
Although the novel, according to the Preface, “exhibit[s], in a variety of 
aspects, the commonest of all the vices,” the various manifestations of selfishness are 
all united by their reliance on this process of estrangement (5).  Just as Pecksniff 
initiates his project to become Mr. Chuzzlewit’s heir by estranging himself from the 
old man, he attempts to further ingratiate himself both when he renounces Martin in 
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Chapter 12 and later when he dismisses Tom Pinch from his service, saying, “‘We 
part, Mr. Pinch, at once, and are strangers from this time’” (472).  While Pecksniff’s 
method of estrangement is rhetorical, other characters engage in estrangement by 
deploying various modes of disguise.  Montague Tigg, for example, disguises himself 
as Tigg Montague in order to create the spurious Anglo-Bengalee Disinterested Loan 
and Life Insurance Company and defraud investors, who include acquaintances like 
Pecksniff.  Tigg’s secretive assistant, Nadgett, also relies upon estrangement: he 
manages to spy upon Jonas Chuzzlewit by making it appear as if that is the very thing 
he is not doing.  Jonas never comprehends the reason for Nadgett’s frequent proximity 
to him because Nadgett always appears to be keeping an appointment “with the man 
who never appeared” (446).  Put differently, Nadgett deceives Jonas by making it 
appear as if his proximity is coincidental rather than intentional.  The fact that 
characters such as Nadgett can self-consciously deploy the category of coincidence 
demonstrates the degree to which social connections are illegible in the social space of 
the novel.113  Even Mrs. Gamp uses a false connection to promote her own designs by 
constantly invoking the praises of the apocryphal Mrs. Harris.  Selfishness thus 
embraces and capitalizes upon the opacity of social space through the process of 
estrangement: to estrange oneself is to assert that you are a stranger to me, that I have 
no connection and therefore no obligation to you, that my interests are in no way 
connected to yours.  If selfish characters in the novel exist in a milieu whose material 
and spatial complexity generates a sense of self-sufficiency, then their responses to 
these conditions sever moral connections through deception and misrepresentation. 
                                                 
113 The narrator also self-consciously uses the category of coincidence, describing meetings that are 
intentional as coincidental as a way of both veiling and ironically revealing intention.  When Ruth 
Pinch, for example, enters Temple Bar late in the novel and finds her lover John Westlock passing 
through, the narrator remarks, “The Temple is a public thoroughfare; they may write up on the gates 
that it is not, but so long as the gates are left open it is, and will be; and Mr Westlock has as good a right 
to be there as anybody else” (645).  The narrator, of course, is here revealing while also obscuring 
John’s amorous intentions toward Ruth.     
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In characteristic fashion, Dickens provides in the minor character Mark Tapley 
a counter-example to selfishness who offers an alternative moral response to the 
material conditions of the novel.  Whereas selfish characters practice estrangement in 
the effort to sever bonds of obligation, Mark is characterized by a neighbourliness that 
forges such bonds.114  The coincidences involving Mark not only provide points of 
contrast to selfishness that further reveal its causes and consequences, but they also 
illustrate how the novel attempts to reform selfishness.  During Mark and Martin’s 
transatlantic voyage aboard ‘The Screw,’ Mark befriends an overwhelmed mother, 
who significantly remains nameless—anonymous—throughout the novel.  As Mark 
helps her care for her children, Martin implores him to stop “‘worrying with people 
who don’t belong to you’” (243) and asks him to  “‘tell your friend, who is a nearer 
neighbor of ours than I could wish, to try and keep her children a little quieter 
tonight’” (247).  Unlike Martin who strives to dissociate himself, Mark accepts that 
these people “belong to him” because of their proximity, and his neighbourliness 
creates bonds that transcend location.  Indeed, just as coincidences belie the selfish 
belief in self-sufficiency, they affirm Mark’s assertions of moral and social obligation.  
When Martin falls ill after their arrival in Eden, Mark knocks on the nearest door in 
search of medicine, saying, “‘Neighbour […] for I am a neighbor, though you don’t 
know me,’” only to “[hear] his own name pronounced, and [find] himself clasped 
about the skirts by two little boys, whose faces he had often washed, and whose 
                                                 
114 What I call “neighbourliness” here could also be called “civility” or “sociability.”  In Dickens and 
the Social Order (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2004), Myron Magnet discusses how Dickens’s early works 
(from Nicholas Nickelby to Chuzzlewit) reflect his social philosophy, which emphasizes the humanizing 
benefits of society.  See Magnet, pgs. 203-37, for a discussion of how Dickens’s experience in America 
influenced his portrayal of civility in Martin Chuzzlewit.  Mark is not the only figure of 
neighbourliness.  When Martin explains his American trip to his grandfather, he tells him of his debt to 
Mr. Bevan: “‘I am indebted to the charitable help of a stranger in a land of strangers, for the means of 
returning here’” (Martin Chuzzlewit 627).  Bevan is, aside from the nameless family Mark befriends, 
the only person they meet in America who takes any interest in their well-being and does not deceive or 
exploit them. 
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suppers he had often cooked” during their transatlantic voyage (p. 485, emphasis in 
original).  While the sudden appearance of this family in Eden is certainly improbable, 
Mark’s neighbourly assertion of connection in spite of anonymity provides a stark 
contrast to the selfish assertion of disconnection because of anonymity, a difference 
further emphasized when the purportedly anonymous turn out to be known.  The 
coincidence is not just droll sentimentalism: if Mark only seemed fleetingly connected 
to this family on the voyage, their coincidental reappearance in the backwoods of 
America reminds us that social connections persist across expansive and within 
convoluted social spaces.   
  The novel’s most improbable coincidence, which occurs in its closing pages 
and also involves Mark and this nameless family, exemplifies Martin Chuzzlewit’s 
sophisticated treatment of the relationship between social space and social relation.  In 
the midst of rescuing Mercy Pecksniff from the scene of her sister’s ill-fated wedding 
in the heart of London, Mr. Chuzzlewit notices a peculiar look on the face of Mark 
Tapley and inquires about its cause: 
‘The wonderfullest ewent, sir!’ returned Mark, pumping at his voice in 
a most laborious manner, and hardly able to articulate with all his efforts.  
‘A coincidence as never was equaled!  I’m blessed if here ain’t two old 
neighbours of ourn, sir!’ 
‘What neighbours!’ cried old Martin, looking out of the window.  
‘Where!’ 
‘I was a walkin’ up and down not five yards from this spot,’ said Mr 
Tapley, breathless, ‘and they come upon me like their own ghosts, as I 
thought they was!  It’s the wonderfullest ewent that ever happened!’ […] 
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‘What do you mean!’ exclaimed old Martin, quite as much excited by 
the spectacle of Mark’s excitement, as that strange person was himself.  
‘Neighbours where!’ 
‘Here, sir!’ replied Mr. Tapley.  ‘Here in the city of London!  Here 
upon these very stones!  Here they are, sir!  Don’t I know ’em!  Lord love 
their welcome faces, don’t I know ’em!’ […] 
‘Neighbours, WHERE!’ old Martin shouted: almost maddened by his 
ineffectual efforts to get out at the coach-door. 
‘Neighbours in America!  Neighbours in Eden!’ cried Mark.  
‘Neighbours in the swamp, neighbours in the bush, neighbours in the 
fever… Haven’t they come a strugglin’ back, without a single child for 
their consolation!  And talk to me of neighbours!’ (775-6) 
Our initial reaction might be to scoff at this encounter, or to interpret it along with 
Hilary Dannenberg as a manifestation of Dickens’s “playfully nonmimetic style.”115  
Yet focusing on whether this coincidence is “realistic” or “probable” distracts us from 
the importance of the conversation between Mark and Mr. Chuzzlewit.  Mr. 
Chuzzlewit must thrice repeat his question—“Neighbours where?”—because of 
confusion about both the “where” of the neighbours as well as the concept of 
“neighbour” itself.  Mark misinterprets Mr. Chuzzlewit’s question—first as, In what 
location did you just meet these people? and then as, Where are these people now?—
because he and Mr. Chuzzlewit hold conflicting understandings of a neighbour.  Only 
when he realizes that Mr. Chuzzlewit is asking him In what location were these people 
your neighbours? can he provide a suitable answer.  For Mr. Chuzzlewit, a neighbour 
is a relation defined by and predicated upon a specific location.  One may meet this 
                                                 
115 Coincidence and Counterfactuality, pg. 156.  
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person elsewhere—“in London” or “upon these very stones”—but the “in Eden” is the 
necessary condition of addressing her as a neighbour.  For Mark, however, being a 
neighbour is not tied to a specific time and location, but rather describes one’s 
comportment toward another: they are neighbours here in London at the present 
moment, just as they were neighbours in Eden.   The novel’s persistent use of the 
vocabulary of “strangers” and “neighbours” to describe modes of comportment is 
therefore intimately connected to its representation of social space.  In a complex and 
opaque social world where “daily business” involves “shooting arrows” onto an 
anonymous multitude, proximity and location are neither markers nor guarantees of 
social connection. This vocabulary, like coincidence, draws our attention to the 
unmoored nature of social relationships in the world of the novel.   
 Even though Mark’s neighbourliness is the antithesis of selfishness, his 
behavior nevertheless reflects the atomizing effects of social space in the novel.  Just 
as coincidences assert connection in a manner that cuts against the selfish drive for 
disconnection, they curiously undermine Mark’s attempts at a different kind of 
disconnection.  Mark’s “whimsical restlessness” has largely escaped critical attention 
despite being central to the moral logic of Martin Chuzzlewit (17).116  Mark explains 
his condition to Tom Pinch: “‘My constitution is, to be jolly; and my weakness is, to 
wish to find a credit in it’” (690).  Jolly by nature, Mark describes himself as “a roving 
sort of chap” (119).  He itinerantly seeks a difficult situation in which to be jolly 
because, as he constantly reiterates, there’s “no credit” in being jolly in circumstances 
that would make anyone happy.  The problem he faces, however, is that his jolliness 
                                                 
116 Most critical accounts of the novel do not mention Mark, and where they do, he is usually referenced 
simply as Martin’s companion in America.  Sylvère Monod, in a book-length study of Martin 
Chuzzlewit (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), notes that Mark is “an original creation and a 
character in whom Dickens took much interest,” only to follow on the heels of other critics to say that 
“he is not totally convincing and engaging.” See Monod, pgs. 115-7. 
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actually transforms trying circumstances to the point where there’s no longer “credit” 
in them, compelling him to seek new difficulties.  As Martin endures illness in the 
swamps of Eden, he asks Mark if he could possibly ask for better circumstances in 
which to “come out strong” than the deplorable ones they have found in America.  
Mark replies,  
‘On the first morning of my going out, what do I do?  Stumble on a family 
I know, who are constantly assisting us in all sorts of ways […] That won’t 
do, you know: that ain’t what I’d a right to expect.  If I had stumbled on a 
serpent, and got bit; or stumbled on a first-rate patriot, and got bowie-
knifed […] I might have distinguished myself, and earned some credit.  As 
it is, the great object of my voyage is knocked on the head.  So it would be, 
wherever I went.’ (490, emphasis added) 
Mark’s neighbourliness means that he is always at home and never at home because 
his jolliness is “contagious” and prevents him from dissociating himself from his 
environment in order to be “jolly with credit” (385).  Mark’s inability to dissociate 
himself from his milieu manifests itself in the formation of bonds, bonds which 
coincidentally follow him around and undermine his attempts to be jolly with credit.  
Thus, while his neighbourliness forges bonds of moral obligation where estrangement 
would normally sever them, his desire to earn “credit” is a self-confessed weakness.  It 
is an effort to detach himself from his surroundings that slips into the acquisitive and 
monetary idiom of selfishness, causing him to be constantly on the move.  Although 
he personifies moral behavior, the persistent irrationality of his restlessness 
foregrounds his deficient perception of his relation to his surroundings.        
 Thus, far from detracting from the novel’s realism, Martin Chuzzlewit’s 
coincidences represent how the illegibility of social connections generates subjective 
feelings of isolation and independence.  They also reveal how selfishness manifests 
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itself as a particular behavioral response to these conditions.  The very unexpectedness 
of such encounters highlights the discrepancy between the fact of various connections 
between characters and those characters’ denial or foreshortened perception of such 
connections.117  Although coincidences might seem to be a manifestation of formal 
chaos—a chaos befitting the representation of a world in which Mrs. Todger’s 
boarding house can only be found by chance—they are in fact a unique means of 
organizing that social space.118  These coincidences are in themselves “improbable,” 
but their improbability creates opportunities for the novel to represent aspects of 
reality that are otherwise unrepresentable.  What makes realism unique is not its 
capacity to conform to our experience of the everyday, but rather its capacity to put us 
into contact with features of a particular milieu.  To invoke Jameson’s terminology, 
coincidences in Martin Chuzzlewit enable a certain “figuration” of reality that 
uniquely “exhibits” selfishness. 
Martin Chuzzlewit, of course, not only exhibits selfishness but also works to 
reform it, and coincidences are also integral to the novel’s didactic effort to rebuke 
                                                 
117 It is worth emphasizing that the novel thematizes this foreshortened perception in a variety of ways.  
Consider this passage describing Tom’s suspicions regarding the identity of his anonymous patron late 
in the novel: “He sat with the outer door wide open at all times, that he might hear the footsteps as they 
entered, and turned off into chambers on the lower floors.  He formed odd prepossessions too, regarding 
strangers in the streets; and would say within himself of such or such a man, who struck him as having 
anything uncommon in his dress or aspect, ‘I shouldn’t wonder now if that were he!’ But it never was.  
And though he actually turned back and followed more than one of these suspected individuals, in a 
singular belief that they were going to the place he was then upon his way from, he never got any other 
satisfaction by it, than the satisfaction of knowing it was not the case” (584).   
118 In Cooking With Mud: The Idea of Mess in Nineteenth-Century Art and Fiction (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2000), David Trotter links the emerging concept of “mess” in the mid-nineteenth century 
to the notion of “the contingent self.”  In his discussion of Dickens, Trotter discusses mess in Dickens 
in relation to chance, suggesting that it reflects Dickens’s growing recognition of “an autonomous social 
order whose medium is secular history rather than providence” (161).  Trotter, in other words, supports 
the idea that something like coincidence, which may appear “messy” or extraneous on a formal level, is 
actually a manifestation of new way of thinking about the social world.  Trotter, however, follows 
others in suggesting that this shift in Dickens’s thinking, resulting in the recognition of an “autonomous 
social order,” occurred in the early 1850s (i.e., between Dombey and Son and Bleak House).  My 
reading of selfishness in Martin Chuzzlewit, of course, would suggest that as early as the 1840s Dickens 
was beginning to conceive of the idea of a “contingent self” that is shaped by the social order.  See 
Cooking with Mud, pgs. 161-75 for Trotter’s discussion of Dickens.  
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selfishness while promoting Mark’s neighbourliness.  Although the novel’s 
didacticism may seem to return us to the problem of authorial ideology, it is more 
productively considered as illustrating what James Chandler describes as the inherent 
link between historicization and politicization.  As Chandler argues, for early 
historicists like John Stuart Mill and Thomas Carlyle, “to represent a historical state of 
affairs is to begin to transform it, to make ‘history’ is to begin to ‘make history’.”119  
Similarly for Dickens, the effort to reform selfishness follows logically from the 
apprehension of it as a product of particular historical circumstances.   In the novel, as 
characters constantly encounter people they thought were physically distant from 
them, they are forced to recognize, like the reader, the illusory nature of their self-
sufficiency.  When Jonas finds Pecksniff spying through his window, for example, he 
exclaims, “‘It’s enough to make a man stare, to see a fellow looking at him all of a 
sudden, who he thought was sixty or seventy miles away’” (291).  Not only is Jonas 
unable to successfully deploy disguise to commit murder without detection, but he is 
also later confronted by Lewsome, the man from whom he purchased the poison to 
potentially murder his father and whom “he had supposed to be at the extremest corner 
of the earth” (732).  Whereas these encounters force Jonas to confront his guilt, a 
coincidence involving Martin illustrates more clearly their consequences for 
selfishness. In order to raise money after being dismissed by Pecksniff, Martin enters a 
London pawnbroker’s shop, where he coincidentally encounters Tigg, who exclaims, 
“‘This is one of the most tremendous meetings in Ancient or Modern History!’” (218).  
This particular coincidence is significant for the plot, as we learn later that Tigg is at 
this moment employed by Mr. Chuzzlewit, and this encounter enables Mr. Chuzzlewit 
to send Martin the money that funds his trip to America.  At the same time, the 
encounter also frustrates Martin’s attempt at anonymity:  
                                                 
119 England in 1819, pg. 93. 
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It was with a bitter sense of humiliation that he cursed, again and again, the 
mischance of having encountered this man in the pawnbroker’s shop.  The 
only comfort he had in the recollection was, Mr Tigg’s voluntary avowal of 
a separation between himself and Slyme, that would at least prevent his 
circumstances (so Martin argued) from being known to any member of his 
family, the bare possibility of which filled him with shame and wounded 
pride. (220)   
Martin’s pride—his sense of self—is predicated upon the possibility of maintaining a 
distance between himself and his family, a distance which this coincidence collapses.  
It exposes and challenges Martin’s selfishness by dissolving his sense of independence 
and anonymity.120 
A series of coincidences involving Tom Pinch and Nadgett provides the most 
extended example of how coincidences dissolve the belief in self-sufficiency through 
the assertion of interconnectedness.  This series also demonstrates most clearly how 
this reading of coincidence requires us to look beyond the conditions of serial 
production in order to fully appreciate the function of coincidence in Martin 
Chuzzlewit.  Chapter 38, entitled “Secret Service,” opens with this striking passage: 
In walking from the City with his sentimental friend, Tom Pinch had 
looked into the face, and brushed against the threadbare sleeve, of Mr 
Nadgett, man of mystery to the Anglo-Bengalee Disinterested Loan and 
Life Insurance Company.  Mr Nadgett naturally passed away from Tom’s 
                                                 
120 In his recent biography of Dickens, Michael Slater notes that in late 1823 and early 1824—in the 
period leading up to his father’s imprisonment for debt and young Charles being sent to work in 
Warren’s Blacking Factory—Dickens’s errands for his family “mainly consisted of taking household 
items (as well as precious books from his father’s library) to the pawnbroker’s while his parents made a 
last desperate struggle to stay afloat” (Charles Dickens [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2009], pg. 19).  
While Martin experiences the shame the highly self-conscious young Dickens no doubt felt as a result 
of his family’s debasement, that shame is amplified by the fact that he encounters someone he knows in 
the pawnbroker’s shop.   
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remembrance, as he passed out of his view; for he didn’t know him, and 
had never heard his name. 
As there are a vast number of people in the huge metropolis of England 
who rise up every morning, not knowing where their heads will rest at 
night, so there are a multitude who shooting arrows over houses as their 
daily business, never know on whom they fall.  Mr Nadgett might have 
passed Tom Pinch ten thousand times; might even have been quite familiar 
with his face, his name, pursuits, and character; yet never once have 
dreamed that Tom had any interest in any act or mystery of his.  Tom 
might have done the like by him, of course.  But the same private man out 
of all the men alive, was in the mind of each at the same moment; was 
prominently connected, though in a different manner, with the day’s 
adventures of both; and formed, when they passed each other in the street, 
the one absorbing topic of their thoughts. (554) 
The peculiarity of this passage is only increased when we realize that the presentation 
of Pinch and Nadgett as “strangers” is technically a mistake.  It is subsequently 
revealed that Tom and his sister have actually become Nadgett’s lodgers two chapters 
prior to this moment.  In Chapter 36, Tom and Ruth travel to London’s outskirts in 
search of suitable lodgings, eventually securing them in what the reader later learns is 
Nadgett’s house.  The landlord is not named in that passage, so to say in Chapter 38 
that Tom “didn’t know [Nadgett], and had never heard his name” is not an explicit 
contradiction—though one would assume that even if the transaction were not 
conducted with the landlord himself, his name nevertheless would have been 
mentioned.121 
                                                 
121 This is the full passage from Chapter 36: “After roaming up and down for hours, looking at some 
score of lodgings, they began to find it rather fatiguing, especially as they saw none which were at all 
adapted to their purpose.  At length, however, in a singular little old-fashioned house, up a blind street, 
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Thinking about the compositional history of the novel can help us to explain 
some of the peculiarity of this passage.  First, we can see this passage operating as a 
transition from Tom’s adventures in London to Nadgett’s stalking of Jonas in order to 
obtain information that will help Tigg gain financial leverage over him.  The previous 
few chapters have dealt with Tom’s arrival in and wanderings through London, 
including his coincidental meeting with Charity Pecksniff, which brings him into 
contact with Jonas’s wife, Merry.  Having Tom pass Nadgett in the street enables the 
narrative to transition between two different sets of characters within the same 
monthly number.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, we can safely conclude, as 
Jonathan Arac suggests, that Dickens decided only later in the novel’s composition to 
make Nadgett the landlord as a means of tightening the plot.122  That is to say, this 
particular relationship between Pinch and Nadgett was not “planned” but came about 
after the composition of this passage, retroactively creating a minor glitch in the 
narrative’s logic. 
 While these contingencies of serial production provide traction in making 
sense of this passage, they also attempt to explain away the coincidence.  To account 
for or explain the coincidence in these terms implies that it is somehow foreign to the 
novel’s proper content, that it simply doesn’t belong.  This requires deemphasizing or 
even overlooking how this passage explicitly describes the way in which the 
conditions of “daily business” shape the way individuals in “the huge metropolis of 
England” relate to each other. Bracketing the question of authorial intent or 
compositional history allows us to see this moment as part of a larger pattern and 
                                                                                                                                            
they discovered two small bed-rooms and a triangular parlour, which promised to suit them well 
enough.  Their desiring to take possession immediately was a suspicious circumstance, but even this 
was surmounted by the payment of their first week’s rent, and a reference to John Westlock, Esquire, 
Furnival’s Inn, High Holborn” (543-4).   
122 See Arac, Commissioned Spirits (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1979), pgs. 86-7. 
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appreciate its thematic importance.  It is not just that Tom and Nadgett are both 
thinking of Jonas, or that they cross paths without knowing it:  both men are thinking 
of Jonas at the same time and in the same place without being aware of the connection 
between them.123  Significantly, Jonas is also the common link in the third and final 
coincidence involving Tom and Nadgett, which occurs in Chapter 40 and involves 
Jonas’s attempt to flee England and escape Tigg’s persecution.  Nadgett follows Jonas 
to the wharves, where Tom and Ruth happen to find themselves on one of their 
morning perambulations.  Nadgett sees his lodger watching the ship that the disguised 
Jonas is boarding, and he asks Tom to deliver the blackmailing note that recalls Jonas 
to shore.  Tom agrees to deliver the note, not knowing that the recipient is Jonas, so 
“What was Tom’s astonishment to find in [the recipient] the man with whom he had 
had the conflict in the field, poor Merry’s husband.  Jonas!” (592).  This moment is 
constructed with great dramatic effect, as the blow that thwarts Jonas’s flight is 
delivered by the novel’s central figure of morality, a man who has physically struck 
Jonas earlier in the novel.  The fact that neither man can comprehend the other’s 
relation to the note only adds to this effect. 
 Considered simply as a plot mechanism, coincidence appears to be the 
imposition of narrative structure onto reality—a way of “artificially” creating 
connections where they do not exist.  Yet this terminology is inadequate for describing 
the effect of these moments.  Coincidences here do not impose structure by creating 
                                                 
123 This is not the only moment in the text when two characters are imagining the same face at the same 
time and place.  When Tom and Martin first meet in Chapter 5, Tom tells his new friend about playing 
the organ for a beautiful stranger.  “‘It led to my seeing,’ said Tom, in a lower voice, ‘one of the 
loveliest and most beautiful faces you can possibly picture to yourself.’ ‘And yet I am able to picture a 
beautiful one,’ said his friend, thoughtfully, ‘or should be, if I have any memory’” (Martin Chuzzlewit, 
p. 85).  Both are picturing Mary Graham.  This particular technique of drawing the reader’s attention to 
common referents is central to Dickens’s method of imbuing the significance of isolated narrative 
moments with broader social meaning.  See, for example, Ralph Rader’s discussion of the passage in 
Bleak House where Jo looks at the cross atop St. Paul’s (“The Comparative Anatomy of Three Baggy 
Monsters: Bleak House, Vanity Fair, Middlemarch,” Journal of Narrative Technique,19.1 [1989]: 49-
58).   
 
 
 
132 
connections where they do not exist, but rather reveal structure by making extant 
connections visible.  The reader does not need Tom and Nadgett to bump elbows in 
order to trace how they are connected in the novel (i.e., that they both have some 
connection to Jonas).  However, these moments reflect the characters’ increasing 
consciousness of that connection.  The connection between Tom and Nadgett has four 
discrete moments: (1) Pinch and Nadgett are connected mediately through their 
individual relationships with Jonas; (2) Pinch and Nadgett are connected 
economically, with Pinch as lodger (Ch. 36); (3) Pinch and Nadgett are connected 
spatially by their shared involvement with Jonas as they pass each other without 
recognition (Ch. 38); and (4) Pinch and Nadgett are connected concretely in the plot 
by their convergence with Jonas on the wharf, an encounter that happens by chance 
but allows them to see their triangular relationship (Ch. 40).  It is important to note 
that the connection between Pinch and Nadgett exists prior to the last two moments, 
but it is these two moments that make the connection legible. While the connection 
becomes explicit to the reader in the third moment, only in the fourth moment do the 
characters begin to grasp the full extent of their interconnectedness.  Until that point, 
Nadgett is unaware that Pinch knows Jonas; Pinch is unaware that his landlord knows 
Jonas; and Jonas cannot fathom any connection between Pinch and the Anglo-
Bengalee Company.  By aligning homelessness with “daily business” in the passage at 
the beginning of Chapter 38 and then having Tom and Nadgett pass each other without 
recognition, the novel highlights a fact of modern social existence: every day we are 
brought into contact, either physically or mediately, with an anonymous multitude 
without being able to determine our exact relation to them.  To be sure, Dickens uses 
coincidence as a way of tightening the plot of the novel and as a means of creating and 
sustaining suspense.  By obscuring the connections between Pinch, Nadgett, and 
Jonas, Dickens can both surprise the reader and orchestrate moments of great effect, 
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such as Tom’s confrontation with Jonas on the wharf.  However, the point to be 
emphasized is that this obscured nature of social connections is a reflection of social 
reality.    
  Coincidences, therefore, enable characters to develop a better understanding of 
the social space in which they live by forcing them to acknowledge their previously 
obscured relation to others.  In doing so, they are integral to the novel’s understanding 
of moral transformation.  In undermining the selfish plotting of Tigg, Jonas, and 
Pecksniff, the novel promotes an understanding of social interconnectedness embodied 
by Mark’s neighbourliness.  Moral transformation for the two Martin Chuzzlewits 
requires a fundamental change in the way they see the world.  Martin’s transformation 
occurs in the swamps of Eden, where privation and illness induce reflection, and 
eventually the epiphany that he has acquired selfishness from his grandfather and that 
it has grown quietly in his breast.  As a result of this recognition, “He made a solemn 
resolution that when his strength returned he would not dispute the point or resist the 
conviction, but would look upon it as an established fact, that selfishness was in his 
breast, and must be rooted out” (497).  Having acknowledged his selfishness, Martin 
resolves to root it out by constantly putting “his purpose before his own eyes.”  The 
success of his resolution is evident not only in his altered perception of Tom Pinch, 
which convinces John Westlock that Martin has changed for the better, but also when 
he meets with his grandfather upon his return from America.  Still engaged in his 
scheme to expose Pecksniff’s true nature, Mr. Chuzzlewit remains silent during 
Martin’s pleas for reconciliation and merely hangs his head while Pecksniff castigates 
his grandson.  “In his most selfish and most careless days,” the narrator remarks, this 
scene would have wounded Martin’s pride.  However, “changed for the better in his 
worst respect; looking through an altered medium on his former friend […] 
resentment, sullenness, self-confidence, and pride, were all swept away” (624, 
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emphasis added).  Martin reacts out of compassion rather than wounded pride because 
he no longer sees the world through the medium of self.  Mr. Chuzzlewit experiences a 
similar change in vision, inspired largely by Mark Tapley’s mild-mannered accusation 
that he has been self-deceived in his perception of Martin.  Mr. Chuzzlewit admits that 
he had been possessed by “‘a kind of selfishness… which is constantly upon the watch 
for selfishness in others; and holding others at a distance by suspicions and distrusts, 
wonders why they don’t approach, and don’t confide, and calls that selfishness in 
them’” (752).  The moral movement of the novel is thus to overcome the myopia of 
selfishness by altering the way characters see their relation to others and consequently 
how they comport themselves toward the world. 
  Although Tom Pinch, whose sincerity Alexander Welsh has eloquently shown 
to be the foil of Pecksniff’s hypocrisy in the novel, does not experience moral 
transformation, he nevertheless sees the world differently by the novel’s end.124  In his 
break with Pecksniff, Tom realizes that “It was not that Pecksniff: Tom’s Pecksniff: 
had ceased to exist, but that he had never existed” (467).  In Pecksniff’s death, the 
narrator remarks, “Tom would have had the comfort of remembering what [Pecksniff] 
used to be, but in this discovery, he had the anguish of recollecting what [Pecksniff] 
never was.  For as Tom’s blindness in this matter had been total and not partial, so was 
his restored sight.”  This ocular vocabulary returns when Tom leaves to seek his 
fortune:   
Oh! what a different town Salisbury was in Tom Pinch’s eyes to be sure, 
when the substantial Pecksniff of his heart melted away into an idle dream!  
He possessed the same faith in the wonderful shops, the same intensified 
appreciation of the mystery and wickedness of the place […] and yet it was 
                                                 
124 See Welsh, From Copyright to Copperfield: The Identity of Dickens (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1987), pgs. 29-58. 
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not the old city nor anything like it […] For in the centre of the market-
place he missed a statue he had set up there, as in all other places of his 
personal resort; and it looked cold and bare without that ornament. (524-5) 
Tom’s blindness was not a product of his selfishness, but rather a consequence of 
Pecksniff’s hypocrisy.  Although the world looks “cold and bare” to Tom without his 
idealized vision of Pecksniff, his “restored sight” means that he is no longer 
hoodwinked by Pecksniff and that his goodness can no longer be manipulated in the 
service of Pecksniff’s selfish aims. 
 Even Mark Tapley experiences an alteration in his vision of his relation to 
others, and in overcoming his “whimsical restlessness,” Mark projects an alternative to 
the social space of the novel.  At the end of the novel, Mark finally settles down and 
decides to marry Mrs. Lupin, and the couple change the name of the Blue Dragon to 
the “Jolly Tapley.”  He explains his decision to marry:  “‘Then all my hopeful wisions 
bein’ crushed; and findin’ that there an’t no credit for me nowhere; I abandons myself 
to despair, and says, “Let me do that as has the least credit in it, of all; marry a dear, 
sweet creetur, as is wery fond of me: me being, at the same time, wery fond of her: 
lead a happy life; and struggle no more again’ the blight which settles on my 
prospects”’” (691).  In abandoning his “hopeful wisions” of trying to distinguish 
himself, Mark embraces his connections to others and to his surroundings.  His 
ultimate fate as proprietor of the Jolly Tapley embodies the novel’s vision of 
unalienated social space.  His constitutional jolliness becomes the quality of a visual 
social space, as his neighbourliness generates a neighbourly place.  After Pecksniff’s 
final defeat and the reunion of the two Martins, the characters plan a celebratory feast, 
and Mark is put in charge of the dinner.  He and Mrs. Lupin serve the guests, “but 
Mark could by no means be persuaded to sit down at the table; observing, that in 
having the honour of attending to their comforts, he felt himself, indeed, the landlord 
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of the Jolly Tapley, and could almost delude himself into the belief that the 
entertainment was actually being held under the Jolly Tapley’s roof” (768).  Although 
the ideal offered by the Jolly Tapley is still here a “delusion,” it nevertheless posits a 
social space that promotes interconnectedness rather than self-interest.  When he 
encounters his anonymous American neighbours on the streets of London in the 
closing pages of the novel, Mark whisks them away to the Jolly Tapley, where, as he 
says, “‘There’s nothin’ in the house they sha’n’t have for the askin’ for, except a bill’” 
(776).   
 
II.  Martin Chuzzlewit and Dickens’s Development as a Novelist 
 I am by no means trying to suggest that Martin Chuzzlewit is a superbly plotted 
masterpiece comparable to Bleak House (1852-3) or Our Mutual Friend (1864-5). 
However, my reading does demonstrate that the novel’s “construction and conduct” 
are neither entirely “defective” nor at odds with its thematic content.  More 
importantly, understanding the role of coincidence in Martin Chuzzlewit helps link 
two strands of Dickens’s development as a novelist.  As I mentioned at the outset of 
this chapter, Dickens’s Preface to Martin Chuzzlewit demonstrates an emerging desire 
to “resist the temptation of the current Monthly Number, and to keep a steadier eye 
upon the general purpose and design.”  This tension between part and whole, or 
number and novel, certainly has its origins in the compositional history of Dickens’s 
early works, works in which coincidences play an important structural role.  Dickens’s 
first “novel,” The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (1836-7), did not 
commence as a novel:  Dickens was only commissioned to provide copy for a series of 
plates by Robert Seymour.  When Seymour committed suicide in April 1836, 
however, Dickens took control of the text and developed it into something that moved 
beyond the picaresque.  He accomplished this not only through the introduction of 
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Sam Weller, but also by coincidentally bringing back Alfred Jingle and Job Trotter.  A 
similar process can also be seen at work in his next novel, Oliver Twist (1837-9).  
Although the content of the “Parish Boy’s Progress” was Dickens’s from the 
beginning, the renegotiation of his contract with Bentley’s Miscellany midway through 
the work’s composition—from a series of monthly contributions to a novel—
transformed the narrative’s arc and development.125   From this compositional 
perspective, coincidence appears primarily as a product of the novel’s material 
production.   To be sure, Martin Chuzzlewit certainly bears the scars of its 
compositional history, as seen in Dickens’s seemingly rash decision to send Martin off 
to America at the end of the fifth monthly number, suggesting that at times the 
pressures of the monthly number ultimately prevailed.126  However, my reading has 
shown that coincidence is more than a mere plot mechanism in the novel.  While 
Dickens relied on coincidence early in his career as a way of moving beyond the 
episodic in order to generate narrative structure, by the time of Martin Chuzzlewit 
Dickens began to understand that such plot devices could also be utilized in the 
service of the novel’s realist aims.   
Martin Chuzzlewit not only initiates Dickens’s growing concern with the 
“general purpose and design” of his novels, but, as other critics have suggested, it also 
marks the starting point of his career as a mature social realist.  Jonathan Arac, for 
example, has argued that during the novel’s composition, Dickens began to understand 
London as a place where he could analyze social reality and create a “vision of 
                                                 
125 See Robert Patten, “When Is a Book Not a Book?” [The Book History Reader, eds. David 
Finkelstein and Alistair McCleery (New York: Routledge, 2006), pgs. 354-68] for a discussion of the 
conditions of serial production of Oliver Twist. 
126 The decision to send Martin to America has usually been read as an attempt to boost the 
disappointing sales of the early numbers, though Sidney Moss intriguingly suggests that it was actually 
an attempt to gall American publishers, who in order to profit by pirating the novel would have to print 
passages offensive to their readers [Charles Dickens’ Quarrel with America (Troy: The Whitston 
Publishing Company, 1984), pgs. 131-2].   
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people’s specific interdependence, a sociology to replace the atomism and laissez-faire 
of Utilitarian psychology and political economy.”127  And Amanda Claybaugh has 
suggested that through his trip to the United States in 1842, Dickens “learned that he 
could present himself publicly as a reformer [… and] that he could be a reformist 
writer.”128  Dickens’s emerging reformist impulse can be seen in Martin Chuzzlewit’s 
use of coincidence to explore how specific social conditions generate particular types 
of social behavior.  The novel’s rendering of moral transformation in visual terms 
looks forward to the social vision that comes to dominate Dickens’s subsequent works.  
The effort to reveal obscured connections in the service of moral reform becomes the 
groundwork for a reforming perspective, which Dombey and Son posits as “a good 
spirit who would take the house-tops off […] and show a Christian people what dark 
shapes issue from amidst their homes.”  Such a view would “[rouse] some who never 
have looked out upon the world of human life around them, to a knowledge of their 
own relation to it, and [make] them acquainted with a perversion of nature in their 
own contracted sympathies and estimates.”129  Social vice, in this view, is a result of a 
distorted vision of social relations, a perversion that the perspective generated by the 
novel is capable of correcting.  Martin Chuzzlewit’s engagement with social alienation 
                                                 
127 Arac, pg. 69.  Arac also suggests that the novel attempts to represent social interconnectedness 
within legible social space.  My argument, however, differs from Arac’s in terms of the scope of that 
space within the novel.  Arac argues that during the composition of the novel, Dickens began to see 
London as a ideal space for uncovering connections between individuals, citing Nadgett’s navigation of 
the city as a reversal of “the famous ‘view from Todgers’s’ [that] shows the observer helpless before the 
energy of random surfaces turbulent with the energy of obscured meaning.”  This reading, in my 
opinion, projects the London of the later novels onto the London of Martin Chuzzlewit.  Nadgett is 
certainly a forerunner of Mr. Bucket in Bleak House, and in the novel we can see Dickens’s later 
London in embryonic form, but as I’ve noted, even Nadgett is unable to fully untangle the web of 
connections that ultimately unites the characters.  In my reading, it is not London, but rather the Jolly 
Tapley that is posited as place where social connection is joined to an intelligible social space. See 
Arac, pgs. 67-93. 
128 Claybaugh, The Novel of Purpose: Literature and Social Reform in the Anglo-America World 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2007), pg. 82. 
129 Dickens, Dombey and Son  (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), pg. 703. 
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also anticipates Bleak House’s more thorough exploration of the connection between 
social distance and moral obligation through the critique of Mrs. Jellyby’s telescopic 
philanthropy.  Although Dickens may have deployed coincidence more carefully as 
his novels became both more deliberately planned and more engaged with particular 
aspects of Victorian reality, the use of coincidence in Martin Chuzzlewit should be 
understood not as a deviation, but rather as a unique moment in that development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Improbability and the Historicist Habit of Mind:  
Coincidence and the Form of Hardy’s Novels 
 
 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation have explored how coincidence 
functions as a realist technique, challenging the dominant critical notion that realism is 
by definition probable.  As a fuller picture of “improbable realism” has emerged 
through readings of particular novels, two more general insights have also 
materialized.  First is an understanding of how coincidence frequently draws the 
reader’s attention to the features of a particular social milieu.  Presupposing that 
improbable events are foreign to literary realism forces us to explain (or explain away) 
their presence, which usually results in reading them strictly in relation to authorial 
ideology or the contingencies of production.  Doing away with this presupposition has 
enabled me to concentrate on the formal effects of coincidence.  For example, whereas 
critics have generally read Tom Jones’s coincidences as a manifestation of Fielding’s 
beliefs, attention the narrator’s sophisticated framing of accidental events showed that 
the novel’s coincidences in fact focus the reader’s attention on features of the world in 
which Tom lives.  Similarly, although we can turn to the conditions of serial 
production to account for the prevalence of coincidence in Martin Chuzzlewit, doing 
so occludes the fact that they enable Dickens to represent and historicize selfishness as 
a consequence of the Victorian social milieu. The second thread that has emerged 
involves seeing how coincidence often performs this task through apt juxtapositions.  
In Redgauntlet, for instance, the competing interpretations Hugh and Darsie offer of 
the coincidence that brings them together enable the novel to historicize the 
obsolescence of Hugh’s Jacobite ideology.  In Martin Chuzzlewit, coincidence’s 
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curious blend of connection and disconnection allows Dickens to juxtapose the 
subjective experience of isolation and self-sufficiency against the illegible webs of 
social connection that both generate but ultimately challenge that sense of 
disconnection. 
This fourth and final chapter builds on these insights as it offers a 
reconsideration of the function and effect of coincidence in Hardy’s novels.  I shall be 
arguing that coincidences in Hardy’s novels foreground the fact that individual 
experience is embedded in a social milieu that profoundly shapes identity and agency.  
Coincidences in Hardy direct us toward the social forces that shape the character’s 
lives, not—as is usually assumed by critics of Hardy—to the hand of fate or the power 
of chance.  The heroine of A Pair of Blue Eyes (1873), for example, coincidentally 
encounters relics from her past relationships, highlighting how her identity and fate are 
shaped by social forces such as class.   Whereas coincidences in A Pair of Blue Eyes 
juxtapose the past and present, coincidences in The Return of the Native (1878) 
generate opportunities for the juxtaposition of different perspectives on events.  Such 
juxtapositions illustrate the limitations on individual perspectives, and in doing so 
cultivate an awareness of how experience is embedded in a particular social milieu.  
Ultimately, I will be arguing that understanding coincidence in Hardy’s plots is 
necessary to correctly apprehending the form of his novels.130  The tragic form of 
Hardy’s plots marks their fundamental difference from those of realist authors such as 
Scott and Dickens.  Whereas Scott and Dickens explore, among other things, issues of 
self-determination in particular social milieus, Hardy’s novels involve the more 
general fact of social embeddedness.  His novels, in other words, do not so much 
                                                 
130 By form, I mean (borrowing James Phelan’s definition) “the particular fashioning of the elements, 
techniques, and structure of a narrative in the service of a set of readerly engagements that lead to 
particular final effects on the implied audience” (Experiencing Fiction, pg. 3).   
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explore the particular features of nineteenth-century “Wessex” that shape identity as 
they explore the tragedies that result from the fact that individuals are shaped by social 
and historical forces beyond their control.  At the same time, however, I shall also be 
insisting on the fundamental difference of Hardy’s plots from the tragic form.  Many 
critics have suggested continuities between Hardy’s works and Greek tragedy.  RM. 
Rehder, for example, argues that Hardy’s “characters are set against the nature of 
things, the entire universe, as in the Greek tragedies.”131  As I argued in the 
Introduction, although in a somewhat different context, applying the terms or elements 
of Greek tragedy to the realist novel creates more problems than it solves.  The central 
tragic struggle in Hardy is not that of individuals in an indifferent universe, but rather 
that of individuals coming to terms with their existence in history.  
This consideration of the form of Hardy’s novels entails complicating 
ingrained ways of thinking about several aspects of his works, particularly the role of 
chance and coincidence.  Although the body of criticism on Hardy is vast and diverse 
enough to defy easy generalizations, the interpretation of coincidence in his work is 
peculiarly univocal. Chance and coincidence have generally been read as 
manifestations of Hardy’s pessimistic or agnostic worldview, a reading that involves 
emphasizing the influence of Darwin (and others such as Schopenhauer) on his 
thinking.  Irving Howe voices this view succinctly:  Hardy “wanted plot to serve as a 
sign of philosophic intent and this seduced him into relying too heavily upon 
mechanical devices,” resulting in “coincidences which cannot be justified even in 
terms of his darkening view of life.”132  This reading of coincidence is predicated upon 
                                                 
131 “The Form of Hardy’s Novels,” in Thomas Hardy After Fifty Years, ed. Lance St. John Butler 
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977), pg. 24. 
132 Thomas Hardy (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pgs. 90-1.  In a similar vein, Leland Monk writes, 
“Hardy writes in a traditional narrative mode the formal properties of which derive for the most part 
from a providential aesthetic; but in his own thinking he emphatically denied the existence, or at least 
the benevolence, of an all-seeing deity.  He therefore manipulates his plots, arranging sometimes 
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three interdependent assertions: (1) that Hardy had a more or less defined and 
consistent “habit of mind”; (2) that Hardy’s novels voice this habit of mind in a 
“relentlessly monological”133 manner; and (3) that coincidences are a direct 
manifestation of this worldview (i.e., that coincidences point us in an unmediated way 
to Hardy’s worldview).  My aim in attending to the effects of coincidences in Hardy’s 
works and highlighting the historicist strain of his thought is to demonstrate that, as 
Angelique Richardson suggests, Hardy’s fiction strives to represent life “without 
falling victim to a single scientific theory, [to] a single way of seeing.”134  In other 
words, attending more closely to the effects of coincidence in Hardy will allow us to 
appreciate the richness and complexity of his “habit of mind,” which in turn will 
enable us hear the multiple voices at play in his works. 
The first section of this chapter provides a brief consideration of Hardy’s 
historicist habit of mind.  Although I have argued throughout this dissertation that 
identifying an author’s beliefs is a problematic way to account for particular features 
of a novel, it is necessary to distill this strain of Hardy’s thought before turning to a 
                                                                                                                                            
implausible coincidences, in order to illustrate his belief that there is not a supreme being. […] As a 
result, chance in Hardy’s novels usually signifies an inverted Providence” [Standard Deviations: 
Chance and the Modern British Novel (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1993), pg. 158].   William 
Newton provides a similar view in “Chance as Employed by Hardy and the Naturalists” [Philological 
Quarterly 30 (1951): 154-75].  However, Newton’s comparison of Hardy with Zola and other 
Naturalists is illuminating because he points out how Zola’s novels frequently use coincidence, even 
though his “scientific” theory of the novel explicitly precluded chance. 
133 Charles Lock, “Hardy and the Critics” [Palgrave Advances in Thomas Hardy Studies, ed. Phillip 
Mallett (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)], pg. 20.  An essay by Virginia Woolf, written shortly 
after Hardy’s death in 1928, illustrates the way in which these three assertions are interconnected.  
Woolf remarks that Hardy’s early novels demonstrate that he must be “driven by some sense that 
human beings are the sport of forces outside themselves, to make use of an extreme and even 
melodramatic use of coincidence,” and concludes her remarks by saying that his novels present “a 
vision of the world and of man’s lot as they revealed themselves to a powerful imagination” [“The 
Novels of Thomas Hardy,” in Collected Essays: Volume I (London: The Hogarth Press, 1980), pgs. 
256-266]. 
134 “Hardy and Science: A Chapter of Accidents” [Palgrave Advances in Thomas Hardy Studies, ed. 
Phillip Mallett (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)], pg. 176. 
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consideration of his novels.  Critical emphasis on the fact that Hardy depicts 
individuals in conflict with natural laws that are indifferent to human forms of 
meaning has occluded Hardy’s rich appreciation of the fact that human meaning is 
shaped by particular social formations.  Glances at several passages from his novels 
and non-literary writings will bring this aspect of his thought into focus.  More 
importantly, it will also identify the conceptual importance of “relics” to this line of 
his thinking. As vestiges of the social past, relics in Hardy have the power to unite the 
past and present in a manner that forces individuals to recognize the entanglement of 
their lives in the social web.  The remaining sections of the chapter examine two 
novels—A Pair of Blue Eyes and The Return of the Native—whose forms embody 
Hardy’s historicist habit of mind.  The second section considers the way in which the 
plot structure of A Pair of Blue Eyes relies upon coincidental encounters with “casual 
relics” of the heroine’s past in order to draw the reader’s attention to the social forces 
that shape her fate.  While I only offer a fairly schematic reading of what is certainly 
not one of Hardy’s best novels, this reading will illustrate the particular ways in which 
his historicist habit of mind informs his aesthetics.  In the third and final section, I 
offer a more detailed reading of The Return of the Native.  My focus will be not only 
on the effects of coincidence, but also on the effects of the novel’s use of free indirect 
discourse (FID).  Although coincidence is not the sole focus of my reading, my aim is 
to show that Hardy’s use of coincidence works in conjunction with other formal 
elements in order to cultivate a historicist perspective. 
 
I.  “Casual Relics” and Hardy’s Historicist Habit of Mind 
 During the construction of Hardy’s new home Max Gate in 1884, two graves 
from the Roman period were unearthed, yielding skeletons and fragments of pottery.  
Hardy described the findings to the local Dorset Natural History and Antiquarian Field 
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Club in a speech entitled “Some Romano-British Relics Found at Max Gate.”  After 
providing a description of the various articles found in the graves, Hardy concludes his 
remarks with these thoughts: 
In spite of the numerous vestiges that have been discovered from time 
to time of the Roman city which formerly stood on the site of modern 
Dorchester, [...] one is struck with the fact that little has been done towards 
piecing together and reconstructing these evidences into an unmutilated 
whole—[…] a whole which should represent Dorchester in particular and 
not merely the general character of a Roman station in this country—
composing a true picture by which the uninformed could mentally realize 
the ancient scene with some completeness. 
It would be a worthy attempt to rehabilitate, on paper, the living 
Durnovaria of fourteen or fifteen hundred years ago—as it actually 
appeared to the eyes of the then Dorchester men and women, under the 
rays of the same morning and evening sun which rises and sets over it now. 
[…Standing on some] commanding point, we may ask what kind of object 
did Dorchester then form in the summer landscape as viewed from such a 
point; where stood the large buildings, where the small, how did the roofs 
group themselves, what were the gardens like, if any, what social character 
had the streets, what were the customary noises, what sort of exterior was 
exhibited by these hybrid Romano-British people, apart from the 
soldiery?135 
                                                 
135 Thomas Hardy’s Public Voice: The Essays, Speeches, and Miscellaneous Prose, ed. Michael 
Millgate (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), pg. 64. 
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As Michael Millgate suggests, Hardy’s speech is “frankly amateurish”136 from an 
antiquarian or archaeological perspective, yet his concluding remarks display a strange 
fascination with the way in which relics enable us to reconstruct a past culture into an 
“unmutilated whole.”  The unexpected discovery of vestiges of the past reminds Hardy 
that an ostensibly “natural” landscape is in fact layered with history.  As the 
foundation is dug for his new home, Hardy discovers that he is building not on top of a 
natural landscape, but on the remnants of past civilizations.  Hardy imagines standing 
on a hill, looking out onto the Dorset countryside, and being able to “mentally realize” 
what that scene might have been like millennia ago.  While the landscape is largely the 
same, the social character of that area is now entirely different.  Hardy’s idea of 
moving from shards of pottery and fragments of bone to the “unmutilated whole” of a 
departed society is clearly fanciful, but it demonstrates the power such relics had over 
his imagination. 
 The Preface to the 1895-6 edition of The Trumpet-Major (1880), Hardy’s only 
historical novel, voices similar ideas and also illustrates more precisely the conceptual 
importance of relics to Hardy’s thinking.  In describing the origins and sources of the 
novel, Hardy writes: 
Down to the middle of this century, and later, there were not wanting, 
in the neighbourhood of the places more or less clearly indicated herein, 
casual relics of the circumstances amid which the action moves—our 
preparations for the defence against the threatened invasion of England by 
Buonaparte.  An outhouse door riddled with bullet-holes, which had been 
extemporized by a solitary man as a target for firelock practice when the 
landing was hourly expected, a heap of bricks and clods on a beacon-hill, 
                                                 
136 “Some Romano-British Relics Found at Max Gate,” pg. 61. 
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which had formed the chimney and walls of the hut occupied by the 
beacon-keeper, worm-eaten shafts and iron heads of pikes for the use of 
those who had no better weapons, ridges on the down thrown up during the 
encampment, fragments of volunteer uniform, and other such lingering 
remains, brought to my imagination in early childhood the state of affairs at 
the date of the war more vividly than volumes of history could have 
done.137 
As opposed to religious relics, which are preserved for an explicit memorial purpose, 
Hardy’s “casual relics” are material remnants that have simply survived the 
transformations of time.  Yet, like religious relics, they have the power to inspire awe 
and immerse one in the past “more vividly than volumes of history.”   
Like this description of the casual relics of the Napoleonic era, a description of 
the well-shaft in Marygreen at the beginning of Jude the Obscure (1895) demonstrates 
that the power of such casual relics depends upon the knowledge of the observer.  As 
Jude peers down the well-shaft after Mr. Philloston’s departure for Christminster, the 
narrator remarks that the well-shaft “was probably the only relic of the local history 
that remained absolutely unchanged.  Many of the thatched and dormered dwelling-
houses had been pulled down of late years… [and] the original church… had been 
taken down, and either cracked up into heaps of road-metal in the lane, or utilized as 
pig-sty walls, garden seats, guard-stones to fences, and rockeries in the flower-beds of 
the neighbourhood.”138  Just as the “heap of bricks” from The Trumpet-Major is 
simply a pile of rubble to the casual observer, the well-shaft has no historical 
significance for Jude.  For the narrator, however, it is a relic because he knows, among 
                                                 
137 The Trumpet-Major (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), pg. 3. 
138 Jude the Obscure (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), pg. 12.   
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other things, that the material of the original church has been incorporated into other 
structures.  The fact that in Hardy a relic is always a relic “for someone” focuses our 
attention on the effects such encounters have on observers, enabling them to discern 
both their connection and disconnection with past social worlds.  Just as relics provide 
a connection to the past for the observer, they also immerse the observer in a past that 
is fundamentally different from their present. 
If the Roman bones and Napoleonic bullet-holes show the power relics possess 
to immerse the observer in a past milieu, a passage from The Hand of Ethelberta 
(1876) reveals the effects such moments can have on the observer’s perception of their 
own situation.  Visiting in the seaside village of Knollsea, Ethelberta decides to 
explore the celebrated ruins of Coomb Castle and attend a meeting of the association 
devoted to its preservation.  Ethelberta had never been to such a meeting, but 
what was left in any shape from the past was her constant interest, because 
it recalled her to herself and fortified her mind.  Persons waging a 
harassing social fight are apt in the interest of the combat to forget the 
smallness of the end in view; and the hints that the perishing historical 
remnants afforded her of the attenuating effects of time even upon great 
struggles corrected the apparent scale of her own.  She was reminded that 
in a strife for such a ludicrously small object as the entry of drawing-
rooms, winning, equally with loosing, is below the zero of the true 
philosopher’s concern.139  
Whereas Hardy’s encounter with the Romano-British relics thrusts him imaginatively 
into the past, Ethelberta’s experience of the remnants of Coomb Castle “[recalls] her 
to herself.”  The juxtaposition of the remnants of the past with her current social 
                                                 
139 The Hand of Ethelberta (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), pg. 235. 
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situation enables her to put that situation into perspective, to recognize its particularity 
and its transience.  The encounter with relics of the past, in other words, not only 
offers the individual a vision of the past, but in doing so also generates an altered 
perspective on the present. 
While this process is beneficial for Ethelberta, enabling her to fortify herself 
for the petty social struggles she faces in her attempts at social ascent, such 
realizations of the “attenuating effects of time” can also be threatening to the 
individual’s sense of self.  The “cliffhanger” scene in A Pair of Blue Eyes is the most 
famous episode in the novel, one often discussed in the context of Hardy’s relationship 
to Darwin.  As the novel’s heroine Elfride and her second lover—the geologist Henry 
Knight—stroll along the “Cliff without a Name,” they are caught in a sudden storm, 
which results in Knight finding himself on the brink of death, hanging perilously from 
the cliff: 
By one of those familiar conjunctions in which the inanimate world 
baits the mind of man when he pauses in moments of suspense, opposite 
Knight’s eyes was an imbedded fossil, standing forth in low relief from the 
rock.  It was a creature with eyes.  The eyes, dead and turned to stone, were 
even now regarding him.  It was one of those early crustaceans called 
Trilobites.  Separated by millions of years in their lives, Knight and this 
underling seemed to have met in their death.  It was the single instance 
within reach of his vision of anything that had ever been alive and had had 
a body to save, as he himself had now. 
The creature represented but a low type of animal existence, for never 
in their vernal years had the plains indicated by those numberless slaty 
layers been traversed by intelligence worthy of the name.  Zoophytes, 
mollusca, shell-fish, were the highest developments of those ancient dates.  
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The immense lapses of time each formation represented had known 
nothing of the dignity of man.  They were grand times, but they were mean 
times too, and mean were their relics.  He was to be with the small in his 
death […] 
Time closed up like a fan before him.  He saw himself at one extremity 
of the years, face to face with the beginning and all the intermediate 
centuries simultaneously.140 
The passage extends for several pages, as Knight travels imaginatively in time, 
reflecting on the life of prehistoric man and his own mortality.  Whereas the 
realization of the “attenuating effects of time” fortifies Ethelberta insofar as it enables 
her to recognize the “smallness” of social customs, for Knight the realization seems to 
have quite a different effect.  His encounter with the trilobite, a relic of a time before 
human existence, forces him to recognize the insignificance of his own life in relation 
to the grand scale of geological time. 
 This passage is one of the most significant in Hardy’s early works, and in it 
Darwin’s influence on Hardy’s thinking and art is clearly palpable.  For critics wishing 
to emphasize Hardy’s “Naturalist” or “Darwinian habit of mind,” this passage 
provides plenty of food for evolutionary thought.  Such readings of Hardy tend to 
emphasize the way in which his novels depict the plight of humankind in a world 
indifferent, if not antagonistic, to human meaning.  As Gillian Beer remarks in her 
influential study of Darwin’s influence on the Victorian novel, plot in Hardy usually 
“involves the overthrow of the individual by the inevitability of death or by the 
machinations (or disregard) of ‘crass casuality’.”141  Yet the drive to “find Darwin” in 
                                                 
140 A Pair of Blue Eyes (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), pgs. 213-4.  Further references are to this 
edition and appear in the text.   
141 Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), pg. 223.  The term “crass casualty” is from Hardy’s poem 
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Hardy forces us to disregard other important elements of his work.  In the passage 
from A Pair of Blue Eyes, for example, it is necessary to remember that the entire 
passage is focalized through Knight, the geologist.  It is his knowledge which allows 
him to understand the trilobite as a “mean relic” and to imaginatively span the eons 
between its existence and his own.  More importantly, if his encounter with this relic 
forces him to recognize the smallness of his existence, it also—like Ethelberta’s visit 
to Coomb Castle—“recalls him to himself.”  After Knight pictures the eons uniting 
him with the fossil, his first thought is, “Was he to die?  The mental picture of Elfride 
in the world, without himself to cherish her, smote his heart like a whip” (A Pair of 
Blue Eyes 214).  The consequences of Knight’s confrontation with his own mortality 
are distinctly social, since it is this adventure that leads him to abandon his class 
scruples and declare his devotion to Elfride.  As different as Knight and Ethelberta’s 
encounters with relics might be, they have similar effects insofar as the juxtaposition 
of past and present puts that present into perspective and draws our attention to its 
unique features. 
 Put somewhat differently, how we understand such juxtapositions depends on 
our emphasis.  Read in isolation, what is remarkable about the cliffhanger scene is the 
way in which it places Knight’s individual existence and the relic he encounters 
against the backdrop of grand scales of time.  However, read in the context of these 
                                                                                                                                            
“Hap.”  For other discussions of Darwin and Hardy, see George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, pg. 
227-34 and “Hardy and Darwin: An Enchanting Hardy?” [A Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. Keith 
Wilson (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), pgs. 36-53], as well as Richard Kaye, The 
Flirt’s Tragedy: Desire Without End in Victorian and Edwardian Fiction (Charlottesville: The Univ. 
Press of Virginia, 2002), pgs. 118-150.  As Kaye notes, “Although Hardy’s fictional extrapolation of 
Darwinian concepts has been a mainstay of criticism of the novelist’s work, such correlations more 
often have been evoked than fully illustrated” (142).  A statement from Angelique Richardson 
exemplifies my claim that Hardy’s historicist habit of mind needs to be distinguished from Darwinian 
influence.  Richardson writes, “Through this emphasis on the environment Hardy embraces the central 
tenet of Darwinism, the interrelation of individual and environment, and ultimately, the subordination 
of species to their surroundings” (“Hardy and Science: A Chapter of Accidents,” pg. 167).  I, too, 
believe that Hardy is interested in exploring the “interrelation of individual and environment,” but I 
believe it is imperative that we think of “environment” in a strict social sense.   
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other passages, it is simply another instance of Hardy using relics to juxtapose two 
distinct eras in order to examine the particular features of each.  If relics in Hardy, in 
other words, remind us that time attenuates all and that we live in a natural world 
indifferent to our desires, they also foreground the unique features of different forms 
of social life: they enable us to access and reconstruct the past and in doing so offer us 
perspective on the present.142  If the trilobite reflects Hardy’s recognition that time 
destroys all, the bones unearthed at Max Gate remind us of his desire to reconstruct 
and understand what time destroys.143  To ignore this latter aspect of relics is to 
overlook Hardy’s deep appreciation for the ways in which particular social formations 
shape individual experience, which is the foundation of his historicist habit of mind. 
 
                                                 
142 The fact that relics in Hardy point us to the social is supported by Hardy’s poem, “Tess’s Lament,” a 
poem which gives voice to Tess’s suffering after Angel’s departure.   The sixth and final stanza of the 
poem reads:   
 It wears me out to think of it, 
   To think of it; 
 I cannot bear my fate as writ, 
  I’d have my life unbe; 
 Would turn my memory to a blot. 
 Make every relic of me rot, 
 My doings be as they were not, 
  And leave no trace of me! 
In the poem,Tess wishes to obliterate her existence, “I would that folk forgot me quite, / Forgot me 
quite!” (lines 1-2), but then goes on to remember the happy times at Talbothay’s, “Where I would rise 
up staunch and strong, / And lie down hopefully,” (lines 11-12) as well as her wedding day.  Indeed, it 
is the very persistence of those memories of happiness, contrasted with her present privation that “wears 
[her] out to think of it.”  The juxtaposition of the two in her consciousness makes her distraught and 
generates the desire to “have my life unbe.”  But if Tess wishes to eradicate her existence, and the 
memory thereof, the impossibility of that desire is indicated by her inability to “turn my memory to a 
blot” or “Make every relic of me rot.”  Tess, in other words, cannot make her “life unbe” because, on 
one hand, she cannot destroy her memory, and because, on the other, relics of her do not “rot.”  Relics 
of Tess, like relics in Hardy generally, cannot rot because they are an objectified form of social 
memory—they point to separation of the social from the natural world [The Complete Poetical Works of 
Thomas Hardy, Vol. I, ed. Samuel Hynes (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), pgs. 216-7].   
143 Part of Beer’s argument, of course, is that against “plot,” which is indifferent to human life, Hardy 
pits “writing,” which works to recover pleasure and happiness.  My point is that Hardy is not just 
interested in the individual drive for pleasure but also how that drive is shaped by social forces.  See 
Beer, pgs. 220-241. 
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II.  Coincidence and “Casual Relics” in A Pair of Blue Eyes 
 The manner in which relics generate juxtapositions of the past and present and 
highlight their salient features provides a context for analyzing the form of A Pair of 
Blue Eyes.  In teasing out the historicist strain of Hardy’s thought, the importance of 
coincidence was not readily apparent, though Hardy’s unforeseen encounter with the 
relics at Max Gate and Knight’s meeting with the trilobite intimated that the power of 
relics for Hardy inheres in their ability to generate unexpected confrontations with the 
past.  The plots of Hardy’s novels frequently utilize coincidences to create such 
confrontations with relics and the past.  In The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886), for 
example, the return of the furmity vendor brings to light the truth about Henchard’s 
past, and Tess, of course, is frequently reminded of the past she is trying to escape 
through encounters with Alec D’Urberville and others.  While in these novels 
characters encounter relics of their past in the form of people, in A Pair of Blue Eyes 
such encounters involve “casual relics”—seemingly ordinary objects that nevertheless 
retain the power to revive the past.  Coincidences involving three casual relics—an 
earring, a potted plant, and a tombstone—are central to the novel’s structure because 
they bring about the dissolution of the engagement between Elfride Swancourt and her 
second lover, Henry Knight.  Attending to the effects of coincidence in the novel, 
therefore, can enable us to understand how Hardy’s historicist habit of mind manifests 
itself in the form of his novels. 
 Hardy’s third published novel, A Pair of Blue Eyes has the explicit class 
concerns, biting humor, semi-autobiographical characters, and sensational plot that 
characterize many of Hardy’s “lesser” works, those novels not belonging to the half-
dozen “Wessex Novels” considered to be his finest.  Despite its marginal status in 
Hardy’s oeuvre, A Pair of Blue Eyes is an important forerunner of Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles, particularly in the way that the heroine’s marriage is ruined by the 
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revelation of a past lover.  In both novels, this revelation is damaging not necessarily 
in itself, but because the men fetishize the “natural” purity of their lovers.  Both novels 
use coincidences to stage a confrontation between the fantasy of naturalness and the 
reality of social existence, thus highlighting the tragic limitations on the heroine’s self-
determination.  Therefore, although A Pair of Blue Eyes does not demonstrate Hardy 
at the height of his powers, it is nevertheless an important novel because it deals with 
issues and utilizes devices Hardy would return to throughout his career as a novelist.  
In the same way that Sense and Sensibility (1811) provides a helpful point of reference 
for understanding Austen’s more mature works, A Pair of Blue Eyes is useful for 
drawing our attention to certain features of Hardy’s aesthetics. 
 A Pair of Blue Eyes opens with the arrival in Endelstow of Stephen Smith, a 
young architectural assistant from London who has come to make sketches for the 
restoration of the local church.  As Stephen lodges with the local parson, Mr. 
Swancourt, romance blooms between Stephen and Swancourt’s daughter, Elfride, and 
the father allows the courtship to proceed, believing Stephen to be of the professional 
class.  On the brink of engagement, the two lovers make confessions:  Stephen admits 
that, although he has professional ambitions, he is actually the son of the local 
stonemason, and Elfride confesses that she has been loved before by a boy named 
Felix Jethway.  Elfride is emphatic that she did not reciprocate Felix’s feelings—in 
fact, she spurns Felix when he attempts to kiss her, which causes Felix to essentially 
pine to death (he is, we learn later, buried on the day of Stephen’s arrival).  Mr. 
Swancourt strictly forbids the marriage when he learns of Stephen’s heritage, as he has 
his own class pretensions and ambitions.  Stephen receives an opportunity in India to 
advance his prospects, and the two lovers decide to wed before his departure in order 
to solidify their commitment while Stephen attempts to make himself worthy in Mr. 
Swancourt’s eyes.  However, confusion over the local marriage license dooms their 
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plan, and their only option is to elope and marry in London.  Although they depart 
with the intention of getting married, Elfride loses courage and insists that they return 
immediately upon their arrival at Paddington station.  Elfride realizes the potential 
disgrace that might arise from her “wretched vacillation,” and, unluckily, the couple is 
seen upon their return by Mrs. Jethway (A Pair of Blue Eyes 113).  Her coincidental 
appearance is significant because the woman believes that Elfride has “killed” (79) her 
son, leading her to “haunt Elfride like a shadow” (287) for the remainder of the novel.  
During Stephen’s absence in India, Elfride is thrown into contact with Henry Knight, a 
more worldly man who is both Stephen’s mentor and the relative of Elfride’s rich new 
stepmother (whom Swancourt has married primarily to advance Elfride’s prospects).  
Knight initially finds Elfride silly, having been the reviewer who panned her historical 
romance, but the two are gradually brought together, as Elfride’s supposedly “raw” 
(292) and “unused state” have “great charm” for Knight (320-1).  Their engagement 
dissolves, however, when through the “concatenation of circumstance” Knight’s 
growing doubts about Elfride’s past are confirmed by encounters with casual relics of 
her previous relationships, which compel her to confess her past lovers (323).  A final 
blow is struck when Mrs. Jethway forwards Knight a letter written by Elfride, which 
begs the grief-stricken mother not to ruin her prospects.  Knight, having definitively 
broken the engagement, departs for a tour of Europe to clear his mind.  Returning over 
a year later, he chances upon Stephen.  The two exchange their experiences, causing 
both to realize their continued love for Elfride.  Both rush to Endelstow to claim her, 
only to find that she has recently died after marrying the local nobleman, Lord 
Luxellian.   
 The central issues in the novel are similar to the ones Hardy would later return 
to in Tess:  the question of purity—as a bodily fact, a moral quality, and a social 
fantasy—and the power of the past to haunt and determine the present.  These two 
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issues become intertwined through coincidences.  Chance encounters with casual 
relics of the past juxtapose that past with the present in a manner that foregrounds the 
fantasy of Elfride’s “naturalness” or purity.  These irruptions of the past into the 
present draw the reader’s attention to the social forces—most notably those related to 
class—which shape and determine Elfride’s fate.  In other words, the structure of the 
novel’s plot, through its various returns and repetitions, highlights the social context of 
Elfride’s life and the courtship of her blue eyes. 
  While Stephen is away in India seeking his fortune, coincidences involving 
casual relics of Elfride’s relationship with him—an earring and a potted plant—bring 
that past to bear on the present.  During their courtship, Stephen and Elfride visit the 
seaside cliffs, and after their first kiss, Elfride promises Stephen that “‘nothing shall 
make me cease to love you’” (62).  Upon their return home, Elfride discovers that she 
has lost an earring and tells Stephen that it must be on the cliff since she 
“‘remember[s] a faint sensation of some change about me’” (67-8).  The earring 
becomes a symbol of the change occurring in Elfride, a symbol which in turn becomes 
external to her and part of the landscape.  Later in the novel, Knight proposes to take 
Elfride to the same cliffs, and Elfride is keenly aware of the repetition:  “A duplicate 
of her original arrangement with Stephen.  Some fatality must be hanging over her 
head […] Elfride had still too lively a sense of the past to enjoy the idea of imitating to 
the letter peculiar actions she had lately gone through with another lover and other 
hopes” (308).  As the lovers gaze upon the sea, Knight wonders if other lovers have 
sat where they now sit, prompting Elfride to recall her visit with Stephen and her lost 
earring.  Elfride glances around for the earring and sees it glinting in a crevice:  “Only 
for a few minutes during the day did the sun light the alcove to its innermost rifts and 
slits, but these were the minutes now, and its level rays did Elfride the good or evil 
turn of revealing the lost trinket” (309).  Elfride, having previously mentioned the loss 
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of the earring to Knight (though not the circumstances of the loss) is “seized with a 
misgiving that Knight, on seeing the object, would be reminded of her words.”  
However, in attempting to surreptitiously dig the earring out of the crevice in order to 
conceal it, she in fact draws Knight’s attention to it. 
 In the previous chapter, Elfride has offered to give Knight, who is preparing to 
return to London for a time, something “‘to make [him] think of [her] during this 
autumn at [his] chambers’” (297).  Rather than choosing the customary lock of hair or 
portrait, Knight selects a “‘dwarf myrtle-tree in the pot, which [Elfride has] been so 
carefully tending’” (297).  Like the earring, the myrtle-tree enacts a repetition, for “it 
so happened that the myrtle Knight unluckily had singled out had a peculiar beginning 
and history.  It had originally been a twig worn in Stephen Smith’s button-hole, and he 
had taken it thence, stuck it into the pot, and told her that if it grew, she was to take 
care of it, and keep it in remembrance of him when he was far away.”  In attempting to 
create a memento of Elfride to unite the distance between London and Endelstow, 
Knight actually brings Elfride’s past alive by the same process.  Not only does the 
plant form an objective link between Elfride and her first lover, who is now 
geographically distant, but its natural attribute—the fact that it has grown from a twig 
into a plant—objectifies the time between her commitment to Stephen and the present 
moment.  Like the earring, then, the potted plant reminds Elfride of the persistence of 
the past, while simultaneously eroding the image of purity that Knight idealizes.  
 Following the trip to the cliffs, Knight interrogates Elfride about her past, his 
suspicions having been aroused by Elfride’s reactions to the myrtle-tree and earring.  
Before she can reply to Knight’s inquiries about past lovers, “the moonlight returned 
again, irradiating that portion of the churchyard within their view” and illuminating “a 
white tomb—the tomb of Felix Jethway” (315).  Felix’s tomb is an extremely 
important site in the novel, as aside from being an explicit memorial of Felix, it is also 
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the location where Stephen and Elfride first come to an understanding.  After Stephen 
confesses his lowly class origins, Elfride confesses that someone has loved her before:  
“‘Where is he now?’  ‘Here.’ […]  ‘Where here?’  ‘Under us.  He is under this tomb.  
He is dead, and we are sitting on his grave’” (78).  The tombstone not only revives 
these memories in Elfride, but it spurs a series of associations in Knight’s mind and 
impels him to wrest a confession from Elfride about Felix and eventually about 
Stephen.  Knight exclaims, “‘What, a lover in the tomb and a lover on it?’” (318).  The 
repetition of events on the tombstone—a lover in it and then a lover on it, and now 
another lover near it—reflects its function as palimpsest, a piece of stone that becomes 
a relic memorializing Elfride’s experiences with Felix and Stephen.  All of these 
objects, then, are objectifications of Elfirde’s past that have a distinct power over her 
memory.  Although the past they memorialize has receded out of view, moments of 
chance or coincidence activate that past and bring it to bear on Elfride’s present.   
 These objects are not the only means by which Elfride’s past is objectively 
carried forward into the present.  Mrs. Jethway also plays an extremely important role 
to this effect, most vividly when she accuses Elfride of killing Felix.  Although Mrs. 
Jethway tells Elfride, “‘He died because you were his own well-agreed sweetheart, 
and then proved false—and it killed him,’” the attachment appears to have been 
entirely on Felix’s side (271).  Elfride simply “‘said [she] liked the name Felix better 
than any other name in the parish,’” and then later asked Felix to help her dismount 
from her horse, only to later rebuff his attempt to kiss her.  Felix here seems to be an 
anticipatory parody of Michael Furey of Joyce’s “The Dead,” and his mother is a 
figure of excessive grief turned into melodramatic vengeance.  Elfride’s behavior is far 
from coquettish, having never encouraged Felix “‘by look, word, or sign,’” yet she is 
nevertheless made to feel the guilt of both a murderess and a sexual being (78).  As 
she tells Mrs. Jethway, “‘I little expected to be scourged with my own kindness’” 
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(273).  Her guilt is an illusion—both in the sense that Felix and his death are not 
represented in the novel and in the sense that she is not culpable—but it pursues her in 
the guise of Mrs. Jethway.  When Mrs. Jethway is coincidentally present when Elfride 
and Stephen return from London, Elfride’s illusory sexual guilt is united to her more 
substantive guilt because Mrs. Jethway becomes the bearer of her secret.  Ultimately, 
Mrs. Jethway is the vehicle of Elfride’s undoing, since she sends Knight the note 
Elfride has written to her, which pleads with her “in the name of common 
womanhood” not to “execute the threats you have repeated to me” (331).  However, 
Elfride is the agent of her own demise insofar as, by writing the note, she accepts the 
illusory guilt attributed to her.   
 The importance of coincidence to the novel’s events certainly makes it seem as 
if some “fatality must be hanging over” Elfride.  The terror aroused by the menacing 
presence of Mrs. Jethway is extended to everyday objects and to the landscape itself as 
the plot of the novel coincidentally and repeatedly presents Elfride with relics of her 
past.  Indeed, the third volume of the novel seems to justify complaints about the 
mechanistic nature of Hardy’s plots.144  The first chapter contains Elfride’s failed 
confession to Knight, a chance encounter with Mrs. Jethway, and then her engagement 
to Knight.  Following this, encounters with relics come in quick succession:  Mrs. 
Jethway is coincidentally on the same boat as Elfride and Knight (Ch. II); Knight asks 
                                                 
144 For example, in Aspects of the Novel (New York: Harvest Books, 1956), E.M. Forster says that 
Hardy’s works exemplify those in which “plot triumph[s] too completely.”  According to Forster, as 
opposed to The Dynasts (1904-8) in which “the hammer-strokes are heard, cause and effect enchain the 
characters despite their struggles, complete contact between the actors and the plot is established,” in 
Hardy’s novels “though the same supreme and terrible machine works, it never catches humanity in its 
teeth” (pgs. 93-4).  In a much more recent article, Zena Meadowsong focuses on the “mechanical” 
nature of Tess, arguing that the novel’s plot devices—including coincidence—reflect the novel’s formal 
internalization of the problem of industrialization.  I agree with Meadowsong insofar as she sees 
coincidence and other aspects of the novel’s form as directing the reader toward the social realm; 
however, I disagree with her characterization of coincidence as a “deformation of narrative realism” 
because it implies that coincidence is inherently opposed to realism.  See Meadowsong, “Thomas Hardy 
and the Machine: The Mechanical Deformation of Narrative Realism in Tess of the D’Urbervilles,” 
Nineteenth Century Literature 64.2 (2009): 225-48.  
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to have the myrtle-tree as a memento of Elfride (Ch. III); Elfride and Knight travel to 
the cliffs where the lost earring is discovered (Ch. IV); Felix’s tomb is illuminated 
during the conversation in the churchyard (Ch. V).  Knight finally breaks off their 
engagement in Chapter VII after receiving the note from Mrs. Jethway.  The timing of 
the letter is more significant than its contents, as it “had a virtue in the accident of its 
juncture far beyond any it intrinsically exhibited” (331).   
 The devices Hardy uses here are indeed crude: an earring wedged in a rocky 
crevice and a bereft mother bent on revenge.  However, it would be a mistake to read 
these events as a sign of a “fatality” besetting Elfride.  Indeed, far from being 
arbitrary, these events draw our attention to the social forces shaping Elfride’s fate, 
most notably the social fantasy of her purity.  The juxtaposition of Knight’s fantasy of 
Elfride as “natural” with the numerous objective reminders that Elfride is a thoroughly 
social being highlights the contradictions in the forces that shape her life.  Knight’s 
fantasy is itself a by-product of class ideology, the same ideology that compels Mr. 
Swancourt to drive away Stephen and instead promote Knight’s suit.  Elfride here is 
not up against “the nature of things, the entire universe.”  Rather, she is up against a 
set of specifiable social forces, forces to which coincidental encounters with relics 
direct our attention.  To be sure, these forces are not portrayed with much complexity, 
but they are nevertheless the ones we know Hardy was preoccupied with during the 
early years of his career as a novelist, such as in his first (unpublished and now lost) 
manuscript, The Poor Man and the Lady.145  
A Pair of Blue Eyes, then, illustrates the role coincidences and casual relics 
play in Hardy’s aesthetics.  In a notebook entry from 1890, Hardy wrote, “Art is a 
                                                 
145 See Michael Millgate, Thomas Hardy: His Career as a Novelist (New York: Random House, Inc., 
1971), pgs. 17-25 for a brief description of what is known about this lost novel.  Millgate suggests that 
Hardy reworked some of the material from the social satire into subsequent novels, including A Pair of 
Blue Eyes. 
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disproportioning—(i.e., distorting, throwing out of proportion)—of realities, to show 
more clearly the features that matter in those realities, which, if merely copied or 
reported inventorially, might possibly be observed, but would more probably be 
overlooked.  Hence ‘realism’ is not Art.”146  Although Hardy here dismisses “realism,” 
he nevertheless posits Art as realist insofar as Art disproportions reality in order to 
have the reader observe its salient features.  Thus, Brian Richardson’s claim that 
coincidence is excluded from the nineteenth-century novel so that “the extensive 
effects of social and biological forces can be shown in all their complexity and self-
sufficiency”147 can only cause us to overlook or misunderstand the principles of 
Hardy’s aesthetics.  While coincidences appear to create “unnatural” or “improbable” 
chains of cause and effect, in the case of A Pair of Blue Eyes, they disproportion 
features of reality in order to foreground the social forces that shape Elfride’s life and 
her tragic fate.148 
 
III.  Coincidence, FID, and the Form of The Return of the Native  
 While A Pair of Blue Eyes juxtaposes the past and present through casual relics 
to highlight the social forces that shape its protagonist’s fate, The Return of the Native 
                                                 
146 Thomas Hardy, The Life and Work of Thomas Hardy, ed. Michael Millgate (Athens: Tthe Univ. of 
Georgia Press, 1985), pg. 239. 
147 Unlikely Stories, pg. 41 
148 In this sense, coincidence in Hardy can be thought of in “positive” terms insofar as it points to a 
positive content.  Most critics have considered chance in Hardy as a negation, both in the sense of it as 
an explicit negation of human freedom and in the sense of Hardy’s use of failed convergences, which 
indicate lost opportunity.  Viewing coincidence negatively leads logically to certain claims, such as that 
things would have been different for Tess if only her letter had reached Angel as she had intended.  My 
point would be that things might have worked out somewhat differently for Tess, but not that 
differently.  And this is not because she is beset by some abstract fatalism, but rather because we have a 
rich enough picture of the social forces that beset her.   Put differently, the complications of plot do not 
cause Tess’s (and Elfide’s, and Eustacia’s) demise, but rather heighten the reader’s sense of the forces 
shaping the heroine’s fate.  For readings emphasizing the negative side of Hardy’s use of chance and 
coincidence, see Dannenberg, pgs. 103-4 and Bert Hornback, The Metaphor of Chance: Vision and 
Technique in the Works of Thomas Hardy (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1971).  
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juxtaposes different perspectives on the present in order to do the same.  The Return of 
the Native is Hardy’s most profound exploration of community and unique among his 
oeuvre—not coincidentally—in its lack of a central protagonist.  The lives of the main 
characters of the novel—Clym, Eustacia, Wildeve, Diggory Venn, and Mrs. 
Yeobright—are all shaped in a significant manner by their conflicts with the 
community and values of Egdon Heath.  The tragic fates experienced by most of these 
characters result from their attempts to achieve happiness without understanding the 
social context of their actions—that is to say, as a result of their limited perspectives.   
 In the reading that follows, I argue that the form of the novel attunes the reader 
to the seeing these characters in the proper (that is, historicist) perspective.  On one 
hand, this will involve an analysis of the way in which coincidences and moments of 
chance create opportunities for juxtaposing individual perspectives on events, the 
combination of which enables the reader to achieve a greater understanding of events 
than characters themselves have access to.  As I have argued throughout my 
discussion of Hardy, coincidences in the novel do not embody some philosophical 
statement about the rule of chance over characters’ lives, but rather generate 
opportunities for the reader to see the social forces such as class that shape those lives.  
On the other hand, this reading will also involve an extended analysis of the novel’s 
use of free indirect discourse.  Hardy’s novels are usually noted for their distinct lack 
of FID, but The Return of the Native is an important exception.  As I shall argue, 
passages of FID in the novel are significant because, like coincidences, they juxtapose 
different perspectives on events in order to attune the reader to the social context of 
the characters’ lives.  Therefore, even though my reading is not focused solely on 
coincidence, it nevertheless illustrates how coincidence works in junction with other 
important elements of the novel’s form in order to cultivate the proper historicist 
perspective. 
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 Even though relics do not play an important role in the narrative structure of 
The Return of the Native, the term does appear once in the text, in a significant 
passage that also illustrates what I mean by “the proper perspective.”  As the sixth and 
final book of the novel opens, we learn that Clym Yeobright, after the tragic deaths of 
his wife and mother, has developed a new habit: 
He frequently walked the heath alone, when the past seized upon him 
with its shadowy hand, and held him there to listen to its tale.  His 
imagination would then people the spot with its ancient inhabitants:  
forgotten Celtic tribes trod their tracks about him, and he could almost live 
among them, look in their faces, and see them standing beside the barrows 
which swelled around, untouched and perfect as at the time of their 
erection.  Those of the dyed barbarians who had chosen cultivable tracts 
were, in comparison with those who had left their marks here, as writers on 
paper beside writers on parchment.  Their records had perished long ago by 
the plough, while the works of these remained.  Yet they had all lived and 
died unconscious of the different fates awaiting their relics.  It reminded 
him that unforeseen factors operate in the evolution of immortality.149 
Even in a novel as obsessed with seeing as The Return of the Native, this is a strange 
moment of vision.  Time is flattened in a peculiar manner, as past and present co-exist: 
Clym achieves a kind of double vision that enables him “to almost live among” extinct 
tribes but simultaneously to see them from a perspective where their works are 
regarded as “relics.”  Although Egdon Heath is frequently noted—both in the novel 
and by critics—for its intractability to human will, it is that very characteristic which 
                                                 
149 The Return of the Native (1912 text; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), pg. 315-6.  If 
further proof of the special importance Hardy attached to “relics” were needed, in 1895 Hardy changed 
the word  “works” to “relics” in the penultimate sentence of this passage. 
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makes this moment possible.  The fact that the Celtic tribes had chosen the heath for 
their barrows means that their gestures toward immortality have, unlike those of the 
dyed barbarians, survived.  As with the encounters with relics I have discussed 
throughout this chapter, this is a moment of difference and continuity.  Clym is 
immersed in the past but simultaneously viewing it from a perspective that recognizes 
its specificity. 
 The dual perspective Clym achieves in this moment is not only a thematic aim 
of the novel, but also a way of seeing that the novel cultivates formally through both 
its plot structure and through its tactical use of free indirect discourse.  Throughout the 
novel, FID appears at moments where characters reflect upon their situations and 
attempt to anticipate the outcome of events.  While in these moments the reader is 
subtly immersed in the perspective of the situated individual, the shift out of the free 
indirect mode indicates to the reader the limitations of that perspective.  These 
limitations are in turn further emphasized by the plot, which relies heavily on 
moments of chance and coincidence.  As in A Pair of Blue Eyes, such events turn the 
reader’s attention to the forces and “unforeseen factors” that shape the characters’ 
lives, factors which characters themselves are unable to fully grasp.  Therefore, 
whereas FID is usually recognized for the way it blends voice, what distinguishes it in 
The Return of the Native is the way it juxtaposes perspectives.  In other words, what is 
important is not that FID is providing us access to characters’ interiority, but rather 
that it is providing us with a detached immediacy to a characters’ perspective: we 
regard events how they regard them but simultaneously see that perspective in its 
social context.  While the plot and tragedy of the novel are fueled by characters’ 
inability to see and anticipate those “unforeseen factors” that Clym appreciates by the 
novel’s end, these failures are embedded within a formal structure that attunes the 
reader to historical contingency.   
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 Vision is a persistent thematic concern of the novel.   It enters the novel not 
only  in the form of the eye troubles that beset Clym, but also in the way that class and 
education influence people’s perception.  For example, the complicated romantic 
entanglements that drive the early part of the novel largely result from Mrs. 
Yeobright’s concern over how people will view Thomasin when they learn that she 
has not married Wildeve after all.  This concern with vision also manifests itself on a 
discursive level.  From the outset of the novel, point of view is continually shifting.  
The events atop Rainbarrow during the novel’s opening scene are first presented as 
Diggory Venn sees them at a distance as he approaches the heath.  Then, as Eustacia’s 
presence atop the barrow is described, the perspective shifts to that of an “imaginative 
stranger,” who might have supposed that the woman was “one of the Celts who built 
the barrow, so far had all of modern date withdrawn from the scene.”150  As the 
perspective zooms in to a view of the Egdonites gathered around the bonfire, the 
perspective on the characters becomes unstable:  “the permanent moral expression of 
each face it was impossible to discover, for as the nimble flames towered, nodded, and 
swooped through the surrounding air the blots of shade and flakes of light upon the 
countenances of the group changed shape and position endlessly” (21).  While in this 
moment the point of view is disembodied, external to the characters, at other points in 
the text the discourse shifts to moments of intense experiential narration, such as when 
Mrs. Yeobright sits on the heath in her final moments, observing a colony of ants, or 
the passage describing Clym’s “curious microscopic” experience as a furze-cutter 
(247). 
 It not just the perspective on events that shifts, but also the perspective on 
characters.  Eustacia and Clym, for example, are both introduced with a full chapter 
                                                 
150 The Return of the Native (1878 text; New York: Penguin Books, 1999), pg. 17.  Further references 
are to this edition and appear in the text, unless otherwise noted. 
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devoted to a description of their characters.  At times, these descriptions ask the reader 
to view the character through mythic lenses.  Eustacia is first described as “the raw 
material of divinity” (68) before the narrator remarks that “the new moon behind her 
head, an odd helmet upon it, a diadem of accidental dewdrops round her brow, would 
have been adjuncts sufficient to strike the note of Artemis, Athena, or Hera” (69).  
However, these gestures toward abstraction are attenuated by persistent 
acknowledgement that individuals are shaped by their circumstances.  Much is made 
of Eustacia’s education in Budmouth and how it has made her ill-fitted for life on 
Egdon:  “Every bizarre effect that could result from the random intertwining of 
watering-place glitter with the grand solemnity of a heath, were to be found in her” 
(70).  Thus, although Eustacia appears as the “queen of the night” on the heath, we 
learn that “a narrow life in Budmouth might have completely demeaned her” (71).  
This entanglement of character and circumstance is no more apparent than in the case 
of Diggory Venn.  On one hand, we see Diggory as the other characters see him—
either as the mythic figure of the reddleman, or a man whose trade physically and 
socially alienates him from the genteel community.  On the other hand, however, the 
presentation of Thomasin’s letter rejecting his suit enables us to understand that, even 
before his adoption of the reddle trade, class prejudice has shaped people’s perception 
of him.  Therefore, while the reader is invited to view characters as others in the 
community see them, he or she is also taught to recognize that such situated 
perspectives are limited or at least shaped by factors such as class and education. 
  In my reading of Tom Jones in Chapter One, I emphasized how the novel’s 
narrator “trains” the reader to view accidents in a certain manner.  The Return of the 
Native also trains its reader.  This training, however, is not in how to interpret 
accidents, but rather in how to evaluate the competing perspectives on events and 
characters presented in the novel.  Although the shifting perspectives I have discussed 
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might just seem to offer different, though equally limited views, the narrative attunes 
the reader to recognize the limitations of such perspectives.  The primary mechanism 
the novel uses to accomplish this training is free indirect discourse.  As I’ve already 
mentioned, FID is rather sparse in Hardy, particularly in relation to other 
contemporaries such as Trollope or James.  And this absence is usually read as a 
confirmation that Hardy’s novels are only presenting us with one voice—that they are 
“shamelessly monological,”151 pitting the voice of the narrator against the characters.  
However, closer attention to the consistent manner in which FID is deployed reveals 
that the interplay of voices and perspectives in the novel is much more complex that is 
usually assumed.  Although the free indirect mode only appears sporadically in The 
Return of the Native, these appearances are both significant and extremely tactical, for 
they always present character’s thoughts at critical junctures in the plot.  For example, 
when Eustacia learns that Thomasin might not desire Wildeve, the description of her 
“stupefied silence” is followed by a passage in the free indirect mode:152 
What curious feeling was this coming over her?  Was it really possible that 
her interest in Wildeve had been so entirely the result of antagonism that 
the glory and the dream departed from the man with the first sound that he 
was no longer coveted by her rival?  She was, then, secure of him at last.  
Thomasin no longer required him.  What a humiliating victory!  He loved 
her best, she thought; and yet—dared she to murmur such treacherous 
                                                 
151 Lock, pg. 25.  As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, interpretations of Hardy’s 
“monologism” and his use of chance go hand in hand.  Lock, for instance, cites other critics who have 
emphasized Hardy’s “‘spectatorial narrator’” or the fact that he is “‘one of the most scopophilic of 
novelists.’”  As Lock notes, the term scopophilic draws on Foucault’s theory of power and surveillance, 
implying Hardy’s narrator is one “who enjoys the sense of control and possession that viewing 
bestows.”  If we assume that Hardy’s narrator is on “the outside” of his characters and intent on 
controlling them, then it soon follows that chance and coincidence are simply another instantiation of 
that control.  My aim is to show both that there is not just one dominant vision in the novel and also that 
coincidence is operating in a more nuanced manner than this “monological” reading of Hardy suggests. 
152 Italics are added in all quoted passages to indicate FID. 
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criticism ever so softly?—what was the man worth whom a woman inferior 
to herself did not value?  The sentiment which lurks more or less in all 
animate nature—that of not desiring the undesired of others—was lively as 
a passion in the supersubtle, epicurean heart of Eustacia.  Her social 
superiority over him, which hitherto had scarcely ever impressed her, 
became unpleasantly insistent, and for the first time she felt that she had 
stooped in loving him. (101-2) 
This passage is characteristic of FID in the novel because it demonstrates the keenness 
with which some characters perceive their situations.  Eustacia here is strongly aware 
of the fact that her desire for Wildeve is generated by antagonism.  In other words, she 
recognizes not only that her desire is triangulated and inherently social, but also that it 
is influenced by class (“what was the man worth whom a woman inferior to herself did 
not value”).  At the same time, this passage is characteristic because the shift out of 
the free indirect mode marks the limitations of Eustacia’s discernment.  Eustacia is not 
aware that the sentiment “of not desiring the undesired of others” lurks not just in 
herself but in all animate nature (or more particularly, in those with whom she is 
involved, such as Wildeve).  What is important about this passage is not so much that 
we’re “hearing Eustacia’s voice,” but rather that we’re momentarily evaluating events 
from her perspective.153     
 A glance at other passages of FID supports the notion that its most important 
feature in the novel is the way it juxtaposes perspectives rather than how it blends 
                                                 
153 The interpretation of this passage is made considerably more complicated by the allusion (“the glory 
and the dream departed from the man...”) to Wordsworth’s Intimations Ode:  “Whither is fled the 
visionary gleam? / Where is it now, the glory and the dream?” (lines 56-57).  The question is whose 
voice we’re hearing at this moment: is the narrator ironizing Eustacia’s experience through the allusion, 
or is Eustacia herself capable of ironizing her own experience in this way?  Given Eustacia’s education, 
her self-awareness, and her worldview, I certainly think it likely that she could think about her own 
experience in these terms.   
 
 
 
169 
voices.154  Although there are many passages that illustrate this point, three should be 
sufficient to demonstrate the pattern.  The first passage occurs early in the novel.  Mrs. 
Yeobright is on her way to try and convince Wildeve to fulfill his engagement to 
Thomasin, when Diggory approaches her and offers to marry her niece.  Although 
Venn’s offer does not change Mrs. Yeobright’s plan to pressure Wildeve, it changes 
the manner in which she attempts to persuade him: 
She knew enough of the male heart to see that with Wildeve, and indeed 
with the majority of men, the being able to state, at such a critical juncture, 
that another lover had eagerly bid for the hand that he was disposed to 
decline would immensely alter the situation.  […] Mrs. Yeobright 
accordingly resolved that her system of procedure should be changed.  She 
had left home intent upon straightforwardness; she reached the inn 
determined to finesse.  To influence Wildeve by piquing him rather than by 
appealing to his generosity was obviously the wise course with such a man.  
She thanked God for the weapon which the reddleman had put into her 
hands. (98) 
The second passage narrates Wildeve’s reaction after he receives a letter from 
Eustacia in which she rejects him, prompting him to marry Thomasin after all: 
Wildeve was put upon his mettle by the situation.  To lose the two 
women—he who had been the well-beloved of both—was too ironical an 
issue to be endured.  He could only decently save himself by Thomasin; 
and once he became her husband, Eustacia’s repentance, he thought, 
                                                 
154 This is certainly an idiosyncratic way of reading FID; however, my point is that we need to 
understand FID in Hardy on its own terms and for the particular effects it produces.  FID is not like 
calculus—it’s not something you either do correctly or incorrectly.  Rather, it’s a considerably complex 
technique that has various effects depending on the context.  If we attempt to evaluate FID in Hardy by 
comparing it to FID in James, then we’re likely to draw conclusions very different from those we will 
draw by attending to its effects.   
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would set in for a long and bitter term.  It was no wonder that Wildeve, 
ignorant of the new man at the back of the scene, should have supposed 
Eustacia to be playing a part.  To believe that the letter was not the result of 
some momentary pique, to infer that she really gave him up to Thomasin, 
would have required previous knowledge of her transfiguration by that 
man’s influence. (153) 
The final passage details Clym’s thoughts as contemplates the “three antagonistic 
growths” of his relationship with his mother, his desire for Eustacia, and his ambition 
to start a school.  After realizing that Eustacia is in love with an idealized version of 
himself, Clym reflects: 
Along with that came the widening breach between himself and his mother.  
Whenever any little occurrence had brought into more prominence than 
usual the disappointment that he was causing her it had sent him on lone 
and moody walks; or he was kept awake a great part of the night by the 
turmoil of spirit which such a recognition created.  If Mrs. Yeobright could 
only have been led to see what a sound and worthy purpose this purpose of 
his was, and how little it was being affected by his devotion to Eustacia, 
how differently would she regard him! Thus as his sight grew accustomed 
to the first blinding halo kindled about him by love and beauty Yeobright 
began to perceive what strait he was in […] Three antagonistic growths had 
to be kept alive: his mother’s trust in him, his plan for becoming a teacher, 
and Eustacia’s happiness.  His fervid nature could not afford to relinquish 
one of these, though two of the three were as many as he could hope to 
preserve. (198-9) 
What is common among these passages is the representation of a character’s thought 
process as he or she attempts to understand and control external events—more 
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specifically, social relationships.  While the free indirect mode momentarily immerses 
the reader in the character’s belief in their ability to “read others” and control the 
outcome of events, the return of the narrator’s perspective identifies contingencies that 
prevent them from doing so.  Mrs.  Yeobright believes it best to pique Wildeve rather 
than appeal to his generosity, but we are immediately told that “the greatest effect of 
her strategy on that day was, as often happens, in a quarter quite outside her view 
when arranging it” (100).  Wildeve decides to marry Thomasin in order to spite 
Eustacia, but he is unaware that Eustacia’s changed attitude toward him is a 
consequence of Clym’s arrival.  And Clym believes that it is possible to reconcile 
those three antagonistic growths, but he is unaware that “two of the three were as 
many as he could hope to preserve.”  Perhaps more importantly, although he believes 
his three projects are separate, we know that his educational plan and his desire for 
Eustacia are deeply intertwined.  In each of these instances, the narrative discourse 
encourages us to see events through a character’s eyes, but it simultaneously enables 
us to view that perspective in its broader social context.155 
                                                 
155 Hardy’s revisions to the text confirm that, on some level, this technique is deliberate.  On the night 
of Eustacia’s death, Clym anxiously awaits a response to his letter of reconciliation to his wife:  
“Secretly Clym had a more pleasing hope.  Eustacia might possibly decline to use her pen—it was 
rather her way to work silently—and surprise him by appearing at his door.  How fully her mind was 
made up to do otherwise he did not know” (1912; pg. 297)  The first two sentences here appear in both 
the 1878 and 1895 editions of the text, but Hardy added the final sentence in 1912.  Another important 
aspect of FID in the novel is that we only have access to the thoughts or perspectives of certain 
characters—Clym, Eustacia, Mrs. Yeobright, Wildeve and Diggory.  In a somewhat idiosyncratic 
approach to the novel via Heidegger, J. Hillis Miller suggests that the use of FID is limited to those 
characters who have “authentic Daseins” insofar as they lead “an independent inner life” unlike the 
“they” of the Egdonites.  Class and education are certainly a factor in whose thoughts we are presented, 
and this certainly raises a number of issues, but I’m not sure that ontology is necessarily one of them.  
What is at stake in the novel is not Being, but rather belonging.  FID only appears in relation to these 
characters because it is their education and class status that put them at odds with the values and 
structure of the community in which they live.  Miller’s reading also serves as a useful point of 
comparison for my reading.   Miller suggests that Hardy ascribes to Clym “insights into the way the 
mismatch between what men and women want and what natural laws allow makes happiness and the 
satisfaction of desire impossible.”  My argument is that the “mismatch” is not between human desire 
and natural laws, but rather between individual desire and its social context.  Hardy, in other words, is 
not trying to move us beyond the milieu to a universal “human condition,” but rather turning our 
attention to the particular milieu to see how it shapes the individual.   See Miller, “Individual and 
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 All of these passages dramatize a conflict between the will and circumstance.    
While this conflict frequently manifests itself in the novel as the desire to manipulate 
people and relationships, the novel also explores how one’s broader milieu remains 
intractable to individual will.  This, of course, is dramatized most explicitly through 
the failure of Clym’s plan to educate the natives of Egdon upon his return from Paris.  
The text is quite explicit about the necessary failure of his project.  In his desire to 
unite cosmopolitan “high thinking” with the “plain living” of the heath, Clym fails to 
recognize that the positivism of Comte is not only unintelligible to furze-cutters but 
more importantly unsuited for them (172).  The fact that the community of Egdon will 
remain resistant to Clym’s ideological project is bolstered by the rich sense of that 
community as a “fossilized survival”—a community formed through inherited social 
customs and practices (122).  The failure of Clym’s project, in other words, makes it 
abundantly clear that the organization and way of life in a particular community are 
not the product of mere ideas but rather the result of various forms of social 
inheritance.  Clym has a rich understanding of culture, but is nevertheless unable to 
grasp the extent of it influence.  As he waits for Eustacia on the night they become 
engaged, he gazes at the moon and reflects upon the fact that in returning to the heath 
community “he had anticipated an escape from the chafing of social necessities; yet 
behold they were here also”:  “More than ever he longed to be in some world where 
personal ambition was not the only recognised form of progress—such, perhaps, as 
might have been the case at some time or other in the silvery globe then shining upon 
him” (193).  Clym gazes at the moon and fantasizes about a world without culture.  In 
poignant contrast to the moment at the end of the novel which I discussed above, 
Clym imagines such a world “till he almost felt himself to be voyaging bodily through 
                                                                                                                                            
Community in The Return of the Native,” in Thomas Hardy Reappraised, ed. Keith Wilson (Toronto: 
Univ. of Toronto Press, 2006), pgs. 154-173. 
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[the moon’s] wild scenes, standing on its hollow hills, [...] or mounting to the edges of 
its craters.”  At this point in the novel, in other words, Clym can imagine a world 
without culture, but cannot quite grasp the implications of being immersed in a 
particular culture. 
 Whereas Clym desires escape only after the failure of his “culture scheme,” 
Eustacia desires escape from Edgon from the outset of the novel, and coincidental 
encounters heighten our awareness of the illusory nature of her desire for escape 
(245).  Even before Clym arrives home, we are abundantly aware that Eustacia desires 
him almost solely because he is coming from the glamorous world of Paris and, 
perhaps more importantly, can potentially transport her there.  On the night of his 
arrival, however, this desire is heightened as she coincidentally crosses paths with 
Clym and his mother on the heath: “she could not, for a moment, believe that chance, 
unrequested, had brought into her presence the soul of the house she had gone to 
inspect” (116).  While this encounter only increases the mystery surrounding Clym, 
the implications that Clym and Eustacia are wholly incompatible are readily apparent 
to the reader as Eustacia overhears Clym remark “upon the friendliness and geniality 
written in the faces of the hills around.”  The fact that Clym represents only the 
illusion—and not the concrete opportunity—of escape is emphasized by the dream 
which this encounter generates.  Although Eustacia’s dream that night was “amid the 
circumstances of [her] life [...] as wonderful as a dream could be,” the “heath dimly 
appeared behind the general brilliancy of the action” (118).     
 Another coincidental encounter later in the novel further emphasizes the 
illusory nature of her desire to disentangle herself from her community.  In an attempt 
to “battle against Depression”—depression generated by Clym’s blindness and his 
growing fondness for life on the heath—Eustacia decides to attend a dance in a nearby 
village, where she coincidentally encounters Wildeve (251).  As the two dance—their 
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anonymity and their nominal relation as brother-and-sister-in-law making it ostensibly 
decorous—old desires are awakened in Eustacia: 
How near she was Wildeve! it was terrible to think of.  She could feel his 
breathing, and he, of course, could feel hers.  How badly she had treated 
him! yet, here they were treading one measure.  The enchantment of the 
dance surprised her.  A clear line of difference divided like a tangible fence 
her experience within this maze of motion from her experience without it. 
(256) 
The coincidence, like the free indirect discourse, juxtaposes two perspectives on 
Eustacia’s experience.  We see what it is like to be near Wildeve and to feel the sense 
of escape from the social order that has thwarted Eustacia’s hopes.  However, even 
though the dance was “an irresistible attack upon whatever sense of social order there 
was in their minds,” we also understand that the “clear line of difference” dividing this 
moment from her life in the community is an illusion (257).  In a curiously similar 
manner to Martin Chuzzlewit, this coincidence juxtaposes connection and 
disconnection: the encounter at the dance provides a context of anonymity that enables 
Eustacia to feel isolated, yet the coincidence also reveals that that sense of isolation 
and detachment is illusory. 
 This coincidence that reunites Eustacia and Wildeve at the dance brings us to a 
broader consideration of chance and coincidence in the novel, and more specifically, 
the role such events play in readers’ evaluation of characters and their fates.  Although 
this coincidence has unfortunate consequences for Eustacia, there is nothing inherently 
sinister about it.  She certainly could have chosen not to dance with Wildeve, and 
therefore we have no trouble accepting that she is responsible for any consequences 
attending her decision.  Yet the novel’s reliance on coincidental events and the 
disastrous consequences of those events considerably complicate the questions of 
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freedom and responsibility in the novel (as anyone who has taught The Return of the 
Native, or any Hardy novel, very well knows).    
 Among Hardy’s novels, The Return of the Native arguably has the most 
intricately plotted causal structure.  Serious problems for the characters start when 
Mrs. Yeobright has Christian Cantle deliver their respective fifty guinea inheritances 
to Clym and Thomasin.  Christian loses all hundred guineas to Wildeve in a game of 
dice, and although Diggory wins them back, he mistakenly delivers all hundred to 
Thomasin, “an error which afterwards helped to cause more misfortune than treble the 
loss in money value could have done” (232).  When Mrs. Yeobright learns of the 
mistake, she decides to visit Eustacia at home and see if she has received them.  
However, on her way there, she coincidentally encounters Eustacia on the heath, who 
happens to be on her way somewhere else (a coincidence which is significant insofar 
as Clym’s presence would certainly have caused the conversation to go differently).  
The unfortunate wording of Mrs. Yeobright’s inquiry about the guineas causes 
Eustacia to think that her mother-in-law is insinuating that she is having continuing 
interaction with Wildeve.  The result of the misunderstanding is the complete rupture 
of the relationship between Eustacia/Clym and Mrs. Yeobright.  When Mrs. Yeobright 
attempts to make amends by visiting them, Wildeve is coincidentally present and 
Clym happens to be fast asleep on the floor.  Eustacia hides Wildeve and does not 
answer the door because she overhears Clym say “mother” (though he is only having a 
dream).  Mrs. Yeobright sees Eustacia looking through the window and interprets the 
closed door as her son’s rejection of her, leading her to travel home in the heat and 
consequently die.  Matters are only made worse for Eustacia in the aftermath of Mrs. 
Yeobright’s death when Charley makes a bonfire in an attempt to cheer her, not 
knowing that this is Eustacia’s secret signal to Wildeve.  Wildeve obediently responds 
to what he thinks is a summons, which leads Eustacia to ask him to help her escape the 
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heath.  As Eustacia attempts to execute this plan, she realizes the futility of it due to 
her lack of money, and more broadly, her inability to escape the troubles that beset 
her, leading her to drown herself in Shadwater Weir.156 
 Although the chain of events that leads to Eustacia’s death is highly 
contingent, those events all have some relationship to her past actions.  Eustacia’s 
disregard for the mores of the heath community are as much at fault for these events as 
chance.  More importantly, these coincidences—as in A Pair of Blue Eyes—create 
opportunities for highlighting the social forces that shape Eustacia’s fate.   For 
example, the misunderstanding that arises between Eustacia and Mrs. Yeobright is 
almost entirely a product of their particular class prejudices:  Eustacia’s pride causes 
her to interpret Mrs. Yeobright’s question in a particular manner, just as Mrs. 
Yeobright’s pride shapes her perception and response to Eustacia’s accusations.  The 
seemingly simple question, “Did you receive the fifty guineas?” becomes extremely 
complicated in the particular context of its asking.  These coincidences not only assert 
the lingering implications of Eustacia’s past involvement with Wildeve, but they also 
present the opportunity for the juxtaposition of perspectives that I have suggested is so 
important to the novel’s form.  When all of the characters converge on Clym and 
Eustacia’s cottage on the fateful day of Mrs. Yeobright’s death, we see the events 
from multiple perspectives.  We look out of the window with Eustacia, but we also 
see, like Mrs. Yeobright, Eustacia’s face looking out of the window.  Similarly, we see 
                                                 
156 Whether or not Eustacia commits suicide is, of course, ambiguous in the text, though there is 
considerable consensus among critcs that we are intended to read her death as suicide.  See Ken 
Zellefrow, “The Return of the Native: Hardy’s Map and Eustacia’s Suicide” [Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction 28.2 (1973): 214-20], for a concise and helpful discussion of the debate.  If Eustacia’s death is 
not suicide, then it is an accident, which—as Zellefrow notes—“seems probable” to those “accustomed 
to Hardy’s use of ironic incidents of chance and fate.”  My point throughout this chapter is that chance 
is more than just the hand of fate in Hardy.  Zellefrow supports the idea of suicide by referring to 
Hardy’s maps for the novel.  If we are to take the map as accurate (which Hardy himself certainly 
seemed to have done), then Eustacia would have had to cross the road on which Wildeve was waiting 
for her in order to get to Shadwater Weir, a fact that for Zellefrow rules out accident. 
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the bonfire that Charley lights from multiple perspectives—we see it as a gift through 
Charley’s eyes, as signal through Wildeve’s, and as a burden through Eustacia’s.  The 
way in which we evaluate these events is a product of the juxtaposition and 
accumulation of these perspectives. 
 The effect of this training on the reader’s perception is best demonstrated by 
how we see and evaluate characters at the novel’s conclusion.  The following two 
paragraphs are the last presentation of Eustacia while she is alive:   
Anyone who had stood by now would have pitied her, not so much on 
account of her exposure to weather and isolation from all of humanity 
except for the mouldered remains inside the Barrow; but for that other form 
of misery which was denoted by the slightly rocking movement that her 
feelings imparted to her person.  Extreme unhappiness weighed visibly 
upon her. [...] The wings of her soul were broken by the cruel 
obstructiveness of all about her; and even had she seen herself in a 
promising way of getting to Budmouth, entering a coaster, and sailing to 
some Northern or Western port, she would have been but little more 
buoyant, so fearfully malignant were other things.  She uttered words 
aloud.  When a woman in such a situation, neither old, deaf, crazed, nor 
whimsical, takes upon herself to sob and soliloquise aloud there is 
something grievous the matter. 
‘I can’t go, I can’t go!’ she moaned.  ‘No money: I can’t go!  And if I 
could, what comfort to me?  I must drag on next year as I have dragged on 
this year, and the year after that as before.  How I have been tried and tried 
to be a splendid woman, and how destiny has been against me! ... I do not 
deserve my lot!’ she cried in a frenzy of bitter revolt.  ‘O the cruelty of 
putting me into this imperfect, ill-conceived world!  I was capable of much; 
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but I have been injured and blighted and crushed by things beyond my 
control!  O how hard it is of Heaven to devise such tortures for me, who 
have done no harm to Heaven at all!’ (346) 
These two paragraphs voice the same idea:  the narrator says, “Pity her!” and Eustacia 
says, “Pity me!”  Yet, curiously, the reader’s reaction is not pity, or rather, it is 
something much more complicated than pity.  Eustacia’s failure to take responsibility 
for her plight and her unqualified attribution of her problems to “things beyond my 
control” are at odds with our deep sense that certain things have been within her 
control.  In other words, the pity the narrator arouses is undermined by Eustacia’s 
soliloquy.  Two paragraphs that appear monological are in fact dialogical.  To the 
hypothetical observer who has no knowledge of Eustacia and her circumstances, the 
vision of her on the heath elicits pity, but to the reader, who has a much more nuanced 
perception of her, this situation elicits a more complex response.  In the same way that 
we know that Eustacia’s suffering is not a consequence of Susan Nunsuch’s voodoo 
doll, we recognize that Eustacia’s plight is not the product of intangible forces 
designed to torture her.  We have a rich enough understanding of her social context to 
understand that her fate arises not from an “imperfect, ill-conceived world,” but rather 
from her interactions with her particular milieu.  It is not that the world is ill-
conceived, but rather that she is ill-conceived for the society of the heath. 
 Our perception of Clym at the novel’s close is of the same complexity.  As I 
suggested above, his moment of double vision on the heath illustrates that he has a 
better sense of his place in history.  By the novel’s end, he uses his imagination not to 
walk among the craters of the moon but rather to walk among extinct tribes.  Yet this 
does not mean that he is able to transcend his own situation.  Shortly after this 
moment, Thomasin informs him of her decision to marry Diggory Venn.  Clym is 
“vexed at what seemed her unaccountable taste” and “half angry with her for choosing 
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Venn” (385).  Thomasin anticipates his objection by admitting that Venn is perhaps 
not quite “gentleman enough” for her (384).  Clym, however, eventually comes round, 
recognizing that Venn is “after all, as honest and persevering a young fellow as any on 
Egdon, since he had turned over a new leaf” (385).  Clym, like the reader, recognizes 
Venn’s virtue, but, unlike the reader, he can only do so once Venn has “turned over a 
new leaf” in abandoning the reddle trade (even though Venn has been honest and 
persevering all along).  Although the suffering Clym has endured has given him a 
better perspective, his perception is still profoundly shaped by his circumstances.  The 
image at the novel’s conclusion of Clym preaching on the heath reinforces this idea.  
Clym modifies his culture scheme, becoming a itinerant preacher.  Although he has 
learned enough to speak “in simple language on Blackbarrow and in the upland 
hamlets around” and “in a more cultivated strain elsewhere,” as well as to abandon 
“set creeds and systems of philosophy,” this does not mean he is able to alter his 
community (396).  “Some believed him, and some believed not; some said that his 
words were commonplace, others complained of his want of spiritual doctrine; while 
others again remarked that it was well enough for a man to take to preaching who 
could not see to do anything else.”  In other words, just when Clym seems to be rising 
above his circumstances into a kind of transhistorical figure, our knowledge of his 
reception firmly wrenches him back into his concrete situation within his particular 
community. 
 As I’ve argued, the effects generated by The Return of the Native are produced 
through the juxtaposition of different perspectives, through different ways of viewing 
particular events, people and scenes.  The novel accomplishes this both through its use 
of free indirect discourse and through the structure of the plot, which work together to 
attune the reader to a proper perspective.  This final image of Clym on Blackbarrow, 
surrounded by listeners, is set against the opening image of the novel, that of Eustacia 
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standing atop Blackbarrow.  Perceived by the hypothetical “imaginative stranger” 
invoked by the narrator, the vision of Eustacia atop the barrow is “strangely 
homogenous”:  “the vale, the upland, the barrow, and the figure above it, all these 
amounted only to unity,” as the “form was so much like an organic part of this entire 
motionless structure” (17).  Although the stranger to Egdon Heath might see 
Eustacia’s relationship to the heath as one of organic unity, it is in truth a false unity.  
Eusticia, of course, flees the barrow when the other Egdonites approach, and the true 
conflict in the novel is not that of humankind against the natural world, but rather that 
of individuals in a particular community.  To those like the reader who become 
acquainted with the community of Egdon during the course of the novel, the proper 
image of unity is that of Clym as a member of the community at the novel’s close—an 
image of unity that is not “organic,” but rather tenuous and ambivalent.  In The Return 
of the Native, Hardy does not put his characters in an ill-conceived world in order to 
torture them (as Eustacia suggests); rather, he places them in a social milieu for which 
they are ill-suited.  The consequences that result are certainly tragic, but that tragedy 
attunes the reader to a proper historicist perspective.  Like Clym’s view of those dyed 
barbarians, we “almost live among” the characters, but simultaneously appreciate 
those unforeseen factors that operate in the evolution of their immortality.  
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CONCLUSION 
Implications of Improbable Realism 
 
 
 
 One of the insights that launched this dissertation was the recognition that 
coincidence is productive for the realist enterprise because improbable events often 
force a confrontation between perceived notions of the world and the world as it is.  
Precisely through defying the everyday, coincidences in novels often grab the 
attention of readers and characters alike and enable them to perceive structures that, as 
Hardy notes, “might possibly be observed, but would more probably be overlooked.”  
Just as coincidences disclose discrepancies between the expected and the real, they 
reveal—as I have demonstrated—conflicts between critical expectations and the 
workings of realist narratives.  Coincidence is a site where some of our most codified 
assumptions about literary realism come up against the reality of texts themselves.  
The broader goal of this dissertation has been to reevaluate the relationship between 
realism and probability in a manner more attuned to the workings of novel as they are 
(rather than according to novels as we think they ought to be).  In large part, this has 
necessitated focusing attention on individual novels in order to analyze the function of 
coincidence.  Nevertheless, broader theoretical and methodological claims have come 
into view as these individuals readings have progressed.  This brief conclusion 
attempts to articulate more clearly these broader claims, as well as to define some of 
the implications of improbable realism for the study of narrative and the novel.  The 
following list is by no means exhaustive, although the following four areas represent 
some of the most important contributions this dissertation makes to the study of 
narrative. 
 
 
 
182 
 
● Throughout this dissertation, I have described the ways in which coincidence is 
utilized as a realist technique, focusing on how it contributes to what I have called the 
historicizing impulse of the realist novel.  This analysis substantiated my critique of 
probable realism, which I made in the Introduction, and in doing so supported the 
notion of “improbable realism” that I have developed.  Although I have shown that a 
number of important authors in the realist canon harness coincidence for realist ends, 
it is worth indicating the exact scope of the claim I am making about coincidence.  Put 
simply:  while I have shown the importance of coincidence to the realist techniques of 
Fielding, Scott, Dickens and Hardy, I am by no means claiming that coincidence 
performs a similar function in other authors.  One of my consistent targets throughout 
this dissertation has been generalizing claims critics have made about coincidence, 
such as Brian Richardson’s claim that “fortunate coincidences are equally excluded 
[from nineteenth-century realism] so that the extensive effects of social and biological 
forces can be shown in all their complexity and self-sufficiency” (Unlikely Stories 41), 
or Marie-Laure Ryan’s categorization of coincidence as among those devices which 
seem “to be borrowed ready-made from a bag of tricks and whose function for the plot 
as a whole is too obvious” (“Cheap Plot Tricks” 57).  Although these claims are not 
made without some authority, the move toward abstraction or generalization causes 
significant methodological problems.  It is worth noting, then, that even though 
coincidence is often harnessed for realist ends, this should in no way be taken for a 
more general claim that can be simplistically applied to other texts.  In the end, our 
understanding of the function of coincidence and other improbabilities must be guided 
by the text in question.  Just as coincidence sometimes directs our attention to 
relationships between social forces and individual agency (as I have shown), 
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sometimes it directs us to the author’s belief in providential design, and sometimes it 
is best classified as a “cheap plot trick.” 
  
● Although our understanding of narrative devices such as coincidence must 
ultimately be answerable to the workings of individual texts, this does not 
simultaneously mean that we must abandon broader conceptualizations or 
theorizations of realist practice.  In other words, I have argued that applying 
assumptions about an undifferentiated conception of “realism” to a broad range of 
texts has caused a serious misunderstanding of the function of coincidence in 
particular authors, but it does not follow that I am advocating some kind of 
nominalism which would require us to speak of realism only as it is practiced by 
particular writers in particular works.  Nor would I argue that simply falling back on 
the habit of speaking of “realisms” is sufficient.  What is required—both 
methodologically and pedagogically—is a more pliable notion of realism, one that is 
attentive to the practices and techniques of particular writers but also able to speak of 
specific trajectories or genealogies of realist practice.  In the Introduction, I noted that 
each of the authors I discuss in the dissertation has been regarded as somehow 
deficient in relation to a respective contemporary.  What I meant, of course, was that if 
we take the works of George Eliot as representative of realism, then Dickens’s specific 
techniques will necessarily appear odd, if not downright amateurish.  I have returned 
to this problem in passing, such as in Chapter Four, when I suggested that examining 
Hardy’s use of free indirect discourse in relation to how it is employed by Henry 
James will force us to make certain (deprecatory) judgments about Hardy’s 
techniques.  What this implies is that when we speak of realism in the context of 
James, we mean—or at least we ought to mean—something quite different than when 
we speak of realism in the context of Hardy.  However, my examination of 
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coincidence has also shown that there are definite and specifiable continuities between 
the aesthetics or realist practices of different authors.  Therefore, narrative devices 
such as coincidence (or intrusive narrators, or free indirect discourse) not only compel 
us to complicate univocal notions of realism, but once we do so they also enable us to 
reconstruct patterns or trajectories of realist practice. 
 
● This, in turn, suggests the desirability, or even pragmatic necessity, of uniting 
historicist and formalist approaches to narrative and the novel.  As I’ve argued since 
the beginning of this dissertation, the dominantly negative view of coincidence in 
critical practice can be seen as a consequence of formalist approaches to the novel, 
which maintain rigid conceptions of realism and insist on evaluative categorization of 
narrative devices.  Marie-Laure Ryan’s recent categorization of coincidence as a 
“cheap plot trick” exemplifies and is the logical endpoint of this approach.  Purely 
narratological approaches to the realist novel overlook, in their insistence on universal 
elements of narrative, fine distinctions and nuances across historical developments.  At 
a certain point, a move toward the general or universal inhibits our perception of the 
particular.  To provide just one example, the narratological treatment of coincidence 
fails to recognize what Franco Moretti, developing Bakhtin’s concept of the 
chronotrope, makes clear:  that “each genre possesses its own space [...] and each 
space its own genre.”157  In other words, to treat a coincidental encounter in a 
sixteenth-century romance as qualitatively similar to a coincidence that occurs in the 
heart of nineteenth-century London overlooks the different historical spaces in which 
those coincidences occur.  As I argued in Chapter Three, Dickens’s use of coincidence 
in Martin Chuzzlewit has very much to do with the historical space which the novel 
represents.  However, just as Dickens’s use of coincidence illustrates limitations of 
                                                 
157 Atlas of the European Novel 1800-1900.  London: Verso, 1998.  Page 35, emphasis in original.   
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purely formalist approaches to narrative, it also illustrates the limitations of historicist 
approaches to the novel form.  Appreciating the serial form of Dickens’s novels helps 
us to see how his use of coincidence originated, at least in part, as a response to the 
material conditions of production.  At the same time, however, to limit our 
understanding of coincidence to merely a response to serialization causes us to 
overlook how Dickens began to understand how he could utilize coincidence in the 
service of his realist aims.  In a similar manner, although chance attains a new 
philosophical importance in nineteenth-century thought, it would be a mistake to move 
in a simplistic manner from this broader cultural meaning of chance to its function in 
Hardy.  As I argued in Chapter One, the importance of “accidents” in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century cultural milieu helps us to identify the potential significance of 
Fielding’s persistent use of the term in Tom Jones, but that significance can only be 
fully understood through an analysis of how accidents contribute to the form of the 
novel.  
 
● Finally, this reconsideration of aspects of nineteenth-century realism suggests 
the need to better account for the ways in which our current understanding of the 
nineteenth-century novel and its modes of representation has been shaped by early 
twentieth-century critical responses.  The first “critics” of the nineteenth-century 
novel, in other words, were those writers penning novels of their own in the early 
decades of the twentieth century.  While it is by no means a novel insight to realize 
that writers are frequently responding to those of the previous generation(s), my 
exploration of coincidence has shown the great degree to which our current view of 
nineteenth-century modes of representation and emplotment are still informed by the 
aesthetic principles of literary modernism.  The fact that we can hear the voices of 
Sinclair Lewis, Henry James, and E.M. Forster in current discussions of nineteenth-
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century realism suggests that the influence of our critical heritage on our reading 
practices ought to be tempered by a fresh look at the texts under consideration.  Just as 
Alex Woloch’s recent reconsideration of characterization in the novel has attempted to 
move us beyond debates about character which had their origins in the critical writings 
of Forster and Virginia Woolf, more work needs to be done to establish conceptual 
frameworks that enable us to understand and appreciate texts on the terms they 
themselves present.158  My reconsideration of the relationship between realism and 
probability has been an attempt to do just that—to show that for too long we’ve been 
evaluating realist novels from the likes of Fielding and Dickens in terms of something 
they never claimed to be.   
                                                 
158 See Woloch, The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003).  In mentioning Forster and Woolf, I have in mind Forster’s 
still widely used distinction between flat and round characters in Aspects of the Novel and Woolf’s 
influential essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” [Collected Essays: Volume I (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1980), pgs. 319-337]. 
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